APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A husband and wife sought to end their long-term marriage. After a prolonged trial, the court classified, valued, and equitably divided the marital estate. The court also ordered both parties to pay their own attorney’s fees. The wife filed a motion to alter or amend the final decree. Acknowledging errors in the initial decree, the court issued an amended divorce decree. Among other things, the court amended the value of the marital residence. Both parties raise issues on appeal. We find the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s classification of the husband’s interest in several parcels of real property as marital property. We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in amending the value of the marital residence, dividing the marital estate, or declining to award attorney’s fees to the wife. So we affirm.

The defendant, Paul D. Page, pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or less of methamphetamine, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of nine years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request to serve his sentence on probation. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

In 1998, the Petitioner, James Morrow, was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments. State v. James Morrow, No. W1998-0583-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1529719 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 29, 1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 26, 2000). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after multiple hearings. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Errol Johnson, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for aggravated child neglect and criminally negligent homicide. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he was denied the right to represent himself at trial and that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to advise him that the State could introduce rebuttal evidence after he testified. Following our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Robert Derrick Johnson, appeals as of right from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his conviction for robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to (1) advise him of a statutory right to at least fourteen days to prepare for trial, see Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-14-105; (2) file a motion to continue the trial; (3) suppress the victim’s in-court identification of the Petitioner; (4) file a motion or object at trial to the destruction of video-recorded evidence; and (5) challenge the Petitioner’s second trial as violative of double jeopardy. The Petitioner also contends that the post-conviction court erred by striking his pro se amendment to the post-conviction petition. Following our review, we affirm.

A non-attorney filed a notice of appeal as next friend of Andrew Jackson Heaton. As a non-attorney next friend may not practice law while acting on behalf of an infant or incompetent, this appeal is hereby dismissed.

This appeal arose from a 2011 divorce decree awarding to the wife one-half of the husband’s military retirement pay that had accumulated during the term of the marriage. At the time of the husband’s retirement in 2018, the United States Defense Finance and Accounting Service would not disburse retirement funds to the wife due to deficient award language contained in the 2011 order. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service explained in a letter addressed to the wife that the 2011 order had failed to provide a method to calculate the marital portion of the husband’s retirement pay and that it had no way to calculate retirement pay that had “accumulated during the term of the marriage.” In order to effectuate the enforcement of its intended division of the husband’s military retirement pay, the trial court attempted to correct its order by replacing “accumulated during the term of the marriage” with language compliant with the United States Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations (“DoD Regulations”) and specifying that the wife should be awarded fifty percent of the husband’s disposable military retired pay based upon his military pay grade rank and his creditable service years as of the date of the divorce.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Kierani C., the minor child (“the Child”) of Christopher A., Sr. (“Father”), and Keona C. (“Mother”). In August 2017, Mother surrendered her parental rights to the Child before the Shelby County Chancery Court (“chancery court”).1 At that time, the Child was placed in the legal custody and partial guardianship of Hannah’s Hope United Methodist Adoption and Pregnancy Counseling (“Hannah’s Hope”) and the physical custody of pre-adoptive parents, Katherine B. and Adrian B. In September 2017, Hannah’s Hope filed a petition in the chancery court to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child. In January 2018, Father filed a petition to establish parentage in the Memphis and Shelby County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”), and in May 2018, Katherine B. and Adrian B. filed a petition in the Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”) to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child. Upon motions filed by Katherine B. and Adrian B., all matters pertaining to the Child were subsequently transferred to the trial court, which consolidated the actions. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted both termination petitions upon its finding clear and convincing evidence of ten statutory grounds, including four abandonment grounds, specifically that Father had willfully failed to (1) visit the Child in the four months preceding the petition’s filing by Hannah’s Hope, (2) financially support the Child in the four months preceding each petition’s filing, (3) visit Mother during the four months preceding the Child’s birth, and (4) make reasonable payments toward Mother’s financial support during the four months preceding the Child’s birth, as well as six grounds applicable to a putative father, specifically that Father had failed to (5) pay a reasonable share of expenses related to the Child’s birth, (6) make reasonable and consistent payments for the Child’s support, (7) seek reasonable visitation with the Child, (8) file a petition to establish paternity within thirty days of receiving notice of alleged paternity, and (9) manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the Child, and, additionally, that (10) placement of the Child in Father’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the Child’s welfare. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father has appealed. We hold that under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(ii) and (iii), a putative father’s efforts made after the termination petition’s filing may be considered in reviewing the respective grounds involving failure to support the child and failure to seek or maintain visitation with the child. Therefore, having determined that clear and convincing evidence did not support the trial court’s findings that Father’s efforts to support and visit the Child made after the respective petitions’ filings were unreasonable or token, we reverse the trial court’s findings as to these two grounds. We affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights in all other respects.

