APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Lavan Tremayne Johnson, Jr., filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel were ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the “Emergency Motion to Alter or Adjust Sentence to Conform With the Principles of Compassionate Release” filed by Vern Braswell, Defendant, this appeal was initiated. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his motion. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Cleotris Ruben, entered guilty pleas pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), to one count of theft of property valued more than $1,000 but less than $2,500, a Class E felony, and one count of theft of property valued $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. After entry of the pleas but prior to sentencing, the Defendant discovered that, contrary to what he had been told by the two attorneys representing him, he was not eligible for judicial diversion. The Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, and the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, this court concluded that counsel had a conflict of interest and reversed the decision, remanding for appointment of new counsel. The trial court appointed new counsel, held a hearing, and again denied the Defendant’s motion to withdraw his pleas, and the Defendant appeals. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion, and we reverse and remand the case for entry of an order permitting withdrawal of the pleas and for further proceedings.

The Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Sarkozy, appeals the revocation of his probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court erred by (1) finding the Defendant violated the terms of his probation when he did not possess the requisite intent for the domestic assault charges used as the basis for the revocation and (2) ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellants, Jason Y. and Katina Y., stated that appellants were appealing the judgment entered on July 1, 2021. As the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The mother of a seven-year-old child appeals the trial court’s decision to grant grandparent visitation. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm existed under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-306(a)(5), generally referred to as the Grandparent Visitation Statute, because the child lived with the grandparents for more than twelve months, a cessation of the relationship would create a danger of substantial harm, and visitation was in the child’s best interests based on the length and quality of the relationship and the existing emotional ties between the child and the grandparents. The trial court, however, made no finding concerning the threshold issue in -306(a): whether the mother opposed or severely reduced the grandparents’ visitation prior to their filing the petition. Following a de novo review of the record, we have determined that the grandparents failed to establish that the mother opposed or severely reduced their visitation prior to filing the petition. As a consequence, the Grandparent Visitation Statute was not implicated. Therefore, thejudgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition.

The claimant has appealed from the dismissal of her claims against the State of Tennessee. Because the claimant did not file her notice of appeal with the clerk of this Court within the time permitted byTennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Urshawn Eric Miller, of first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder for fatally shooting a convenience store employee during an attempted robbery of the store. The jury also convicted the defendant of the attempted second-degree murder of another store employee and of attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, evading arrest, and resisting arrest. The jury imposed the death penalty for the first-degree murder convictions. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction and the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted second-degree murder conviction, and it imposed an effective thirty-year sentence for the remaining convictions to run concurrently with the death sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences but vacated the application of the felony murder aggravating circumstance as to the felony murder conviction. Upon our automatic review, we conclude: (1) the trial court properly ruled on challenges to certain jurors for cause during individual voir dire; (2) the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator and his guilt of the convicted offenses; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to introduce a video recording of the defendant’s prior aggravated robbery during the penalty phase; (4) the death penalty generally, and lethal injection specifically, do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; and (5) the death sentence satisfies our mandatory review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence of death; however, we reverse the portion of the intermediate court’s judgment vacating the application of the felony murder aggravating circumstance.   

Petitioner, Kevin Farrell Wells, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing that the post-conviction court applied the incorrect burden of proof in evaluating his claims, erroneously denied him relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and entered its order beyond the sixty-day statutory deadline. After hearing oral arguments and following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Benton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Lester Lee Doyle, for second offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant or drug (“DUI”) (Count One), violation of the implied consent law (Count Two), failure to illuminate the registration plate of his vehicle at all times when the headlights are illuminated (Count Three), and failure to maintain his vehicle as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane of a roadway divided into two or more lanes for traffic (Count Four). Following trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of DUI in Count One and not guilty of the traffic offenses in Counts Three and Four. On appeal, Defendant argues that because the jury found Defendant not guilty on Counts Three and Four, there was no reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant and therefore Defendant is entitled to a new trial or a reversal of the DUI conviction. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

