APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a breach of trust action by a trust beneficiary, Nancy Hardison (Stokes) Williams (“Plaintiff”), against the co-trustees, Ernest K. Hardison, III, and Cumberland Trust and Investment Company (collectively “Defendants”). The issues raised in this appeal only pertain to Plaintiff’s claims against Cumberland Trust and Investment Company (“Cumberland”). Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Cumberland committed a breach of trust by failing to properly manage and invest trust assets resulting in the trust sustaining significant financial losses. In her effort to recover damages against Cumberland, Plaintiff also sought to declare two trust indemnity and investment agreements—which she and all qualified beneficiaries entered into with Cumberland in 2006 and 2009—void ab initio on the basis that they are unenforceable pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1008 because they violate a material purpose of the trust. She also contended that the agreements are unenforceable because they constitute “an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1008(b). Upon the motion of Defendants for partial summary judgment, the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims arising prior to July 1, 2016, as barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1005(a). Additionally, upon the finding that Plaintiff and the qualified beneficiaries had released Cumberland from liability pursuant to the indemnity and investment agreements, the trial court summarily dismissed all remaining claims against Cumberland. The court then awarded Cumberland its attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $45,594.70 pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1004(a). This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that Cumberland is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses it has incurred in this appeal and remand this issue to the trial court to make the appropriate award.

Bringing a suit pro se, a Patient sued his healthcare providers under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. The trial court dismissed the Patient’s claims, deeming them time-barred. Instead of promptly appealing that order, the Patient serially submitted various motions over the course of approximately a year. The trial court denied the Patient’s motions. The Patient appeals. Concluding that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, we dismiss the Patient’s appeal.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court terminated his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. It also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

Defendant, Demond Maurice Buchanan, appeals his resentencing resulting in a 52-year sentence, imposed following the trial court’s revocation of his original 12-year community corrections sentence. Defendant argues the sentence is excessive and the trial court misapplied enhancement factors. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in all respects, but, because Defendant’s 12-year sentence for evading arrest in case number 2016-C-1352 is illegal, we modify the sentence to six years and remand for entry of a corrected judgment in that case.

After pleading guilty to evading arrest and being sentenced to probation, Bobby Ray Ladd,
Jr., Defendant, was the subject of several probation violation warrants. After a hearing, the
trial court determined that Defendant violated probation and ordered the probationary
sentence revoked. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted
hearsay evidence at the violation hearing. Because the record is inadequate for our review,
we determine that Defendant has waived the issue. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.

This appeal stems from a petition for a parenting plan modification filed by Jacob Cipolla (“Father”). Father shares one child with Sylvia Coutras (“Mother”). The parties engaged in contentious and protracted litigation over the custody of their child. In October of 2022, a juvenile court magistrate entered an order naming Father as the child’s primary residential parent. Mother sought a rehearing before the juvenile court judge pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107 but later withdrew that request. The juvenile court subsequently entered an order awarding Father his attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. Mother appeals that ruling to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Sumner County jury convicted the defendant, Corey Denzal Williams, of first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus eight years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance and in admitting autopsy photographs of the victim, the testimony of Sergeant Harry Harper, and video testimony of the victim. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to sever the offenses and that the error was not harmless as to the defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and false imprisonment. Accordingly, we reverse the defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and false imprisonment and remand to the trial court for a new trial. We otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Tara Allen, was found guilty by a Cheatham County jury of vehicular homicide by intoxication and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless blood draw. The defendant also argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia. Following our review, the parties’ briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the defendant’s convictions.

A Carroll County jury convicted the Defendant, David Sylvester Cavette, of evading arrest involving the risk of death or injury. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years and placed him on probation after serving 180 days in custody. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the State failed to prove either that he intentionally fled from police officers or that his flight created a risk of death or injury to others. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Austin Cunningham, of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to sell and possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, among other offenses. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred when it denied alternative sentencing. Upon our review, we hold that the Defendant has waived his issues by failing to properly prepare his brief in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27. Although we remand Count 6 for entry of a modified judgment as to the sentence imposed, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects.

