Harold Wayne Gibson, and wife, Sylvia Gibson, v. Kit G. McGlothlin, D/B/A Kit McGlothlin Builders, Inc., et al.
03A01-9601-CH-00019
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman

This is an action for damages for breach of a construction contract and of an implied warranty of good workmanship and materials and for negligent construction.

Herman Davis and wife, Darnell Davis, v. Paul A. Hatcher, Sr., M.D.
03A01-9601-CV-00016
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman

This malpractice action was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. It arose from a routine prostate resection which went awry, resulting in adverse consequences to the plaintiff. A device referred to as a resectoscope manufactured by the Circon ACMI Ohio Manufacturing Company,1 malfunctioned while being used by and under the control of the defendant, Dr. Paul Hatcher [hereafter, the “defendant”]. It is not disputed that a portion of the penis of the plaintiff, Herman
Davis [hereafter, “plaintiff”], was either chemically, thermally or electrically burned away, with disastrous results unnecessary here to be recounted.

Herman Davis and wife, Darnell Davis, v. Paul A. Hatcher, Sr., M.D.
03A01-9601-CV-00016
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman

This malpractice action was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. It arose from a routine prostate resection which went awry, resulting in adverse consequences to the plaintiff. A device referred to as a resectoscope manufactured by the Circon ACMI Ohio Manufacturing Company,1 malfunctioned while being used by and under the control of the defendant, Dr. Paul Hatcher [hereafter, the “defendant”]. It is not disputed that a portion of the penis of the plaintiff, Herman Davis [hereafter, “plaintiff”], was either chemically, thermally or electrically burned away, with disastrous results unnecessary here to be recounted.

William Bland and Lena Bland, v. Allstate Insurance Company
02A01-9412-CV-00273
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert A. Lanier

This is a suit brought by William Bland (Bland) against Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) for breach of contract for failure to pay a claim under his homeowner’s insurance policy. At trial, the jury found for Bland and awarded him damages under the insurance contract for the loss of his home and its contents due to a fire. Allstate argued at trial that material misrepresentations on the application, as a matter of law, warranted Allstate’s decision to void Bland’s policy ab initio. Allstate appeals the denial of its motion for directed verdict and alleges error in a number of the jury instructions. We affirm the trial court.

Henry County Medical Center, v. Henry Gronski, M.D.
02A01-9412-CV-00279
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed Mcginley

This is a breach of contract action brought by Henry County Medical Center (HCMC) against Henry Gronski, M.D. (Gronski). In response, Gronski admitted the amounts owed to HCMC under the contract but claimed that he was owed a larger amount as set-off. The trial court awarded HCMC a judgment of $44,900.40 on the contract and awarded Gronski $56,204 as set-off. The court also ordered HCMC to pay Gronski's attorney's fees and accountant fees. HCMC appeals the court’s award of set-off to Gronski as well as the award of attorney’s and accountant fees. We affirm the trial court on all issues.

Charles E . Carey v. Carolina Freight Carriers
02S01-9506-CH-00050
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its appeal, the employer contends that the evidence does not support the trial court's award of seventy percent (7%) to the lower extremity and that the trial court erred in computing the employee's average weekly wage at $273. instead of $22.21 per week. The panel concludes that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's assessment of permanent disability and modifies th e award to thirty-five percen t (35%) to the lower e xtremity. Prope rly computed, the employee's average weekly wage is $22.21 per week. Charles E. Carey ("Carey") was injured on December 27, 1991, when a bank vault weighing five hundred pounds fell off a fork lift and struck the front part of his left thigh. He was initially treated by Dr. R. Michael Cobb, an orthopedic surgeon, who suspected a torn ligament in Carey's knee. Dr. Cobb later concluded, however, that the ligament was not torn and that surgery was not needed. In February, 1992, Carey began to complain of numbness in his toes, although Dr. Cobb was unable to find any indication of injury to the sciatic nerve, which provides feeling to the toes. Carey was given a note to return to work on March 1, 1992. Upon examination on March 16, 1992, Carey's range of motion was excellent and his strength appeared to be normal. He advised Dr. Cobb that he was hav ing no pro blem at w ork. A ne rve cond uction study, pe rformed as a result of the c ompla ints of to e num bness, s howe d no sig n of inju ry to the sc iatic nerv e. Carey was given no permanent physical anatomical impairment and was discharged from Dr. Cobb's care on March 16, 1992. When he returned to work in March, Carey performed the same duties that 2

