APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted permission to appeal primarily to consider how, if at all, the economic loss doctrine, which generally precludes recovery for purely economic losses in tort actions, applies in Tennessee to claims of fraudulent inducement. We hold that when, as here, a fraud claim seeks recovery of only economic losses and is premised solely on misrepresentations or nondisclosures about the quality of goods that are the subject of a contract between sophisticated commercial parties, the economic loss doctrine applies. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the economic loss doctrine bars the plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement claim. We also affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the plaintiff’s claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) is barred as a matter of law because the trucks at issue are not “goods” as that term is defined by the portion of the TCPA on which the plaintiff relied. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-104(b)(7) (2013 & Supp. 2020). We, therefore, set aside the plaintiff’s award of attorney’s fees and costs based on the TCPA. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the separate grounds stated herein.  

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. The juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of severe abuse by the mother and that termination was in the children’s best interests. On appeal, the mother challenges whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support the court’s best interest determinations. In weighing the statutory best-interest factors, she contends the trial court did not properly consider her completion of permanency plan requirements and nearly fifteen months of drug-free tests. The mother also complains that she was denied contact with her children by court order shortly after their removal and, despite her progress, was thwarted in her efforts to reestablish contact. We affirm.

This appeal arises from an action for breach of a promissory note. After granting the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on his claim against one of the defendants, the court held an evidentiary hearing to determine damages. Following the hearing, the court entered a judgment for $1,628,074.27, which included interest and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the defendant contends that, in accordance with the terms of the promissory note, the plaintiff is only entitled to recover the principal sum of $14,194.43 plus interest. We have determined that the defendant failed to properly raise this issue in the trial court; therefore, it is waived. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Defendant, Jackson Chapman North, pleaded guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to two counts of vandalism valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, vandalism valued at more than $1,000 but less than $2,500, a Class E felony, vandalism valued at $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, and unlawful possession of a weapon, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-408 (2018) (vandalism); 39-14-105 (2018) (grading); 39-17-1307 (2018) (unlawful weapon possession). The trial court ordered partial consecutive service and imposed an effective six-year sentence, with four years, sixty days in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the Defendant’s sentence, but as a matter of plain error, we reverse the trial court’s restitution order and remand the case for proper restitution determinations.

Pro se petitioner, Justin C. Howell, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. Upon our review, we affirm.

In this divorce case, the wife appeals the trial court’s calculation of her portion of the husband’s military retirement and valuation of her speech therapy practice, as well as the overall division of marital assets. As appellee, the husband raises a number of issues, all of which are without merit. We vacate the portion of the trial court’s judgment addressing the husband’s military retirement and remand for recalculation of the wife’s share in the same. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. 

Property owners sued lessees for possession and back rent. Lessees counterclaimed, alleging anticipatory breach, fraud, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in conjunction with a purchase option. Property owners moved for summary judgment on their claim for possession, arguing that lessees never exercised their option to purchase. In response, lessees asserted anticipatory breach. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to property owners. After a bench trial, the court dismissed the remaining counterclaims. On appeal, lessees challenge both decisions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.
 

Aggrieved of his convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and incest, the defendant, Vincent Parker Lee, appeals. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of rape of a child; that the trial court erred by permitting the State to ask leading questions of the child rape victim; that the State’s failure to make an election of offenses at the close of its case-in-chief resulted in plain error; that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprived him of the right to a fair trial; and that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. We find no deficiency in the State’s proof and no error in either the trial court’s ruling with regard to the State’s examination of the child rape victim or the consecutive alignment of the sentences. The State’s failure to elect offenses at the close of its case-in-chief was error, but, because the error can be classified as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not rise to the level of plain error. Consequently, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this delayed appeal, Mario Nathaniel Wade, Defendant, challenges his convictions for robbery and carjacking. Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred by failing to require the State to make an election with respect to the carjacking charge, and that he was sentenced improperly. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellee, Michael Edward Cohen, was charged in the Davidson County Criminal Court with sexual exploitation of a minor involving more than one hundred images, a Class B felony. He filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that he turned over the images to a police officer involuntarily after the officer threatened to obtain a search warrant for his residence when the officer did not have probable cause for a warrant. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the motion, and the State appeals. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A patient died after a fall at a state-owned rehabilitation facility. The administrator of the deceased patient’s estate filed a monetary claim against the State of Tennessee for negligently creating or maintaining a dangerous condition on real property. The State moved for summary judgment arguing that the claimant lacked sufficient evidence of causation. The Claims Commission agreed and granted summary judgment to the State. Because the claimant lacked sufficient evidence that the State’s conduct more likely than not caused the patient’s fall, we affirm.

