APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I agree with the majority that Mr. DiNovo failed to cite the record in the argument section of his brief in violation of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7), which requires appropriate references to the record in the argument section itself. I also agree with the majority that violations of Rule 27 may result in the dismissal of an appeal. Where I respectfully divide from my colleagues is that I do not agree that effectively dismissing Mr. DiNovo’s appeal is the appropriate response to the violation of Rule 27 under the circumstances of this case. I would instead consider Mr. DiNovo’s appeal on the merits; accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Defendant appeals a jury verdict finding him liable for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. We affirm the jury verdict, but reverse, in part, the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs under the parties’ contract. We also award the plaintiffs their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code section 27 1-122.

The Appellant previously entered into a workers’ compensation settlement agreement with the Appellee herein, Southern Energy Company, Inc., following serious injuries he received in an incident that had occurred at the latter’s biodiesel plant. Years later, the Appellant also attempted to recover against the Appellee in tort for the incident in the Davidson County Circuit Court. After the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee, the Appellant appealed to this Court. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

The defendant, Noah Rashad Lyles, pleaded guilty to theft of property between $1,000 and $2,500, and the trial court imposed a sentence of three years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for an order of protection filed by the appellant
husband. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the order of protection but reverse the trial court’s award of
attorney fees to the respondent wife.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

Petitioner, Cortney R. Logan, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis as untimely. Following our review of the entire record, briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Trevor Rachell Cullom, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s
probation revocation of the ten-year sentence he received for his guilty-pleaded conviction
of attempted unlawful possession of a weapon. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the
trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the
remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Shanada Nicole Snipes, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and multiple drug offenses. After a sentencing hearing, she received an effective ten-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to apply mitigating factor (13) to her convictions. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. However, we also conclude that the Defendant’s conviction of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell in count three must be reversed and vacated because the Defendant was not charged with that offense and that the case must be remanded to the trial court for correction of the judgment in count four to reflect that the Defendant received a ten-year sentence for possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver. The Defendant’s convictions and effective ten-year sentence are affirmed in all other respects.

Defendant, Jamie Rebecca Ryan, pleaded guilty in Bedford County Circuit Court to one count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell, a Class B felony. The parties agreed to an eight-year sentence, with the manner of service of sentence left to the trial court’s discretion. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve her full sentence in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC), consecutive to a five-year sentence for a prior unrelated offense. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Defendant to serve a sentence of full incarceration and in imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal specifically concerns health care liability claims arising from medical treatment that occurred in 2011 and 2012. After complaints were filed in 2019, the defendants at issue in this appeal sought to have the claims related to the 2011 and 2012 treatment dismissed. The trial court thereafter entered an order dismissing such claims, holding that they were barred by the three-year statute of repose. Although the plaintiff now appeals, her appellate brief is significantly noncompliant with applicable briefing requirements. In light of these briefing deficiencies, we hold that the plaintiff has waived any issues raised and that the appeal should therefore be dismissed.

In this divorce action, the trial court, inter alia, denied Husband any contact with the parties’ children until he follows all recommendations from a complete psychiatric evaluation and granted Wife a lifetime restraining order. Husband now appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision to limit Husband’s parenting time pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-406. We vacate the lifetime restraining order and remand for the trial court to enter a more specific order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65.02.

An employer called the police after finding company property in an employee’s purse.  The employee was arrested and charged with felony theft of property.  She was later acquitted.  After the acquittal, the employee sued her former employer for malicious prosecution.  A jury found the employer liable for malicious continuation of the criminal proceedings.  Because there is material evidence in the record to support the jury verdict, we affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding either that a ground for termination was established or that termination is in the child’s best interest.

Petitioner, LaNorris O’Brien Chambers, appeals as of right from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions for robbery and fraudulent use of a credit or debit card between $1,000 and $2,500 and resulting fifteen-year sentence. After appointed post-conviction counsel filed a notice that no amended petition would be filed, the post-conviction court found that Petitioner had raised a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; however, the court summarily dismissed the petition, reasoning that Petitioner had “fail[ed] to demonstrate any actual prejudice whatsoever” because he sought to be resentenced rather than rescind his guilty pleas and proceed to trial. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing based upon his claims of having entered an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea after receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm.

