APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Parrish L. Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentences are illegal and void. Because the convicting court had no jurisdiction to impose an agreed upon sentence in excess of the statutory limits, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for the grant of habeas corpus relief.

This is a state appeal from the dismissal of an indictment based upon a violation of mandatory joinder Rule 8(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendants, Baird and Fisher, and other individuals were first indicted on July 23, 1999, for aggravated gambling promotion. The indictment alleged the illegal activity occurred from August 1998 through December 1998. On October 18, 1999, the defendants pled guilty to aggravated gambling promotion. The defendants and other individuals were again indicted for aggravated gambling promotion on March 21, 2000. This indictment alleged the illegal activity occurred from January 1999 through June 1999, which was prior to the return of the first indictment. The trial court dismissed the second indictment, finding that it violated Rule 8(a) requiring joinder. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery. He contends that (1) insufficient evidence exists to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by not allowing into evidence the guilty plea of co-defendant Dickerson; (3) the trial court erred by not allowing into evidence statements made by co-defendant Dickerson; and (4) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (D.U.I.) second offense, sentenced to fifty days in jail, and ordered to pay a $2,500.00 fine. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of D.U.I., (2) that the trial court erred in admitting the breath alcohol results, and (3) that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An Obion County jury convicted the defendant for one count of felony evasion of arrest, one count of felony reckless endangerment, and one count of misdemeanor evasion of arrest. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six (6) years as a Range II multiple offender for his conviction for felony evasion of arrest, which was merged with his conviction for reckless endangerment. The trial court also sentenced the defendant to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for his conviction for misdemeanor evasion of arrest, to be served concurrently with his sentence for his felony conviction. The defendant filed for a motion for new trial, and the trial court held a hearing on that motion on the same date that it held the sentencing hearing. Subsequently, the defendant filed a second motion for new trial, which the court treated as an amended motion for new trial. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, his sentence, and the trial court's refusal to grant his motion for new trial based on the threatening statements made to jurors during a break in their deliberations. After reviewing the record, we find that none of these claims merit relief and therefore affirm the defendant's conviction.

One day before his scheduled jury trial for first degree murder, the appellant sought and was granted the right to represent himself. He now appeals from his conviction by a Shelby County jury for the offense of first degree murder, asserting that the convicting evidence was insufficient and that the trial court denied him his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and sentenced to twelve years in confinement. His conviction was affirmed by this court on direct appeal. He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner appealed. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Williamson County grand jury indicted the defendant on one count of possession of not less than ten pounds, one gram of marijuana nor more than seventy pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver. Through counsel the defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence or statements resulting from the allegedly unconstitutional search of the defendant's vehicle. When the motion to suppress was denied, the defendant waived his right to a trial by jury and pled guilty as charged. For this offense the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years, which would be suspended after the service of one hundred days, day for day; placed him on supervised probation for a period of four years; and fined him five thousand dollars. According to the Negotiated Plea Agreement form, there was also an agreement with the State that the defendant would later submit a certified question of law to this Court. Through this appeal the defendant asks us to consider two search related issues. However, the State asserts that the defendant did not properly reserve the certified questions, and, thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider them. Finding the State's position has merit, we, therefore, dismiss this appeal.

The defendant, Daniel Ray Styles, was convicted of felony escape, aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, theft over $1,000, and aggravated criminal trespassing. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fourteen years. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to dismiss his case on the ground that his right to a speedy trial was violated; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictments; (3) whether the indictment charging felony escape was facially void because it was unsigned; and (4) whether the trial court erred by failing to require the State to make an election between aggravated assault and aggravated robbery. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court regarding Defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated robbery, felony escape, and aggravated criminal trespassing. However, we reverse and dismiss Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and theft as violative of constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.

The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary and that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. In a timely appeal to this court, the petitioner raises the issue of whether the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. After a careful review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Randall Ray Mills, was convicted in the Marshall County Circuit Court of one count of rape of a child, three counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of casual exchange. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged all of the defendant's convictions of aggravated sexual battery into the conviction of rape of a child and sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Additionally, the State challenges the trial court's merger of the aggravated sexual battery convictions into the rape of a child conviction and further contends that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court and remand for resentencing.

A Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for premeditated first degree murder. The defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and sentenced to 24 years as a violent offender. In this appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erroneously neglected to charge the jury on the lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide; and (3) the defendant's sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the failure to charge the lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide was, at most, harmless error. The defendant's remaining allegations of error are without merit; thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that the trial court’s erroneous failure to instruct the jury on reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide as lesser-included offenses of first degree murder is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Appellant, Barry N. Waddell, proceeding pro se, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court found Waddell's petition was time-barred. On appeal, Waddell argues that: (1) his petition was timely filed, and (2) alternatively, if the petition was untimely filed, the statute of limitations was tolled under the holding of Dexter Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001). After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.