APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that this court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of this case.

The Defendant, Destiny Hall, was convicted at trial of evading arrest through the use of a motor vehicle, and she received a
one-year sentence, suspended to probation supervised by community corrections after service of thirty days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Deon Smith, pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery, auto burglary, and theft, in exchange for an effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

I concur in Judge McMullen’s opinion and only write separately to respectfully address Judge Holloway’s view expressed in his dissenting opinion that the trial court need not establish installment terms for the payment of restitution for the judgment to be complete and final.

Defendant, Delvon J. White, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence of incarceration in two cases, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by not either reinstating his probation or ordering a sentence of split confinement followed by modified conditions of probation to address his mental health and substance abuse. Following our review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s modification of child support.  Father filed a petition to modify custody.  The trial court modified the parties’ parenting schedule but reserved its determination of child support for future adjudication.  Subsequently, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order requesting that the parties submit their own competing proposed orders concerning child support.  Ultimately, the trial court issued its final order setting child support based solely on the documents attached to Father’s proposed order.  Because the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing, we conclude that there was no evidence before it from which to make a ruling.  Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand with instructions for it to conduct an evidentiary hearing to allow the parties to put on their proof as to child support.

A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to three children. The juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of multiple statutory grounds for termination. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree and affirm.

The Defendant, Meredith Muse Thompson, pleaded guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to making a false police report, a Class D felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-16-502 (2018).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years’ probation.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Donte R. Swainer, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2018 conviction for attempted aggravated robbery.  Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court improperly determined that the petition was time-barred.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case stems from the sale of a 2000 Mercury Sable (“the vehicle”) purchased by Amy Jennings from John M. Lance Ford, LLC, an affiliate of AutoNation, Inc. (“AutoNation” or “Defendant”), in 2017. Ms. Jennings signed all of the paperwork associated with the sale, including an arbitration agreement. In September of 2018, Ms. Jennings and her husband, Dorian Jones, filed suit against AutoNation in the Chancery Court for Washington County (the “trial court”) alleging multiple causes of action arising from the sale of the vehicle. Generally, Ms. Jennings and Mr. Jones alleged that AutoNation breached several warranties and fraudulently induced Ms. Jennings into the sale. Eventually, AutoNation filed a motion to compel arbitration which the trial court granted on August 10, 2020. Mr. Jones filed an appeal to this Court. Because an appeal from an order granting a motion to compel arbitration and staying litigation is nonfinal, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed.

This appeal arises from an action before the Tennessee Claims Commission for personal injuries filed on behalf of a minor child who broke her arm when she fell from playground equipment at Tims Ford State Park. The complaint asserted claims for negligence, gross negligence, and gross negligence per se. It alleged that the State was negligent by failing to adequately maintain its property, and by failing to discover, rectify, and/or warn against a dangerous condition, and allowing park visitors “to use the playground which did not have a safe surface area.” The State denied liability under Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C), insisting it had no notice of any dangerous condition; it also raised the “Recreational Use Statute,” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 70-7-101 to -105, as an affirmative defense. Following discovery, the State filed a motion for summary judgment, which the claims commissioner granted. The commissioner found the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on two grounds. The commissioner found that Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 70-7-102 of the Recreational Use Statute provided immunity to the State as a landowner against premises-liability claims and that the gross negligence exception under the statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-104(a)(1), did not apply. The commissioner also held that the claimants failed to show that notice of the alleged dangerous condition had been provided to the State, which is an essential element of the Claims Commission Act. The plaintiffs appeal one issue, asserting a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether the State’s failure to maintain the playground was gross negligence. We affirm the Commissioner’s decision on both grounds.