Following a trial, a jury found Defendant, Richard Caldwell, guilty of felony evading arrest, reckless driving, and driving on a revoked or suspended license, for which Defendant received an effective two-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction regarding the State’s duty to preserve evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

This appeal involves a complaint to quiet title and for declaratory and injunctive relief filed by a church. The church had purchased property in 1925 pursuant to a deed providing that if the property ceased to be used for the purposes and objects described in the deed, it would “revert” to the estate of an individual who was then serving as a trustee of the church. In 2019, an attorney informed the church that he represented several individuals who were heirs of said trustee and were concerned that the property was not being used in a manner consistent with the deed. Thus, the church filed the instant complaint and sought a declaration that the restriction in the deed was no longer valid and enforceable, or in the alternative, it had not violated the restriction by utilizing the property in a manner inconsistent with the deed. The parties filed cross motions for partial summary judgment on the issues surrounding the validity of the deed restriction. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the restriction remained enforceable. Thus, the trial court noted that the remaining issue to be decided was whether the church had adhered to the applicable restriction. The church filed a motion asking the trial court to either certify its partial summary judgment order as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02 or grant it permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. Before this motion was heard, however, an agreed order was entered certifying the trial court’s partial summary judgment order as final pursuant to Rule 54.02. The church appealed. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its order as final and dismiss the appeal.

In this case, we review a trial court’s determination that a Montgomery County attorney violated Rule 5.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by practicing law while her license was suspended for failure to pay the professional privilege tax and the accompanying sanction of a public censure. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

This case involves a disputed easement. Appellee filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to conclude that an easement existed in its favor. Appellant filed a counter complaint requesting a declaratory judgment that no easement existed and requesting an injunction prohibiting Appellee from using the disputed easement. On Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that an easement existed in favor of Appellee, and it denied the relief Appellant sought. Thereafter, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s counter complaint. We agree that an easement exists, and we affirm the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment. Because the summary judgment order granted relief in Appellee’s favor, Appellant’s request for relief in the counter complaint was denied on the merits, rendering the counter complaint moot. As such, we vacate the trial court’s order on the motion to dismiss.

Albert Randall Worrell injured his shoulder in the course and scope of his employment with Obion County School District. Mr. Worrell and Obion County entered into a settlement agreement. Among other things, the agreement required Obion County to pay for future medical expenses related to his work injury. Almost three years after his initial injury, Mr. Worrell’s doctors recommended that he undergo shoulder replacement surgery. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims concluded that Obion County was not required to pay for the shoulder replacement surgery because Mr. Worrell did not prove that the recommended surgery was causally related to his work injury. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. In his appeal to this Panel, Mr. Worrell presses federal and state constitutional challenges to two provisions of Tennessee’s workers’ compensation law—Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-116 (2014), which instructs courts to construe the workers’ compensation law fairly and impartially, and Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(14) (Supp. 2016), which defines the term “injury.” Mr. Worrell argues that both provisions violate the substantive due process protections of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions and the Open Courts Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. He further argues that the definition of “injury” violates the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. We hold that the challenged statutory provisions are constitutional and affirm the judgment of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board.

This appeal concerns a breach of contract claim filed by an insured in relation to a homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurer filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court initially denied, having determined that there were issues of material fact in dispute. Upon the filing of a renewed motion for summary judgment accompanied by two affidavits from an employee of the insurer that offered interpretations of the evidence in dispute, the trial court granted the insurer’s motion, determining that the affidavits resolved the factual disputes. Because we conclude that there are disputed issues of material fact such that summary judgment should not have been granted, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict wherein the jury found that the defendant had met the burden to prove her
counterclaims for breach of contract or conversion and a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.
Following the jury’s verdict, the trial court entered an order relative to the remaining motions; however, the order
failed to dispose of two of the defendant’s counterclaims that had not been presented to the jury. Because these
two claims remain outstanding, there is no final judgment entered by the trial court, and this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and remand the case to the trial
court for further action.

A landlord obtained a judgment from a General Sessions Court against his tenant for back rent and other damages. The tenant appealed, and the Circuit Court reduced the damages award. The landlord appeals to this court. The landlord, who is pro se, disregards the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in his filings. His filings render his argument indiscernible. The landlord also failed to provide a record that fully and accurately depicts the underlying proceedings. Because the landlord’s deviations from the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure prevent this court from providing meaningful appellate review, we dismiss his appeal.

The Defendant, Isaiah Jamal Simmons, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions in the
Hamilton County Criminal Court for one count of attempted second degree murder, a Class
B felony, aggravated stalking, a Class E felony, two counts of assault, a Class A
misdemeanor, and two counts of harassment, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-
13-210 (2018) (second degree murder); 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt); 39-17-315
(2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated stalking); 39-13-101 (2018) (assault); 39-17-
308 (2018) (harassment). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his agreed-upon,
ten-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court abused
its discretion by denying alternative sentencing and by failing to allow the defense to
present argument at sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.