APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

On October 13, 1998, the three Defendants, Frank E. Huey, Ronnie Finch, and Jeffrey L. Gills, were indicted by a Davidson County grand jury for one count of first degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of felony reckless endangerment. After a jury trial, Defendants Huey and Gills were each convicted of one count of facilitation of first degree murder, two counts of facilitation of attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of felony reckless endangerment. Defendant Finch was convicted of one count of facilitation of first degree murder, two counts of facilitation of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of facilitation of aggravated assault. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing and sentenced Defendants Huey and Gills to effective sentences of 51 years and Defendant Finch to an effective sentence of 49 years. On appeal, all three Defendants contend that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict as evidenced by all three Defendants being convicted of facilitation and none of them convicted of murder, and (2) the sentences imposed by the trial court were excessive. In addition, Defendants Huey and Finch allege that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of previous altercations between the Defendants and the victims. Defendant Finch further contends that the trial court committed plain error by taking his motion for judgment of acquittal under advisement at the conclusion of the State's proof. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Mark Springer, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Adrian Dee Clark, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to serve five (5) years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) sentencing him to five years and (2) denying him probation or alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Aaron Burton, pled guilty to second degree murder in 1997. He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the Defendant's petition was denied, and this Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. See Aaron Burton v. State, No. E1999-01616-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, March 31, 2000). The Defendant subsequently filed the instant proceeding, styled "Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and/or to Reopen." Finding that the Defendant failed to establish any grounds for reopening his previous petition, the trial court denied relief. The Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. The record on appeal is insufficient in that there is no transcript of defendant's guilty plea hearing or other evidence to review. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

The Appellant, Dale Wesley Bell, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1999, Bell pled guilty to nine counts of aggravated burglary and one count of theft in excess of $10,000. Bell, a Range III Persistent Offender, received an effective fifteen-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Bell challenges the validity of his guilty plea upon grounds of: (1) voluntariness and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the McNairy County Circuit Court dismissing the petition.

The Defendant, Jerry McGaha, pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to nine counts of rape of a child. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years for each count with counts one through seven running concurrently with each other and counts eight and nine running concurrently with each other. However, counts eight and nine were to be served consecutively to counts one through seven. On appeal the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to twenty-five (25) years on each count and in ordering counts eight and nine to be served consecutively to counts one through seven. We modify the sentences imposed by the trial court.

The Appellant, Kathy Jane Giles, was convicted by a Henry County jury of DUI, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of drug paraphernalia, and four counts of felony possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver or sell. For these convictions, Giles received an effective three-year Community Corrections sentence with one year to be served in confinement. On appeal, Giles raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) whether she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

The defendant entered pleas of guilty to two counts of manufacturing a Schedule II controlled substance and was sentenced to concurrent three-year sentences. The trial court further ordered that the defendant have split confinement, with supervised probation after serving one year in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals this sentence, arguing that he should be eligible for parole after service of 30% of the sentence, that his sentence should be served at the county workhouse, and that he should receive sentence credits. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Rodney K. Moore, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of sale of cocaine less than .5 grams, a class C felony. Moore was sentenced as a Range II offender, to ten years in the Department of Correction. He now appeals his conviction and sentence, raising the following issues for our review: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the conviction; (2) whether there was cumulative error sufficient to justify a new trial; and (3) whether the trial court erred by sentencing Moore to serve the maximum sentence within his range. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Keith U. Tate, was tried with his co-defendant/brother for aggravated rape. The petitioner was convicted of having committed aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced him to serve seventeen years as a Range II offender. The petitioner filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. The petitioner appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to this Court, and we affirmed the trial court's ruling. See State v. Keith U. Tate, No. 02C01-9406-CR-00132, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 18, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Jan. 19, 1997). Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the trial and appellate levels. After conducting a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now brings this appeal challenging that dismissal. After reviewing the record, we find that the petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The plaintiff sued adjoining landowners asking the court to establish the boundary line between the two properties. The Chancery Court of Marion County held that the line originally ran where the plaintiff claimed but that the plaintiff's claim was barred by laches and adverse possession. We affirm.

The appellant, Christopher D. Neighbours, was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of a felony, namely kidnapping, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. The appellant received a total effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions of both offenses. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An Overton County jury convicted the defendant of possession of cocaine for resale, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. In this appeal, he contends the search warrant was improperly issued, and the trial court erred by not ordering the state to disclose the identity of the confidential informant. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Darryl Lee Elkins, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of child rape, a Class A felony, and attempted child rape, a Class B felony. Defendant received consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for the Class A felony, and twelve years for the Class B felony. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the convictions, arguing that his convictions should be reversed because the “jury improperly accredited the victim’s testimony who committed perjury at trial.” After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments.

Kendrick Jermaine Merritt appeals from his Davidson County conviction of second degree murder for the killing of Julia Lynn Baskette. He claims on appeal that the evidence at trial supports a guilty verdict of no offense greater than voluntary manslaughter and that the trial court excessively sentenced him to a maximum, 25-year term of incarceration. Because we disagree in both respects, we affirm.

The defendants, Timothy Scott Barnes, David Grooms, and Richard Grooms, were convicted of attempted burglary, a Class E felony. The trial court imposed Range I sentences as follows: Timothy Scott Barnes, one year, three months; David Grooms, one year, six months; and Richard Grooms, one year, six months. In this appeal of right, the defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgments are affirmed.

I concur in the majority opinion regarding the child rape conviction. I respectfully disagree regarding the attempted rape conviction. I believe the evidence is insufficient to convict the defendant of any offense above a Class B misdemeanor assault.