APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Royden Russell and Judy Russell ("Plaintiffs") entered into a contract with Malvin L. Bray and Diedre Bray ("Sellers") to purchase a house. The sales contract required Plaintiffs to obtain an inspection by a professional home inspector. Plaintiffs hired Randall L. Douthat and Holly Douthat d/b/a The HomeTeam Inspection Service ("Defendants") to perform the home inspection. Royden Russell signed a form contract ("Contract") presented by Defendants. The Contract contained an exculpatory clause limiting Defendants' liability to the lesser of the cost of repair or the amount of the inspection fee. After moving into the house, Plaintiffs discovered structural problems. Plaintiffs sued Sellers, the realtors involved in the sale of the house, and Defendants. Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment concerning the exculpatory clause contained in the Contract. Defendants responded by filing a Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment concerning, in part, the exculpatory clause. The Trial Court held the exculpatory clause was not against public policy and was enforceable. The Trial Court also granted Plaintiffs permission to file an interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs applied to this Court and were granted an interlocutory appeal on the limited issue of whether the Trial Court erred in holding the exculpatory clause was not against public policy. We reverse.

The majority concludes that reversal is necessitated based upon (1) failure to instruct the jury on facilitation and (2) error in admitting into evidence the defendant's prior felony drug conviction for purposes of impeachment. Because I am unable to join on either point, I must respectfully dissent.

The Defendant, Percy Wade Cockrill, pled guilty to six counts of robbery. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to four years each on three of the robberies, and to five years each on the remaining three robberies. The trial court further ordered the five-year sentences to run consecutively to each other, for an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now challenges the length of each term as well as the imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Robert L. Trocsch, was convicted in the Roane County Criminal Court of one count of burglary and two counts of theft. He received a total effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and alleges that the trial court improperly performed its function as thirteenth juror. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his conviction for DUI - second offense and his sentence of sixty days. The defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, more specifically that he was not impaired while driving or on a public road. The defendant also argues that his sentence of sixty days is excessive. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction. The defendant failed to include the sentencing hearing transcript, thus barring this Court from reviewing his argument concerning sentencing. We affirm the judgment from the trial court as modified.

The defendant was found guilty by a jury of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, vandalism up to five hundred dollars ($500), and public intoxication. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to a term of two years for reckless endangerment, eleven months and twenty-nine days for vandalism, and thirty days for public intoxication. These sentences were to run concurrently and were to be served in confinement in the county jail. The trial court rejected alternative sentencing. The defendant contends his sentence is excessive. Because the defendant failed to include the trial transcript, we are unable to conduct an adequate appellate review. Therefore, we presume the trial court correctly sentenced the defendant and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent. For those reasons expressed in State v. Vernon Dewayne Waller, No. M2001-02414-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Aug. 23, 2002), perm. to appeal granted, (Tenn. 2002), I find no error in the admission of the defendant's prior felony drug convictions for purposes of impeachment.

Richard Albany Goode, convicted upon his guilty plea of statutory rape, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court's imposition of a two-year incarcerative sentence. He claims he should have received an alternative sentence. Because the appellate record does not contain evidence relied upon by the parties and the court at the sentencing hearing, we hold that the defendant has waived our review of his appellate issue. We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

The petitioner, Chico Lopez Chigano, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed

A Rhea County grand jury indicted the defendant on multiple sexual offense charges. At the conclusion of a trial, the defendant was acquitted of numerous offenses but found guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual battery (as lesser included offenses of aggravated rape). For each of these convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twelve years as a standard offender. The court then set these sentences to run concurrently. After unsuccessfully pursuing a new trial motion, the defendant brings this appeal, raising five issues. He avers 1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; 2) that the prosecutor committed reversible error by soliciting "unrelated crimes" evidence from a State witness; 3) that the prosecution committed reversible error by comments made in its closing argument; 4) that the trial court erred in failing to declare a not guilty verdict as to all counts after the jury indicated that this was its verdict; and 5) that the trial court erred in excessively sentencing the defendant. After reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we find it necessary to remand the defendant's aggravated sexual battery conviction under trial count two for resentencing consistent with this opinion. However, we find that none of the other issues merit reversal and, therefore, affirm the defendant's convictions and his aggravated assault sentence under count four of the indictment.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction. He claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel (1) failed to adequately challenge suppression of the petitioner's confession and (2) failed to have the petitioner testify at trial. We affirm the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief.

Myra S. Bikrev appeals from her Williamson County convictions of felony theft of property, coercion of a witness, and aggravated perjury. These convictions were imposed following findings of guilt at a jury trial, and Bikrev is presently serving an effective eight-year sentence involving both jail confinement and probation. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the propriety of the sentences she received. Her appellate arguments are not meritorious, and we affirm.

The defendant, after being allowed to represent himself at the sentencing hearing, proceeds pro se in appealing his especially aggravated robbery conviction and sentence of twenty-two years imprisonment. The defendant argues his right to a speedy trial was violated and argues he was subject to an unreasonable delay in sentencing. The defendant argues the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion to sever the offenses. The defendant argues the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to recuse himself and contends the trial court erroneously allowed a witness to testify to injuries she sustained as a result of the robbery. The defendant argues the trial court improperly ruled the defendant was not entitled to be present during jury deliberations. The defendant argues the trial court frustrated his right to appeal by relieving his trial counsel prior to sentencing. The defendant argues he is the victim of a malicious prosecution. We conclude the trial court did not err and evidence supports the defendant's conviction of especially aggravated robbery. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted, along with her co-defendant husband, of child abuse and neglect, a Class D felony, and sentenced to four years probation. She appeals, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that any neglect that did occur was the result of mistakes in parenting skills, such mistake vitiating any knowing abuse. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner pled guilty to three Class B felony drug offenses. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court orally sentenced the Petitioner to ten years for each conviction with the sentences to be served concurrently to each other and to a prior four-year sentence, resulting in an effective sentence of ten years. After the sentence was imposed, the Petitioner asked that he be allowed to begin serving his sentence the following day. The trial court granted the Petitioner's request, with the condition that if he did not report as ordered, two of the sentences would run consecutively. The next day, the Petitioner failed to report, and the trial court entered judgments in which two of the Petitioner's sentences were consecutive, resulting in an effective sentence of twenty years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, contending that his plea was unlawfully induced, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that his sentences were illegal. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Concluding that the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and the Petitioner's due process rights, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner appeals the dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief by the Giles County Circuit Court. She was originally convicted of premeditated first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. In this appeal, she contends the post-conviction court erred by finding she received the effective assistance of counsel and argues trial counsel was deficient in not filing a motion to suppress her confession. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of especially aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty years incarceration pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement setting the maximum amount of time to be served at twenty years. The defendant contends her sentence is excessive and the trial court misapplied enhancement factors (4), (5), (6), and (10). We agree the trial court misapplied two enhancement factors, but the record supports the imposition of a twenty-year sentence, which is the maximum allowed by her plea agreement and the "presumptive sentence" provided by statute. We affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The petitioner, Teron McKenley, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He originally pled guilty to especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and theft over $1,000 and received an effective sentence of fifteen years. He contends the post-conviction court erred in disallowing the introduction of the victim's medical records at his post-conviction hearing and in failing to find that ineffective assistance of counsel led to an involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.