William Acree Ex Rel. John D. Acree v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County
This appeal arises from an action in tort against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Tennessee (“the Metropolitan Government”) as the sole defendant. The action is brought by the brother on behalf of the decedent who died after being shot by police officers employed by the Metropolitan Government. The plaintiff asserts that the Metropolitan Government owed a special duty of care to the decedent because the police officers were reckless by failing to conduct a reasonable investigation concerning the decedent’s mental health before attempting to serve a felony warrant. Moreover, the plaintiff asserts that police officers failed to abide by internal police department guidelines pursuant to which, the complaint alleges, the officers should have withdrawn from the area before the decedent exited the rear door of his house pointing a handgun at police officers. The undisputed material facts are that when the officers attempted to serve the decedent at his residence, the decedent refused to respond to the officers at the front door of his residence and, instead, abruptly exited through the rear door armed with a loaded handgun where the decedent and one of the police officers exchanged gunfire, resulting in the death of the decedent. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint under the Governmental Tort Liability Act finding, inter alia, that the police officers owed a general duty to the public at large when serving the felony capias; the internal policies and procedures of the Metropolitan Police Department did not establish a duty enforceable in tort; there were no genuine issues of material fact to show the police officers acted recklessly, thus the special duty exception to the public duty doctrine did not apply; and because the special duty doctrine did not apply, the police officers and the Metropolitan Government were immune from liability. The trial court also found the claim was barred by the doctrine of comparative fault based on the undisputed fact that the decedent was at least 50% at fault for his injuries and death because he aimed a loaded weapon at the police officer before the officer opened fire. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anne Frost Montgomery Renner v. Robert Bruce Renner, Sr.
Movant, defendant in a divorce case, seeks accelerated review of the denial of his motion for recusal. He claims a lack of impartiality on the part of the chancellor presiding over the divorce case due to her knowledge of unrelated litigation in which the movant was a party. He contends that the chancellor revealed her lack of impartiality in making adverse credibility determinations against movant, determining movant violated a statutory injunction, and ignoring prior orders and agreements of the parties in making factual findings. Movant also complains of the manner in which the chancellor conducted an emergency hearing, alleging that the chancellor “lacked patience and cooperation with the litigants on th[at] day.” After a de novo review, we affirm the denial of the motion for recusal. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Jeff Robinson v. Cody Haynes Et Al.
This is an appeal from a case involving a contract for the sale of real property. The Trial Court disposed of some of the claims by granting summary judgment. Other claims were dismissed or voluntarily non-suited, and the Trial Court attempted to render its judgment final by citing to Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The Trial Court, however, reserved disposition of a petition for attorney’s fees and an amended petition for attorney’s fees. As a result of the reservation of the disposition of the petitions for attorney’s fees there is no final judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Denton Jones
The State of Tennessee appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of its motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The State sought to correct the six-year sentence the trial court previously imposed for the Defendant’s two merged convictions for theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (2014) (theft); 39-14-105 (2014) (subsequently amended) (grading of theft). On appeal, the State contends that the six-year sentence is illegal because the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant pursuant to the amended version of the grading of theft statute, which became effective after the commission of the offense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Courtney B. Mathews v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Courtney B. Mathews, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury convictions for four counts of first-degree felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner’s issues center around (1) an ex parte communication between the trial judge and trial counsel that took place at the trial judge’s residence; (2) trial counsels’ inadvertent disclosure of the unredacted timeline to the co-defendant’s defense team that contained attorney-client privileged information; (3) the lack of any jury instructions on lesser-included offenses for the felony murder counts; (4) the Petitioner’s alleged absence during the issuance of the supplemental jury instruction on criminal responsibility and when the trial judge answered jury questions; and (5) cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court. We conclude that due to trial counsels’ various deficiencies, there has been a complete breakdown in the adversarial process during the Petitioner’s motion for new trial proceedings. While the Petitioner’s convictions remain intact, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chriteris Allen
The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Chriteris Allen, in two separate indictments, each containing four counts. In Case Number 18-1445, Defendant was indicted for aggravated robbery in count one, aggravated sexual battery in count two, aggravated burglary in count three, and especially aggravated kidnapping in count four. In Case Number 18-1446, Defendant was indicted for aggravated burglary in count one, especially aggravated kidnapping in count two, aggravated robbery in count three, and aggravated rape in count four. Defendant submitted an open guilty plea on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of forty-four years at one hundred percent. On appeal, Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. City of Memphis, et al.
Appellants appeal the trial court’s grant of Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motions in this declaratory judgment action. The trial court dismissed Appellants’ complaint on the ground that Appellants had no standing to seek a declaratory judgment interpreting a contract, to which Appellants were neither parties nor third-party beneficiaries. We affirm the dismissal of Appellants’ complaint for declaratory judgment on the ground that the complaint is barred as res judicata. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. City of Memphis, et al. - dissent
The majority chooses to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint filed by EPE on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata. Because I conclude that an essential element of the doctrine of res judicata has not been established, I must respectfully dissent. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James R. Baysinger
The Defendant, James R. Baysinger, pleaded guilty to reckless homicide, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-215 (2018). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and the manner of service. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years and ordered him to serve five months, followed by four years’ probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred by denying his requests for judicial diversion and full probation. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew K. Johnston
The Appellant, Andrew K. Johnston, filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, and the Bedford County Circuit Court summarily denied the motion. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the twenty-seven-year sentence he received pursuant to his guilty plea to second degree murder is illegal because it is outside the maximum range of punishment for a Range I offender convicted of a Class A felony. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Rader Bonding Company, Inc.