Charles E . Carey v. Carolina Freight Carriers
02S01-9506-CH-00050
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its appeal, the employer contends that the evidence does not support the trial court's award of seventy percent (7%) to the lower extremity and that the trial court erred in computing the employee's average weekly wage at $273. instead of $22.21 per week. The panel concludes that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's assessment of permanent disability and modifies th e award to thirty-five percen t (35%) to the lower e xtremity. Prope rly computed, the employee's average weekly wage is $22.21 per week. Charles E. Carey ("Carey") was injured on December 27, 1991, when a bank vault weighing five hundred pounds fell off a fork lift and struck the front part of his left thigh. He was initially treated by Dr. R. Michael Cobb, an orthopedic surgeon, who suspected a torn ligament in Carey's knee. Dr. Cobb later concluded, however, that the ligament was not torn and that surgery was not needed. In February, 1992, Carey began to complain of numbness in his toes, although Dr. Cobb was unable to find any indication of injury to the sciatic nerve, which provides feeling to the toes. Carey was given a note to return to work on March 1, 1992. Upon examination on March 16, 1992, Carey's range of motion was excellent and his strength appeared to be normal. He advised Dr. Cobb that he was hav ing no pro blem at w ork. A ne rve cond uction study, pe rformed as a result of the c ompla ints of to e num bness, s howe d no sig n of inju ry to the sc iatic nerv e. Carey was given no permanent physical anatomical impairment and was discharged from Dr. Cobb's care on March 16, 1992. When he returned to work in March, Carey performed the same duties that 2

John Ivory, Jr. v. Emerson Motor Company
02S01-9505-CH-00042
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. George Ellis,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Our scope of review of findings of fact by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn.Code Ann. _ 5-6-22 5(e)(2). The employee contends the trial court erred in: 1. Failing to assign perman ent partial disability to the right arm as opposed to the right hand; and 2. Limiting the award o f perman ent partial disab ility benefits to 55% to the right hand. We affirm the trial court in all respects. The plain tiff, John Ivo ry, Jr., ("Ivory") is 25 years o f age with an eleven th grade education. He received a G.E.D and successfully completed Job Corps training in brick masonry. His previous work experience included upholstering furniture, w orking as a construction laborer and as a produ ction line w orker at a chee se fa ctor y. On August 15, 1992, Ivory was repairing a die cast machine for Emerson Motor Company when the machine activated, injuring the fingers of his right hand. Ivory was treated by Dr. Frederick Torstrick, an orthopedic surgeon, for crush injuries to the index, long and ring fingers, fractures to the index and ring fingers, and longitudinal lacerations to the top and bottom of his hand. A later surgical procedure performed to improve movement required incisions in each of the injured fingers, the removal of adhesions between the tendon and underlying bone and cutting of some of the tissues of the capsule of the joints. Ivory was referred to a work ha rdening p rogram w here there w as some q uestion of h is coope ration. 2

John Ivory, Jr. v. Emerson Motor Company
02S01-9505-CH-00042
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. George Ellis,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Our scope of review of findings of fact by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn.Code Ann. _ 5-6-22 5(e)(2). The employee contends the trial court erred in: 1. Failing to assign perman ent partial disability to the right arm as opposed to the right hand; and 2. Limiting the award o f perman ent partial disab ility benefits to 55% to the right hand. We affirm the trial court in all respects. The plain tiff, John Ivo ry, Jr., ("Ivory") is 25 years o f age with an eleven th grade education. He received a G.E.D and successfully completed Job Corps training in brick masonry. His previous work experience included upholstering furniture, w orking as a construction laborer and as a produ ction line w orker at a chee se fa ctor y. On August 15, 1992, Ivory was repairing a die cast machine for Emerson Motor Company when the machine activated, injuring the fingers of his right hand. Ivory was treated by Dr. Frederick Torstrick, an orthopedic surgeon, for crush injuries to the index, long and ring fingers, fractures to the index and ring fingers, and longitudinal lacerations to the top and bottom of his hand. A later surgical procedure performed to improve movement required incisions in each of the injured fingers, the removal of adhesions between the tendon and underlying bone and cutting of some of the tissues of the capsule of the joints. Ivory was referred to a work ha rdening p rogram w here there w as some q uestion of h is coope ration. 2