This appeal concerns a bid protest. UWork.com, Inc., d/b/a Covendis Technologies (“Covendis”) successfully bid on a contract to manage a network of temporary workers for the State of Tennessee. Guidesoft, Inc. d/b/a Knowledge Services (“Knowledge Services”), an unsuccessful bidder, filed a protest with the Central Procurement Office (“the CPO”). The CPO dismissed Knowledge Services’ bid for insufficient bond. Knowledge Services appealed to the State Protest Committee (“the Committee”), which denied the appeal. Knowledge Services then filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). After a hearing, the Trial Court dismissed Knowledge Services’ amended petition. Knowledge Services now appeals to this Court, arguing that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-3-514(d), its protest bond should be based on 5% of the lowest evaluated cost proposal rather than 5% of the State’s estimated maximum liability as found below. We hold, inter alia, that the protest bond statute is meant to protect the State, and the appropriate protest bond amount is based on the costs the State may incur rather than a bidder’s proposed cost. Further, the fee relied upon by Knowledge Services to calculate its protest bond is but a small portion of the contract at issue, which is estimated to cost the State $190,000,000. The Committee did not exceed its jurisdiction or act illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently. We affirm the Trial Court. 

The Defendant, Quindarius Lamonta Jordan, pleaded guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder); 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt); 39-13102 (2018) (aggravated assault); 39-17-1307 (2018) (unlawful weapon possession). The trial court imposed eleven years for attempted second degree murder, five years for aggravated assault, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the firearm violation. The court imposed partial consecutive service, for an effective sixteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering confinement and consecutive service. Although we affirm the judgments of the trial court, we remand the case for the entry of judgment forms reflecting a dismissal of the charges in indictment Counts 1, 4, 5, and 6.  

The Appellant, Terrance F. Arnold, appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that there was no “substantial evidence” that he violated his probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a collection lawsuit to recover the balance Appellant allegedly owes on a promissory note held by Appellee.  On Appellant’s motion, the trial court stayed the proceedings and remitted the matter to binding arbitration pursuant to the terms of the promissory note.  Appellant brings the instant appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a).  Because the order appealed is not final, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a).  Furthermore, neither the Federal Arbitration Act nor the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act provides a mechanism for appeal of Appellant’s issues to this Court.  Appeal dismissed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Thomas McLaughlin, was convicted by a Union County jury of vehicular homicide. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-13-213. The Defendant also pleaded guilty to one count each of driving on a revoked license, violating the financial responsibility law, driving without registration, and driving without registration plates. The trial court classified the Defendant as a persistent offender and imposed a total effective sentence of 15 years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: 1) he was unfairly prejudiced by the introduction of evidence of his toxicology reports and license status; 2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for vehicular homicide; and 3) his sentence is unlawful because the trial court erroneously applied aggravating factors.1 Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Darious Fitzpatrick, appeals as of right from his convictions for first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus twenty years. The Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether his sentence is unconstitutional in light of his status as a juvenile at the time of the offenses. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

Defendant, Robert Joseph McBride, was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor involving a number of materials exceeding 25; eight counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, each involving a number of materials exceeding 100; and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor involving a number of materials exceeding 50. Following the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant to search Defendant’s house and computer, Defendant entered guilty pleas to eight counts of sexual exploitation of a minor involving materials exceeding 100, all Class B felonies. The agreed upon sentence was 12 years on each count, to be served concurrently. Defendant reserved for our review eight certified questions of law. We conclude that only Defendant’s question regarding the staleness of the information supporting the search warrant, is dispositive. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a post-divorce proceeding. The father filed a petition to modify child support, and the mother filed a civil contempt action against the father for failure to pay child support as ordered by the court. Following trial, the trial court found that a significant variance existed from the previously ordered child support obligation and granted the father’s petition to modify child support. The trial court retroactively modified the father’s child support obligation from the date the petition was filed, resulting in three modifications while the petition had been pending. In the respective child support worksheets for the modifications, the trial court declined to include a credit to the mother for the health insurance premiums she had paid for the child, determining such expense of additional insurance coverage not to be “a reasonable necessity or requirement.” In consideration of the mother’s civil contempt complaint, the trial court found that the father had been in contempt of court due to his failure to pay child support as ordered by the court but that he had cured his contempt due to an involuntary payment from his income tax refund proceeds and the retroactive modification of his obligation and resultant overpayment of child support while the petition to modify was pending. The trial court further denied an award of attorney’s fees to either party. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter. The trial court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the mother had abandoned her child by wanton disregard and by committing severe child abuse against her. The court also concluded that the evidence was clear and convincing that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We agree and affirm.

The Petitioner, Fredrick L. Tucker, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his rape of a child conviction, for which he received a twenty-one-year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

In this post-divorce action concerning enforcement of the trial court’s order distributing the parties’ marital property, the trial court ultimately awarded a judgment to the wife in the amount of $206,868.67. The court also ordered that the wife would be entitled to a certain portion of the proceeds from the sale of the parties’ former marital residence. The court dismissed the wife’s contempt claims and declined to award interest or attorney’s fees. The husband has appealed. Having discerned two relatively minor errors in the judgment, we modify the amount awarded to the wife to increase it by $18,525.24, enlarging the trial court’s award to the wife to the total of $225,393.91 rather than $206,868.67. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

The defendant, James Howard Harmon, Jr., appeals his Blount County Circuit Court jury convictions of second degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, theft of property valued at $500 or less, arson, and abuse of a corpse, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his statement of April 10, 2012, and by admitting evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Following a hearing, the Circuit Court for Hamblen County (“trial court”) entered an order of protection against Nigel Reid II (“Respondent” or “Cross-Petitioner”) and in favor of Collette Jean Wallace (“Petitioner” or “Cross-Respondent”). Respondent appealed to this Court. Because Respondent’s brief fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The trial court found that seven grounds had been established: abandonment for failure to support; abandonment for failure to visit; abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; persistence of conditions; mental incompetence; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. It also found that termination was in the child’s best interest for many reasons, including the mother’s failure to provide a safe home, maintain regular visitation, pay child support, and resolve her legal, mental health, and substance abuse issues. The mother contends the trial court incorrectly calculated the period relevant to the ground of abandonment, erred by admitting her mental health records into evidence in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-7-122, and that the evidence failed to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard. Following a thorough review of the record, we have determined that four of the seven grounds for termination as found by the trial court were established by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was clearly and convincingly in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The Tennessee Supreme Court entered an order vacating our previous judgment in this matter solely with respect to the division of the marital estate and remanding for our further review consistent with its order. We find upon further review that the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate as it did. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court on this one issue and remand for a new and equitable division of the marital estate.

The Appellant, Jody Alan Hughes, was convicted in the Bradley County Criminal Court of first degree premeditated murder; kidnapping, a Class C felony; tampering with evidence, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective sentence of life plus fourteen years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by denying his “numerous” requests to represent himself; (3) the trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to comment about the codefendants’ exposure to prison sentences during counsel’s opening statement; (4) the trial court erred in its wording of a curative instruction to the jury; (5) the trial court erred by limiting a codefendant’s cross-examination about a false statement the codefendant made in a previous criminal case; (6) the trial court erred by limiting a detective’s testimony regarding the codefendants’ inconsistent statements; and (7) the trial court erred by not allowing testimony about a codefendant’s pretrial statement to impeach the codefendant. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the defendant, Darnell Treshawn Wiggins1, of second degree murder, first degree felony murder, and kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions, the jury improperly weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its opening statement. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in admitting Officer Dalton’s testimony during the penalty phase, in denying his motion for mistrial, and in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.