In this divorce case, Kenneth F. Morgan, Jr. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s judgment adopting a permanent parenting plan that designates Katherine D. Ward2 (“Mother”) as primary residential parent of the parties’ child and grants Father parenting time of every other weekend. Father also argues that the trial court erred in (1) allowing the expert psychologist tasked with a parental assessment to testify in the manner in which he did; (2) declining Father’s request to remove the child’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for alleged bias; (3) ordering Father to pay two-thirds of the GAL fees awarded by the court; and (4) awarding Mother attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Sharon G. Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects all citizens, including Urshawn Eric Miller, from being subjected to punishment that is cruel and unusual. A sentence is cruel and unusual, and thus constitutionally prohibited, when it is excessive or disproportionate as compared with sentences imposed in similar cases. Miller was sentenced to death for shooting and killing a store clerk during an attempted robbery. The loss of the store clerk’s life is tragic, and Miller deserves to be punished. But Miller and the crime he committed do not fall into the rare category of the “worst of the bad.”When compared with other first-degree murder cases, including capital cases, Miller’s case is more like cases in which a sentence of life or life without parole was imposed rather than a death sentence.Thus, Miller’s death sentence is out of line with the punishment imposed in similar cases, making his punishment cruel and unusual.   

Miller’s convictions for first-degree murder and other offenses should be affirmed. Under the Eighth Amendment, Miller should not be put to death but should spend the rest of his life in prison.

Defendant, Sean Mitchell A.K.A. Antwon Rainer, was indicted for rape and aggravated kidnapping, and a jury convicted Defendant as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant, pursuant to the repeat violent offender statute, to two life sentences without the possibility of parole and ran the sentences consecutively. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence, (2) that the chain of custody for Defendant’s penile swabs was not properly established, (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, and (4) that the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case.  The trial court determined that three grounds for termination existed and that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.  We vacate one ground for termination relied upon by the trial court due to the application of an incorrect standard in the court’s order, but we affirm the court’s reliance on the remaining grounds for termination and its best interests determination.  The trial court’s termination of the father’s parental rights is accordingly affirmed.

In this post-divorce case, Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to modify the permanent parenting plan to designate her as the Child’s primary residential parent. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Perry Brent Lanham, pleaded guilty to burglary and theft of property valued $2,500 or more, and he received an effective eight-year sentence on probation supervised by community corrections. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not plead guilty knowingly and voluntarily. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellee, Christapher Baumgartner, was charged in the Bradley County Criminal Court with vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. He filed a motion to suppress his blood test results, arguing that he did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the motion, and the State appeals. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A property owner whose property was destroyed by a lightning-induced fire filed suit against the State on the theory of negligence.  The Claims Commission dismissed the case after concluding that any negligence on the part of the State was not the proximate cause of the property owner’s injury.  Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the Claims Commission.

The defendant, Carl Dwayne Prince, appeals his Robertson County Circuit Court Jury conviction of aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court erred by finding a valid waiver of the right to counsel and permitting him to proceed pro se, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the State’s failure to disclose certain evidence violated due process principles as announced in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Because the trial court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry to support a finding that the defendant effectuated a valid waiver of the right to counsel, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.  Because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of aggravated assault but sufficient to support a conviction of simple assault, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial on alternative counts of assault involving bodily injury and assault by offensive touching.

A Tipton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Keith Lamont Brown, of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-five years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments. State v. Keith Lamont Brown a.k.a. “Kee Kee”, No. W2018-00731-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 2158103, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 16, 2019), no perm. app. filed. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Lauderdale County jury convicted the Defendant, G’Wayne Williams, of numerous sexual offenses. State v. G’wayne Kennedy Williams a/k/a Kenney Williams, No. W2018- 00924-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 211546, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Jackson, Jan. 14, 2020). The trial court imposed a sixty-four-year sentence. Id. On appeal, this court vacated and dismissed fifteen of the Defendant’s convictions and concluded that the trial court had improperly merged a number of the Defendant’s convictions. We remanded the case for entry of corrected judgments and resentencing where applicable and affirmed the Defendant’s remaining convictions. Id. On remand, the trial court dismissed the relevant convictions, merged the additional relevant convictions, and resentenced the Defendant on twelve of the convictions. The trial court concluded that it had lost jurisdiction as to the Defendant’s remaining convictions affirmed on appeal. On this second appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding it had lost jurisdiction on the convictions affirmed by this court. He further contends his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Eric Boyd, was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and four counts of aggravated rape. For his convictions, Defendant received an effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences for the felony murder convictions and an additional 90 years for the remaining convictions. Defendant appeals his convictions, asserting that: 1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for a change of venue, or in the alternative, a special jury venire; 2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce transcripts of a witness’s testimony from a federal court proceeding as substantive evidence against Defendant; 3) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; and 4) he is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After a thorough review of the record, we determine no error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights.  The trial court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of two statutory grounds for termination of the mother’s rights and one statutory ground for the termination of the father’s parental rights.  The trial court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of their parental rights was in their child’s best interest.  After a thorough review, we affirm.