Jimmy Johnson v. WaUSAu Insurance Company
02S01-9601-CH-00008
Authoring Judge: Hewitt P. Tomlin, Jr., Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. William Michael Maloan
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court, in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Jimmy Johnson ("plaintiff") has appealed the trial court's dismissal of his suit for workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that plaintiff failed to prove that he sustained an injury arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment by preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff was employed by Gurien Finishing Corporation ("Gurien"), who was insured by defendant, Wausau Insurance Company. For the foregoing reasons, we find no error and affirm. Plaintiff was employed at Gurien as a washer operator as part of Gurien's manufacturing process of stonewashed jeans. Plaintiff alleges that on August 1, 1993, he injured his lower back while pulling open a washer door that had been jammed with a rock. He stated that he did not report the injury at the time of the accident because it felt more like a cramp. When he woke up in pain the following morning, plaintiff testified that he reported the accident to his shift manager, Cindy Long. He stated that he advised Long that he hurt himself jerking on a washer door. Plaintiff was treated by his personal physician, Dr. Philip Sherman, on August 16, 1993. He gave Dr. Sherman a history of hurting his back while pulling machines at work. Plaintiff complained to Dr. Sherman of low back pain with some pain radiating into his legs, with the pain being worse in his left leg than his right. Dr. Sherman diagnosed pl aintiff as suffering from lumbosacral strain and prescribed pain medication. In November 1993 plaintiff returned to Dr. Sherman with compl aints of 2

Jimmy Johnson v. WaUSAu Insurance Company
02S01-9601-CH-00008
Authoring Judge: Hewitt P. Tomlin, Jr., Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. William Michael Maloan,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court, in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Jimmy Johnson ("plaintiff") has appealed the trial court's dismissal of his suit for workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that plaintiff failed to prove that he sustained an injury arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment by preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff was employed by Gurien Finishing Corporation ("Gurien"), who was insured by defendant, Wausau Insurance Company. For the foregoing reasons, we find no error and affirm. Plaintiff was employed at Gurien as a washer operator as part of Gurien's manufacturing process of stonewashed jeans. Plaintiff alleges that on August 1, 1993, he injured his lower back while pulling open a washer door that had been jammed with a rock. He stated that he did not report the injury at the time of the accident because it felt more like a cramp. When he woke up in pain the following morning, plaintiff testified that he reported the accident to his shift manager, Cindy Long. He stated that he advised Long that he hurt himself jerking on a washer door. Plaintiff was treated by his personal physician, Dr. Philip Sherman, on August 16, 1993. He gave Dr. Sherman a history of hurting his back while pulling machines at work. Plaintiff complained to Dr. Sherman of low back pain with some pain radiating into his legs, with the pain being worse in his left leg than his right. Dr. Sherman diagnosed pl aintiff as suffering from lumbosacral strain and prescribed pain medication. In November 1993 plaintiff returned to Dr. Sherman with compl aints of 2

Mark Anthony Parker v. National Surety Corporation
02S01-9601-CH-00004
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Mark Anthony Parker
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case the first employer appeals the ruling of the trial court that the injury occurred during his term of employment with the first employer. The trial court found no second injury after April 1 and awarded benefits against the first employer. The second issue is raised by Appellant to the awarding of 4% to each arm. We affirm the findings of the trial court. The Plaintiff's carpal tunnel symptoms began in the right hand "at the beginning of the 9's." (T. at 24). The left hand became symptomatic "a year or so later." (T. P. 25). His symptoms became worse with time. (T.P. 25). "Q. . . .(t)hat you went to the doctor finally when it got so bad that you couldn't stand it. Is that correct? A. Yes, ma'am." (T. P. 39). "Q. . . .(t)hat was while you were working for the first employer? A. Yes, ma'am." (T. P. 39). The Plaintiff had a conversation with the second employer's representative a few days before the second employer became responsible and reported a work related injury while working for the first employer. (T. P. 4). The complaint here was filed alleging a February 1994 injury. The second employer took over on April 1, 1994. The employee further testified that, "Q Activities caused you to experience pain in your hands? 1