We granted this appeal to determine whether a surety remains obligated under a bond agreement entered on the defendant’s arrest for driving under the influence second offense when a subsequent indictment charged the defendant with driving under the influence fourth offense. We conclude that sureties remain obligated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-11-130(a)(1), -138(b) and this Court’s holding in Young v. State, 121 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. 1938). We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it entered the final judgment of forfeiture against Rader Bonding Company, Inc. (“Rader”) for the total amount of the bond and declined to grant Rader’s motion to alter or amend. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision holding that Rader should have been relieved from forfeiture on the $7,500 bond in connection with the defendant’s DUI charge and affirm its conclusion that Rader remains obligated on the $2,500 bond in connection with the defendant’s driving on a revoked license charge. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Dodd
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Donald Dodd, of second degree murder as charged, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years at one hundred percent release eligibility. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-210, 40-35-501(i). On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tommy Dale Adams v. State of Tennessee
|
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Reuben Eugene Mitchell
The defendant, Reuben Eugene Mitchell, was convicted of one count of arson and one count of presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant’s arson conviction but reversed his conviction for presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. We granted the State’s application to appeal to address whether the proof at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. Our review leads us to conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the defendant’s conviction for presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Robbie Joe Kilgore
The defendant, Robbie Joe Kilgore, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original three-year sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the imposed sentence is proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vanquish Express, LLC v. Dixie Ohio Xpress, LLC, Et Al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to set aside an agreed order, which, among other things, dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. Defendants alleged that their former counsel entered into the agreement without their authorization. Finding that the defendants submitted no evidence to support the allegation, the trial court denied the motion. Defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Steven J. Dale v. Sharon K. Ball Dale
In this post-divorce matter, the mother appeals the award of attorney fees to the father, who prevailed in his opposition to the mother’s request to relocate out of state. The mother gave notice to the father that she wanted to move to Arizona while the parties’ competing petitions to modify the parenting plan were pending. The trial court denied the mother’s request to relocate and awarded attorney fees to the father as the prevailing party in the relocation matter. As for the petitions to modify the parenting plan, the court ruled that the mother was the prevailing party and awarded to the mother the attorney fees she incurred in the modification matter. The mother appeals contending she should have been awarded fees in both matters as the “overall” prevailing party. Alternatively, the mother contends the trial court erred by awarding the father attorney fees solely on the basis he was the prevailing party in the relocation matter. Having found the trial court identified and properly applied the most applicable legal principles and that the award of attorney fees to the father was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Reginald Bernard Wilson
A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Reginald Bernard Wilson, of resisting arrest, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to ninety days of unsupervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a jury instruction on self-defense and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for resisting arrest. After review, we conclude that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to self-defense. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Kevin Kennedy
The defendant, William Kevin Kennedy, appeals the revocation of the sentence of probation imposed for his 2016 Sullivan County Criminal Court convictions of solicitation of a minor and attempted aggravated sexual battery, claiming that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at the revocation hearing. Because the interests of justice do not require the waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal in this case, the appeal is dismissed as untimely. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Howard Hose Horton, III
The defendant, Howard Hose Horton III, entered open pleas to one count of aggravated assault and one count of felony vandalism, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Matthew Douglas Nattress
The defendant, Matthew Douglas Nattress, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original ten-year sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the imposed sentence is proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Heather P. Hogrobrooks Harris v. Jimmie L. Smith
This appeal arises from a lawsuit over a car accident. Heather P. Hogrobrooks Harris (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, sued Jimmie L. Smith (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) for diminution in the value of her vehicle, medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of use of her vehicle, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. On several occasions over the course of the case, Plaintiff failed to show up to court. When Plaintiff failed to appear for trial, the Trial Court granted a continuance with a warning that, should Plaintiff fail to appear again, her case would be dismissed. Plaintiff subsequently failed to appear, and the Trial Court dismissed her case with prejudice for lack of prosecution, as it warned it would. Plaintiff appeals to this Court, arguing among other things, that the Trial Court Judge was biased against her and that the Trial Court erred in dismissing her case. First, we find no evidence whatsoever that the Trial Court Judge was biased against Plaintiff. Second, Plaintiff’s stated reasons for failing to show up for trial, that it was cold and rainy that day and her car was old and unreliable, respectfully will not suffice. We find no abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s case for lack of prosecution. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan M. Thomas v. Kevin Millen
Tenant appeals the dismissal of his appeal from general sessions court for failure to post a bond constituting one year’s rent. Because the posting of a bond constituting one year’s rent is non-jurisdictional, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Battery Alliance, Inc. v. Clinton Beiter, et al.
Defendants appeal the trial court’s denial of its motion for relief from a default judgment. In support of its motion, defendants raised three grounds: (1) that the judgment was void due to improper service of process; (2) that the judgment was void due to improper notice related to the motion for default judgment; and (3) the judgment should be set aside due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. A thorough review of the record indicates that the trial court exercised its independent judgment to adjudicate only the first of the three grounds alleged. As such, we vacate the denial of the motion and remand for consideration of the remaining grounds. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Anglin v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Billy Anglin, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment, for which he is serving an effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel and due process claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals |