APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

After a trial, Defendant, Martin Stuart Hammock, was found guilty by a Davidson County jury of murder first degree. In accordance with the jury's verdict, the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with parole. Also accused of murder first degree was a co-Defendant, Brent Rollins, with Angela Watson being indicted for Accessory After the Fact to murder first degree. The co-Defendants were severed prior to trial. In this direct appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying introduction of testimony from the victim's neighbor, David Thompson, regarding the victim's past violent behavior; and (2) the verdict was contrary to the evidence and law in that the proof was insufficient to support a verdict of guilty. After reviewing the record, we reverse, modify and remand the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Patricia Adkisson, who was charged with 253 counts of animal cruelty and one count of tampering with evidence, was convicted on three counts of animal cruelty. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-202, 39-16-503. The trial court imposed three consecutive terms of 11 months, 29 days, and granted supervised probation. As a condition of probation, the defendant was prohibited from owning any caged animals for a period of five years. The defendant appealed. Later, the trial court revoked probation and a second appeal followed. In this consolidated proceeding, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence gathered during the initial search of her property; (2) the evidence was insufficient; (3) the sentence was improper; and (4) the trial court lacked authority to revoke her probation. Because the search of the defendant's premises violated constitutional principles, the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence which led to the convictions. Accordingly, the convictions are reversed and the causes are remanded.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of theft over $60,000, a Class B felony. The defendant contends in this appeal that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of a state's witness who heard the victim's testimony despite the trial court's order to sequester witnesses; and (2) the trial court erred in not giving an enhanced unanimity instruction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1992, the defendant, Michael Fields, was convicted of two counts of sale of cocaine; the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eight years in community corrections. In 1993, the defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell; the trial court imposed an additional sentence of eight years in community corrections and ordered it to be served concurrently with the 1992 sentences. In February of 1997, the trial court revoked the community corrections sentences and ordered the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentences in the Department of Correction. In May of 1997, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession with intent to sell less than one-half gram of cocaine; the trial court imposed a sentence of three years, consecutive to his prior sentences, for an effective sentence on all offenses of 11 years, and granted probation. On July 1, 1998, a probation violation warrant was filed in all three cases. The defendant was ordered to serve 30 days of periodic confinement for the violations. On August 1, 1999, another probation violation warrant, which was later amended, was served on the defendant. Ultimately, probation in all three cases was revoked. In this appeal of right, the defendant complains that he had completed his sentence and the trial court had no authority to revoke probation. In the alternative, the defendant argues that if the sentence had not been completed, he should have been returned to intensive probation. The judgments are affirmed.

The defendant, Cayle Wayne Harris, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child. The jury assessed a fine of $50,000 for each count and the trial court imposed sentences of twenty-one years for each offense, two terms to be served concurrently and one to be served consecutively. The effective sentence is, therefore, forty-two years. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient. The judgments are affirmed.

The Defendants, Johnie Jefferson and Larry Johnson, were found guilty by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder in No. W1999-00747-CCA-R3-CD. Both Defendants received life sentences with the possibility of parole. The Defendants now appeal, arguing (1) that there was insufficient evidence to convict them of first degree premeditated murder, (2) that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a demonstrative exhibit showing the organizational structure of the Gangster's Disciples, (3) that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to take an exhibit showing the organizational structure of the Gangster's Disciples into the jury room during deliberations, (4) that the trial court erred in admitting for impeachment purposes Jefferson's prior convictions, (5) that the trial court erred in denying Jefferson's motion to sever, and (6) that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the contents of Johnson's car. In addition, Defendant Jefferson sought relief in a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, which was denied by the trial court. Jefferson's appeal from the denial of this petition came before this court in a separate appeal, No. W2000-01970-CCA-R3-CO; however, both cases were consolidated for appellate purposes. We find no reversible error with regard to any of the issues raised; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendants, Matthew DeLoss Larsen and Andrew Lee Matthews, were indicted for aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. Pursuant to negotiated plea agreements, the defendants pled guilty
to robbery, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-401, and aggravated assault, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102, both Class C felonies. The defendants also agreed to serve consecutive sentences, with the manner of service and length of their sentences to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed five-year sentences for each felony conviction and denied any form of alternative sentencing, which resulted in effective sentences of ten years confinement for both defendants. In this appeal, Larsen and Matthews separately challenge their sentences on similar grounds, essentially alleging that the trial court erred by (1) finding no mitigating factors were applicable in their respective cases, and (2) denying both defendants any form of alternative sentencing. Our de novo review reveals that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors. After a thorough review of applicable law and all relevant facts and circumstances in the record, we modify the trial court’s sentencing determination concerning the length of the defendants’ sentence for aggravated assault and affirm all other aspects of the judgment of the trial court.

I agree with the majority opinion in all respects except for the failure to charge the lesser included offense. Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the failure to charge reckless homicide was error, I would find the failure to charge the lesser offense harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Defendant, Jerry W. Jordan, was convicted of second degree murder in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to twenty-two years of imprisonment. In his appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the Defendant’s Due Process and Equal Protection rights were violated when the State excluded four African-American jurors, (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to reckless homicide as a lesser-included offense, and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant to twenty-two years.  We reverse the Defendant’s second degree murder conviction due to the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury regarding reckless homicide as a lesser-included offense to first degree murder.