Ernesto Perez Aguirre, Petitioner, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a school bullying lawsuit. Doug Zukowski and Aimee Zukowski filed suit in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) on behalf of their son Taylor Alexander Zukowski (“Alex,” who later joined the suit in his own right after turning 18) (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) against the Hamilton County Department of Education (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs alleged that Alex was bullied while a student at Chattanooga’s Center for Creative Arts (“CCA”), a public fine arts magnet school, and that Defendant breached its duty of care to protect Alex. Plaintiffs appeal, raising a number of issues. We find that the record does not contain the requisite clear and convincing evidence necessary to overturn the Trial Court’s credibility determinations. We also find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual finding that Defendant’s employees responded appropriately when Alex reported to them that he was bullied. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Dwaquille Raheem Jabal, appeals the dismissal of his motion for sentence modification, arguing that he continued to serve his sentence beyond the date he was supposed to be placed on probation and that “[i]t would be inequitable for [him] not to be credited with the probation date that he was given.” Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Quinton Cage, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Also before us is the petitioner’s motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 14, to consider post-judgment facts. Because the petitioner’s claim of a double jeopardy violation is not cognizable in a Rule 36.1 motion, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of the motion to correct an illegal sentence. Furthermore, because the post-judgment facts posited by the petitioner do not relate to actions that occurred after the judgment in this case, we deny the petitioner’s motion to consider post-judgment facts.

The Petitioner, Sterling Lamarr Cooper, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Matthew Thomas Dotson (“Defendant”) appeals his Roane County convictions for first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect, for which he received an effective sentence of life without parole. Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his May 3, 2012, statements to law enforcement; (2) the State improperly elicited testimony from a witness regarding Defendant’s prior drug usage and the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s request for a mistrial following such testimony; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting photographs of the victim into evidence; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of amended judgments reflecting proper merger of offenses as outlined below and for the imposition of sentences in Counts 4 and 5.

Petitioner, Darrell Wayne Bumpas, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Terrence Lewis, Petitioner, appeals after the trial court denied post-conviction relief and dismissed his post-conviction petition in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Because Petitioner failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Terry Newsom, of evading arrest, reckless endangerment, and driving with a suspended license. The trial court imposed an effective three-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction and ordered the Defendant to pay the fines imposed by the jury. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for reckless endangerment, that the trial court erred when it sentenced him, and that the fines were improperly imposed. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Plaintiff Joseph Riccardi brought this action for negligent construction of his residence against Carl Little Construction Company (“Defendant”), builder of the residence, and the Bridgewater Condominiums Property Owners Association (“Bridgewater POA”). He alleged that Defendant negligently built the residence on non-compacted fill dirt, causing structural and cosmetic damages to the residence. Plaintiff alleged that Bridgewater POA was contractually responsible for repairs to the exterior of the residence. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant based on its finding that the statutes of limitation and repose had run. The court held that Bridgewater POA was liable for repairs to the porches and patios of the property, but not the foundation or the cracks in the interior. We vacate summary judgment against Defendant, finding that Plaintiff presented evidence sufficient to establish genuine issues of material fact regarding when Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued and whether Defendant fraudulently concealed the defects in the residence. We affirm the judgment against Bridgewater POA.

Petitioner, Maurice “Ricky” Blocker, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding effective assistance of counsel at both trial and on appeal. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Sharod Winford Moore, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In the first direct appeal, this court found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction but that the Defendant waived all other issues for failure to file a timely motion for new trial. The Defendant was subsequently granted a delayed appeal. He now argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present unfairly prejudicial evidence of his alleged gang membership, (2) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by making inflammatory and prejudicial remarks about his alleged gang membership in closing argument, (3) the trial court erred in not allowing evidence of the victim’s propensity for intoxication and violence, and (4) the trial court erred in determining that a State’s intellectually disabled witness was competent to testify. We affirm the conviction.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Acting pro se, the former husband fails to present an issue for this Court to review. Because his brief falls well short of the requirements of both the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court, we dismiss the appeal.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Torijon Coplin, of aggravated assault and tampering with evidence, and he received an effective sentence of four years suspended to supervised probation after eleven months and twenty-nine days of service. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and argues the trial court erred in charging the jury as to criminal responsibility. Because the criminal responsibility charge did not include the natural and probable consequences requirement and because the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the tampering with evidence conviction, we reverse the conviction for tampering with evidence and remand for further proceedings. The judgments are otherwise affirmed.