The petitioner, Harry Pearson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A foreign corporation sought to have a default judgment entered against it set aside on the basis that service of process was ineffective, rendering the judgment void. Because the proof before the court at the time it entered the default fails to demonstrate that service by mail complied with Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the default judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendants, Tony Thomas and Laronda Turner, were convicted of three counts of first-degree premeditated murder and received life sentences on each count. On appeal, they raise the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support their convictions, specifically whether the co-defendant’s testimony was reliable and sufficiently corroborated; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment due to the State’s Ferguson violation by failing to preserve the photographic lineups shown to the witnesses and the co-defendant’s cell phone taken upon his arrest; (3) whether the trial court erred by not granting a new trial because the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose all inconsistent statements made by the co-defendant during proffer sessions; (4) whether the trial court committed error when it sua sponte prohibited the introduction of the printout of the co-defendant’s message to his girlfriend implicating himself in the murders, and in so doing, made an improper comment on the evidence; and (5) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury by including the language “or either of them” throughout the jury instructions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusions that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Defendant Laronda Turner’s convictions and that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose the inconsistent statements made by co-defendant Demarco Hawkins. Because the record shows that Hawkins’ accomplice testimony implicating Defendant Turner was not sufficiently corroborated, I believe that Defendant Turner’s three convictions for first degree premeditated murder should be reversed and that these charges should be dismissed. In addition, because the record demonstrates that the State violated Brady in failing to disclose the inconsistent statements made by Hawkins during several proffer sessions with the prosecution prior to trial, I am of the opinion that the trial court erred in denying a new trial to both Defendant Turner and Defendant Thomas on this basis. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments of the trial court, dismiss the charges against Defendant Turner, and remand the case for a new trial for Defendant Thomas.

The Defendant, William Jesse Clouse, pleaded guilty in the Putnam County Criminal Court to three counts of vehicular assault, a Class D felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-106 (2018) (subsequently amended).  The trial court imposed an eight-year sentence to be served in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for split confinement.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

This appeal involves the applicability of Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-105, the bad faith penalty statute, to automobile insurance policies. The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-105 did not apply to automobile insurance policies. The insured appeals. We affirm.

An agency determined that a tour bus leasing company mischaracterized its tour bus drivers as independent contractors rather than employees, for the purposes of unemployment taxes. The company sought review in chancery court, which affirmed the agency’s determination. Because there is substantial and material evidence to support the agency’s determination, we affirm the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Anthony Eugene Reed, was convicted by a Sequatchie County jury of theft of property valued over $10,000, to wit: a Jeep Wrangler, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-103, and sentenced to seven years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for theft because the State failed to establish his intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property; and (2) the prosecution made improper comments during closing arguments which indirectly commented on his decision not to testify in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellee, Linda R. Kerley (“Appellee”), filed a motion to dismiss this appeal alleging that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is the second appeal in this action for breach of a contract to purchase improved real property. Prior to the first appeal, the trial court, having found following a bench trial that the defendant buyers, Arnold Brush and Pamela Sue Brush, had breached the parties’ purchase and sale agreement, initially entered damage awards in favor of the plaintiffs, who included the sellers, Richard J. Hartigan and Leila R. Hartigan; the Hartigans’ realtor, James M. Henry d/b/a Coldwell Banker Jim Henry & Associates (“Coldwell Banker”); and a realty company, Lakeway Realty Group, Inc. (“Lakeway Realty”), with whom the Brushes had entered into a buyer representation agreement. Mr. Brush, by then acting individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of Pamela Sue Brush, appealed to this Court, raising issues concerning the trial court’s calculations of damages and pre-judgment interest. This Court affirmed the judgment in favor of Lakeway Realty but vacated the award of damages and prejudgment interest to the Hartigans and the calculation of prejudgment interest awarded to Coldwell Banker. This Court directed that upon remand, the trial court was to enter additional findings of fact regarding the fair market value of the property, with further proceedings as necessary, and recalculate the amount of prejudgment interest awarded to Coldwell Banker.

A review of the record on appeal reveals that the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The defendant, Cassius Dominique Ivory, appeals his Rutherford County Circuit Court jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, arguing that the State failed to disclose a preferential agreement with a witness, that the State failed to produce certain pretrial statements, that the trial court failed to merge certain offenses, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.  Because the record establishes that the State did not fail to disclose a preferential agreement or pretrial statements, the trial court properly merged the offenses, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Lawrence County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Simon Dean Porter, for aggravated rape of a child and aggravated child abuse of his sixteen-month-old son. A jury convicted the Defendant as charged, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighty-five years. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-531, 39-15-402(a)(1). On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) proof connecting him to these offenses; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting photographs of the victim’s injuries; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.