Mark Anthony Parker v. National Surety Corporation
02S01-9601-CH-00004
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Mark Anthony Parker
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case the first employer appeals the ruling of the trial court that the injury occurred during his term of employment with the first employer. The trial court found no second injury after April 1 and awarded benefits against the first employer. The second issue is raised by Appellant to the awarding of 4% to each arm. We affirm the findings of the trial court. The Plaintiff's carpal tunnel symptoms began in the right hand "at the beginning of the 9's." (T. at 24). The left hand became symptomatic "a year or so later." (T. P. 25). His symptoms became worse with time. (T.P. 25). "Q. . . .(t)hat you went to the doctor finally when it got so bad that you couldn't stand it. Is that correct? A. Yes, ma'am." (T. P. 39). "Q. . . .(t)hat was while you were working for the first employer? A. Yes, ma'am." (T. P. 39). The Plaintiff had a conversation with the second employer's representative a few days before the second employer became responsible and reported a work related injury while working for the first employer. (T. P. 4). The complaint here was filed alleging a February 1994 injury. The second employer took over on April 1, 1994. The employee further testified that, "Q Activities caused you to experience pain in your hands? 1

Joseph Tyree Glanton, v. Brenda Richardson Glanton (Cherry)
01A01-9601-PB-00013
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

This appeal involves a post-divorce contempt proceeding. The appellant, Mrs. Brenda Cherry, filed an unverified complaint in the Probate Court for Davidson County seeking to recover unpaid child support from her former husband, Mr. Songoleke Kurante Kotunu (formerly Joseph Tyree Glanton). Mr. Kotunu filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing the Complaint was defective since Mrs. Cherry had not verified it. The probate court agreed with Mr. Kotunu, and dismissed Mrs. Cherry’s suit. The court also awarded Mr. Kotunu his attorneys fees. Mrs. Cherry asserts on appeal that the probate court erred by requiring her to have verified her complaint, and in granting Mr. Kotunu’s attorneys fees. We partially disagree with Mrs. Cherry, and therefore affirm the probate court in part.

Douglas E. Samuelson, as the Natural Father and Personal Representative of Kevin L. Samuelson, v. Cecil E. McMurtry, M.D., et al.
01A01-9602-CV-00060
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

In this wrongful death case we have determined that when the plaintiffappellant accepted a jury verdict finding the decedent was forty-nine percent at fault, that finding became binding in the appeal of the trial judge’s action in dismissing another defendant on the day of the trial. We, therefore, pretermit the issues raised by the appellant and affirm the judgment below.

Douglas E. Samuelson and Kevin L. Samuelson v.Cecil E. McMurtry, M.D., et. al. - Dissenting
01-A-01-9602-CV-00060
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.

This appeal involves one of the central principles of our comparative fault system - that all persons involved in an occurrence giving rise to injury or damages should have their rights and liabilities determined in one action. Douglas Samuelson perfected this appeal solely to obtain appellate review  of the summary dismissal of his malpractice claim against one of  several defendants on the day of trial. Rather than deciding this question, the majority has decided that the jury’s verdict with regard to the remaining parties somehow forecloses Mr. Samuelson from ever obtaining relief from the defendant who was removed from the case even before the trial started. I cannot agree with this decision.

Allen E. Cole, v. Tennessee Board of Paroles
01A01-9605-CH-00216
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert S. Brandt

This is an appeal by petitioner, Allen B. Cole, from the judgment of the Chancery Court of Davidson County granting the motion to dismiss of respondent, the Tennessee Board of Paroles ("the Board").

Allen B. Cole, v. Tennessee Board of Paroles
01A01-9605-CH-00216
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.

Even though I concur completely with Judge Lewis’s opinion, I have prepared this separate opinion to elaborate further on the procedure whereby a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is converted to a motion for summary judgment. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) requires this conversion whenever “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the [trial] court.”

