APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The jury returned a verdict for the defendant surgeon and hospital in this medical malpractice action. The plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error at several stages of the trial, including jury selection, witness testimony and jury instructions. We affirm the trial court.

Strategic Capital Resources, Inc. and FPE Funding, LLC sued the buyer and seller of the Pirelli tire plant in Nashville and other parties involved in structuring and financing the transaction. The complaint alleged that the buyer and seller breached an agreement with Strategic, and that other parties were guilty of fraud, inducement of breach of contract, conspiracy, and had been unjustly enriched at the expense of Strategic.. The Chancery Court of Davidson County granted the defendants' Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.06 motion to dismiss because Strategic's contract with the buyers did not bind the buyer to deal exclusively with Strategic. We affirm.

Petitioner pled guilty in state court to second degree murder and aggravated assault. Petitioner contends he was told by trial counsel that a pending first degree murder charge in state court would result in incarceration for life without parole in federal court on related charges. He asserts that trial counsel's performance was deficient resulting in unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas. We disagree and affirm.

The defendant, Edward Korik, appeals the Anderson County Criminal Court's ordering him to serve forty-five days in jail for his guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. He contends that this court should remand his case to the general sessions court, where it originated, with orders that the general sessions court consider his request for work release instead of incarceration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Timothy Tyrone Sanders, was convicted in the Bedford County Circuit Court of one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell. On direct appeal, this court reversed the appellant's conviction because the trial court failed to properly charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession, and we remanded the case for retrial. State v. Timothy Tyrone Sanders, No. M2000-00603-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 38, at **13-14 (Nashville, January 18, 2001). Subsequently, the appellant was once again convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II offender to seventeen years and six months incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In the instant appeal, the appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction, and (2) whether the trial court erred in determining the length of his sentence. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to one count of child abuse, a Class D felony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years to be served on intensive probation. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying him judicial diversion and by imposing as a condition of his probation that he not reside in the same household with children of "tender years." Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On March 6, 1997, the defendant pled guilty to a two-count indictment for passing worthless checks in an amount over $10,000, a Class C felony, and in an amount over $1,000, a Class D felony. He was granted judicial diversion and placed on probation. The trial court subsequently revoked the defendant's diversion and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of four years and six months for the Class C felony and two years for the Class D felony, all suspended except seven months service in the county jail. In this appeal, the defendant contends he should have received full probation or community corrections upon being revoked from judicial diversion. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Don Woody McGowan, was convicted by a Marion County jury of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class E felony. Defendant appeals his conviction, presenting the following issues for review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether he was denied a fair trial by the trial court's denial of his motion to sever the cases when the co-defendant failed to appear on the second day of trial; (3) whether the trial judge erred by failing to recuse himself; and (4) whether his sentence was proper. After a review of the record, we find that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is dismissed.

The defendant was convicted of theft over $500.00, two counts of theft over $1000.00, and driving on a suspended license with prior convictions. He was given an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. The trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after considering and weighing the proper factors and principles set out under sentencing law, and the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.The defendant was convicted of theft over $500.00, two counts of theft over $1000.00, and driving on a suspended license with prior convictions. He was given an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. The trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after considering and weighing the proper factors and principles set out under sentencing law, and the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas Dee Huskey, appeals as of right from his convictions and sentences for aggravated rape, rape, aggravated robbery, robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an aggregate sentence of sixty-six years. The convictions relate to four victims and result from two trials that were consolidated for this appeal. The defendant raises numerous issues. Although we conclude that several errors occurred, only one requires reversal of any convictions. Because of improper consolidation, we reverse the judgments for the three aggravated rape convictions and one especially aggravated kidnapping conviction relating to the victim, D.C., but we affirm the remaining judgments of conviction.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court ordered the Petitioner to serve an effective twenty-six-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions on appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Following a hearing, the court denied post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Because I have no difficulty concluding that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on sexual battery constitutes harmless error according to the standard enunciated in State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 191 (Tenn. 2002), I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the appellant’s convictions of rape. As acknowledged by the majority, our supreme court emphasized in Allen that, “[w]hen a lesser-included offense instruction is improperly omitted, . . . the harmless error inquiry is the same as for other constitutional errors” and entails an examination of both the evidence adduced at trial and the defendant’s theory of defense. Id. As also acknowledged by the majority, RB unequivocally testified at trial that the appellant’s sexual assault upon her included three separate acts of sexual penetration, and her testimony was uncontradicted with the exception of the appellant’s statements to the police denying any sexual activity whatsoever between himself and RB. In other words, the appellant’s defense in this case did not hinge upon the nature of the sexual activity between himself and RB but rather upon whether any sexual activity occurred. Accordingly, with respect to the evidence underlying each count of rape, the appellant was either guilty of the charged offense or entirely innocent. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on sexual battery should not afford the appellant relief.