A Hardin County jury convicted the Defendant, Jordan Dane Weatherspoon, of one count of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, and he later pleaded guilty to two additional counts of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years of incarceration as a Range I offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Lake County jury convicted the Defendant, James Phillip Rickman, of one count of attempted first degree premeditated murder resulting in serious bodily injury, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for attempted first degree murder with serious bodily injury and one count of aggravated assault; and (2) the trial court erred when it dismissed his motion to suppress. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Jay James Macken, Defendant, was convicted of aggravated assault, aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and interference with emergency communication after a jury trial. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of 20 years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant sought review of his convictions in this Court. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for aggravated assault and especially aggravated kidnapping. Because the evidence supported the convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a personal injury case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, and because the order was improperly certified as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner, Robert Wayne Garner, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis challenging his 2011 convictions for first degree felony murder, aggravated arson, and theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. The coram nobis court held an initial hearing to determine whether Petitioner was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing; after the initial hearing, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without a full evidentiary hearing. After review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Defendant Brandon M. Jones was convicted by a jury of seventeen counts of a twenty-seven-count indictment. The offenses involved the possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to a total effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the jury to deliberate late into the evening before reaching a verdict in a bifurcated trial in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable authority, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Christopher A. Duncan, appeals from the Cheatham County Circuit
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted
second degree murder, aggravated arson, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated
burglary, and theft of property valued at more than $2,500 but less than $10,000, for
which he is serving an effective seventy-eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner
contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective
assistance of counsel allegations for trial counsel’s failure (1) to file motions to suppress,
(2) to file a motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendants, (3) to file a motion to
dismiss count five of the indictment relating to theft of property and to object to other
evidence relating to the theft of the victim’s car, (4) to request jury instructions for
facilitation of a felony or accessory after the fact, and (5) to object to the State’s witness
vouching during closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I agree with the majority that, to acquire legal title or a defensive possessory right to real property through adverse possession, the Plaintiffs must show Mr. Eads had “exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious” possession of the property for the requisite time. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Eads’s possession of the property was not “adverse.” ¹ I would hold Mr. Eads has met the requirements to show a hostile or adverse possession for common-law and statutory adverse possession.²

This is the second appeal involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her two children. In the first appeal, this Court vacated the trial court’s finding that the mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children and that termination was in the children’s best interest. We remanded the case for the trial court to make additional factual findings and conclusions of law. On remand, the trial court entered an amended order with additional findings and conclusions. The mother appeals again. We affirm.

This appeal raises a thorny question about adverse possession. Under that doctrine, a party may gain legal title or a defensive possessory right to real property by maintaining exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious possession of the property for a certain length of time. At issue here is the adversity requirement. The original plaintiff in this case, Ora Eads, Jr., obtained legal title to a commercial property near downtown Nashville years ago but did not register the deed. About two decades later, the individual who sold the property to Mr. Eads defaulted on a loan, and his creditor obtained a judgment lien against the property, which was eventually sold to enforce the lien. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Eads adversely possessed the property during the intervening years. Defendant, the subsequent purchaser of the property, disagrees and argues that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse. We agree with defendant. Adversity, for purposes of both common-law and statutory adverse possession, requires either a conflict of title or a controversy about the right to possess the property. Because neither existed here for the requisite time period, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and reinstate the chancery court’s judgment in favor of defendant.

Stephen Charles Johnson (“Husband”) filed for divorce against Elizabeth Kay Johnson (“Wife”) in the Chancery
Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”).2 Former Chancellor Clarence E. Pridemore, Jr., presided at trial.
However, he was defeated for re-election midtrial. Richard B. Armstrong, Jr. succeeded Pridemore as Chancellor.
Shortly before his statutory authority expired, Chancellor Pridemore entered a one-page order adopting Wife’s
59-page proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in full. Husband appeals. We conclude that Chancellor
Pridemore’s order does not reflect his own deliberations and decision-making. We, therefore, vacate the Trial
Court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Steven Mitchel Ambrose, appeals his jury convictions for four counts of rape of a child and his resulting effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements made to law enforcement; (2) the State provided an insufficient election of offenses which deprived him of a verdict by a unanimous jury; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (4) his sentence is excessive; and (5) the multiple “procedural errors and constitutional violations” that occurred in the trial court violated his right to due process and entitle him to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellants sued the appellee, a law firm, alleging that the law firm committed legal malpractice when it gave the appellants legal advice with regard to the tax implications of a stock sale. The law firm filed two motions for summary judgment arguing that the legal malpractice case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Both motions were denied when the trial court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found that the legal malpractice case was timely filed but that the law firm had not committed legal malpractice. Upon our diligent review of the record, we affirm.

Greywood Crossing Owners Association, Inc. (“Greywood”) commenced this action to enforce the
development’s Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions (“the Declaration”) against one of its homeowners,
Barbara Holleman, who had failed to pay assessments for more than three years.1 Specifically, the complaint
asserted claims against Ms. Holleman on a sworn account to collect unpaid assessments plus attorney’s fees
and costs of collection as well “an Order of Sale of the Property to satisfy [Greywood’s] assessment lien and
judgment.” Ms. Holleman, acting pro se in the trial court, filed an answer in which she denied the debt. Upon
Greywood’s motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court found that Ms. Holleman owed the
assessments, awarded fees and costs to Greywood, and ordered Ms. Holleman to list her property for sale to
satisfy the debt. When Ms. Holleman failed to list her property for sale as ordered by the trial court, Greywood
filed a Rule 70 motion for specific performance, which the court granted, directing the clerk and master to sell
Ms. Holleman’s property. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

Appellant, Raven Cobins, appealed a February 16, 2023 order of the Shelby County Circuit Court. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). The appeal is dismissed.