Afsoon Vafaie (formerly) Jane Doe, v. Walter R. Owens, III and wife, Cheryl Roberts Owens
01A01-9510-CV-00472
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

In this case, Plaintiff-Appellant, Dr. Afsoon Vafaie Elmore, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee, Dr. Walter R. Owens, III, with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Owens for assault, malicious harassment and civil conspiracy. Plaintiff also appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee, Cheryl Roberts Owens as to Plaintiff’s claims against Mrs. Owens for assault, malicious harassment, outrageous conduct and civil conspiracy. Plaintiff further appeals certain evidentiary rulings made by the trial court during the course of Plaintiff’s jury trial against Dr. Owens in which the Plaintiff sought to recover damages for severe emotional distress, arising from the alleged outrageous conduct of Dr. JuOwens.

State of Tennessee v. Gary Harris
03C01-9510-CC-00319
Authoring Judge: Judge Paul G. Summers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

A jury found Gary Harris guilty of manufacturing marijuana in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated 39-17-417. Harris appeals and presents the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction; and
II. Whether the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence.

We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Alfred B. Rollins, et al. - Concurring
01C01-9304-CR-1282
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion. I write separately, though, to express my strong belief that the appellant’s conduct in this case is free of any blame, given the context of the question in issue. In this respect, whether I or anyone else would have found a more circumspect way to prove the point or make a record is largely irrelevant. Likewise, whether all the evidence -- viewed in hindsight -- actually proved the points sought to be proved relative to the appellant’s question is largely irrelevant.

Gary Allen Ferrell v. Batesville Casket Company
01S01-9512-CV-00218
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Gerald L. Ewell, Sr.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff appeals this ruling. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff reported problems with swelling, pain and numbness in his right arm to his supervisor in June or July 1991. These problems occurred after using a pneumatic sander at work which plaintiff alleged was defective. He went to the company doctor about a week after he reported these problems to his employer. The company doctor advised him that his problems with his right arm were the result of his use of the pneumatic sander and further advised him to forever avoid using vibrating tools with his right hand. Plaintiff continued to have the same problems with his right arm and experienced exacerbations of his pain whenever he used a vibrating tool. He continued to see physicians, by referral from defendants and on his own. No proof was offered as to whether the defendants had paid any medical expenses for the plaintiff in relation to his alleged injury within a year of his filing this complaint in March 21, 1994. The trial judge held that there was no question in the court's mind that the plaintiff had known since June/July 1991 that he had a work-related injury and that the action was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Our review is de novo on the record, accompanied by the presumption that the factual findings of the trial court are correct. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2). TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-23 provides: The right to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law shall be forever barred, unless within one (1) year after the accident resulting in injury . . . occurred the notice required by _ 5-6-22 is given the employer and a claim for compensation under the provisions of this chapter is filed with the tribunal having jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter; provided, that if 2

Gary Allen Ferrell v. Batesville Casket Company
01S01-9512-CV-00218
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Gerald L. Ewell, Sr., Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff appeals this ruling. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff reported problems with swelling, pain and numbness in his right arm to his supervisor in June or July 1991. These problems occurred after using a pneumatic sander at work which plaintiff alleged was defective. He went to the company doctor about a week after he reported these problems to his employer. The company doctor advised him that his problems with his right arm were the result of his use of the pneumatic sander and further advised him to forever avoid using vibrating tools with his right hand. Plaintiff continued to have the same problems with his right arm and experienced exacerbations of his pain whenever he used a vibrating tool. He continued to see physicians, by referral from defendants and on his own. No proof was offered as to whether the defendants had paid any medical expenses for the plaintiff in relation to his alleged injury within a year of his filing this complaint in March 21, 1994. The trial judge held that there was no question in the court's mind that the plaintiff had known since June/July 1991 that he had a work-related injury and that the action was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Our review is de novo on the record, accompanied by the presumption that the factual findings of the trial court are correct. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2). TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-23 provides: The right to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law shall be forever barred, unless within one (1) year after the accident resulting in injury . . . occurred the notice required by _ 5-6-22 is given the employer and a claim for compensation under the provisions of this chapter is filed with the tribunal having jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter; provided, that if 2

Woodrow Cecil Foster v. Coffee County Highway Department and Coffee County, Tennessee
01S01-9512-CH-00232
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Retired Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John W. Rollins,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer questions the trial court's conclusion that the claim is not barred by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5- 6- 23, a one year statute of limitation. The employer also contends the award of permanent partial disability benefits based on forty-five percent to the body as a whole is excessive. This panel finds that the judgment should be affirmed. The action was commencedby the employee or claimant, Woodrow C. Foster, by the filing of a complaint on March 6, 1991, against the employer, Coffee County Highway Department and Coffee County, Tennessee, seeking workers' compensation benefits for injuries occurring in 1986 and 1987. The defendants served an answer raising the affirmative defense that the claim was barred by the above statute of limitation. Our review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2) (1992). We accept the chancellor's relevant findings of fact as follows: "The plaintiff was a 59 year old male with a tenth grade education who, for the most part, had spent his adult life either driving a truck or loading and unloading a truck with short periods of employment as a carpenter's helper and working at a service station. Mr. Foster testified that in March, 1986, while changing a flat tire, he thought he 'broke his back,' that he went to a doctor who put a corset on him for two weeks and told him he had a 'pulled muscle.' Plaintiff went back to work and testified that he thought (the 'pulled muscle') was the only condition for which he suffered any discomfort. Plaintiff testified that in 199 he saw a doctor because his back continued to hurt. He saw Dr. Robison and Dr. Jekot, who asked him to return for another appointment but he did not let him return to work without seeing a neurosurgeon. He went to see Dr. Verne Allen...(who) performed an MRI that showed a bulging disc...(for which) he ultimately had surgery.... Plaintiff testified that he went back to work after surgery. He was off work approximately two months, but despite being given no restrictions as a result of the surgery he has constant pain out of the left side of his back and down his leg, that he presently takes steroids and walks to try to stay limber although he continues to hurt. Plaintiff testified that he continues to try to perform his job as a truck driver with the defendant Highway Department." An action by an employee to recover workers' compensation benefits for an accidental injury must be commenced within one year after the occurrence of the injury. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-224(1). However, if within such one year period the employer or its insurer makes voluntary payment of benefits, the action may be commenced within one year after the cessation of benefits. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-23. 2

Woodrow Cecil Foster v. Coffee County Highway Department and Coffee County, Tennessee
01S01-9512-CH-00232
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Retired Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John W. Rollins,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer questions the trial court's conclusion that the claim is not barred by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5- 6- 23, a one year statute of limitation. The employer also contends the award of permanent partial disability benefits based on forty-five percent to the body as a whole is excessive. This panel finds that the judgment should be affirmed. The action was commencedby the employee or claimant, Woodrow C. Foster, by the filing of a complaint on March 6, 1991, against the employer, Coffee County Highway Department and Coffee County, Tennessee, seeking workers' compensation benefits for injuries occurring in 1986 and 1987. The defendants served an answer raising the affirmative defense that the claim was barred by the above statute of limitation. Our review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2) (1992). We accept the chancellor's relevant findings of fact as follows: "The plaintiff was a 59 year old male with a tenth grade education who, for the most part, had spent his adult life either driving a truck or loading and unloading a truck with short periods of employment as a carpenter's helper and working at a service station. Mr. Foster testified that in March, 1986, while changing a flat tire, he thought he 'broke his back,' that he went to a doctor who put a corset on him for two weeks and told him he had a 'pulled muscle.' Plaintiff went back to work and testified that he thought (the 'pulled muscle') was the only condition for which he suffered any discomfort. Plaintiff testified that in 199 he saw a doctor because his back continued to hurt. He saw Dr. Robison and Dr. Jekot, who asked him to return for another appointment but he did not let him return to work without seeing a neurosurgeon. He went to see Dr. Verne Allen...(who) performed an MRI that showed a bulging disc...(for which) he ultimately had surgery.... Plaintiff testified that he went back to work after surgery. He was off work approximately two months, but despite being given no restrictions as a result of the surgery he has constant pain out of the left side of his back and down his leg, that he presently takes steroids and walks to try to stay limber although he continues to hurt. Plaintiff testified that he continues to try to perform his job as a truck driver with the defendant Highway Department." An action by an employee to recover workers' compensation benefits for an accidental injury must be commenced within one year after the occurrence of the injury. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-224(1). However, if within such one year period the employer or its insurer makes voluntary payment of benefits, the action may be commenced within one year after the cessation of benefits. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-23. 2