APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Joe Charles Degrafenreid, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (DUI) as a second offender. In this direct appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for DUI and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

David Wayne Fountain, who pleaded guilty to Class E felony attempted theft, appeals from the Rhea County Circuit Court's determination that he serve a two-year, split-confinement sentence for his crime. He claims that he should have received a minimum, one-year probationary sentence. We disagree and affirm the lower court's sentencing pronouncement. However, we modify the sentence imposed to the extent that it mandates day-for-day confinement.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of first degree premeditated murder and reckless homicide. The reckless homicide conviction was merged with the murder conviction and the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in overruling his motions for judgment of acquittal and in allowing a videotape and photograph of the crime scene into evidence.  Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was found guilty of first degree premeditated murder by a Lawrence County jury and sentenced to life imprisonment. In his appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, the trial court erred in allowing opinion testimony of a lay witness based on an experiment regarding the canning of green beans in a pressure cooker, and erred by allowing the statements of three witnesses to be read aloud by the witnesses to the jury and then become exhibits. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was indicted for driving under the influence, driving on a revoked license, evading arrest, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, vehicular assault, and violation of the implied consent law. A Rhea County jury convicted the Defendant of driving under the influence, driving on a revoked license, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and vehicular assault. The trial court merged the DUI and reckless endangerment convictions into the vehicular assault conviction. It sentenced the Defendant to four years for vehicular assault and to six months for driving on a revoked license, to be served concurrently. The trial court ordered that the Defendant serve one year in the county jail, perform one hundred hours of public service, pay $800 in restitution, and imposed a fine of $5,500. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following issues: (1) whether the trial court properly allowed testimony about the Defendant's erratic driving in Hamilton County; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the results of a blood alcohol test into evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred by permitting witnesses to testify about the percentage of alcohol in the samples of blood tested; and (4) whether the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A trial court found the Defendant not guilty by reason of insanity of the offense of stalking. Following judicial hospitalization in the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute, the Defendant filed a motion requesting the trial court to expunge all public records pertaining to the stalking offense. The trial court denied the Defendant's request. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's request to expunge her records. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant was convicted in 1991 of second degree murder, and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. He subsequently filed a "PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM CONVICTION OR SENTENCE PURSUANT TO TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED 40-30-301 THROUGH 40-30-312," and the trial court summarily dismissed the petition relying upon the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. The Appellant now appeals the summary dismissal of his opinion. Our review of the complete petition filed by the Appellant reveals that, despite the statutory sections inappropriately cited in its title, the Appellant sought relief under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand to the trial court for findings of fact pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the petitioner on multiple offenses. At the conclusion of a trial on the indictment first prosecuted, a jury convicted the petitioner of aggravated robbery. See State v. Robert E. Pugh, No. W1999-01260-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 298697, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Mar. 17, 2000). For this offense he received a twelve-year sentence as a standard offender. Id. He subsequently pled guilty to ten additional charges. The trial court then sentenced him as a multiple offender for nine of these counts and as a violent offender for one count. His agreed upon sentences for these offenses in combination with the aforementioned twelve-year sentence resulted in an effective twenty-six-year sentence for all eleven convictions. However, the petitioner later filed a pro se post-conviction petition attacking his pleas by alleging that his counsel at that time provided him ineffective assistance. The trial court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition also alleging ineffective assistance at trial. Following a hearing, the trial court found none of the petitioner's allegations meritorious and denied him relief. Through this appeal the petitioner continues to assert that he received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his guilty pleas and the trial at issue. However, after reviewing the record provided and appropriate authorities, we affirm the trial court's denial of the post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Abebreellis Zandus Bond, was convicted by a jury of two sales of cocaine. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to a nine-year term and an eighteen-year term for these convictions, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. The trial court also imposed the two $100,000 fines assessed by the jury. The Defendant now appeals as of right, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence; the admission of certain testimony; the trial court's failure to issue a missing witness instruction; the chain of custody; and the sentences and fines. We modify the Defendant's fines to $25,000 each. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court's judgments.