APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Greene County jury convicted the Defendant of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the propriety of the sentence imposed by the trial court. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that the sentence is proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant pled nolo contendere to one count of felony child neglect, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, one count of possession of marijuana, and two counts of public intoxication. At issue in this appeal is the sentence for felony child neglect, a Class D felony for which the Defendant received a two-year Community Corrections sentence. Subsequently, based upon a warrant alleging that the Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his Community Corrections sentence, the trial court revoked the Defendant's Community Corrections sentence and increased his original sentence from two years to four years, to be served with the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court improperly enhanced his two-year sentence for felony child neglect to four years and that the court erred by failing to impose some form of alternative sentencing. We conclude that the trial court properly increased the length of the Defendant's sentence from two to four years and that the Defendant's prison sentence was properly imposed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Loudon County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The Defendant's first jury trial resulted in a mistrial. Following a second trial, a Loudon County jury convicted the Defendant of the offense charged. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days incarceration, with all but four days suspended, and fined him $400. The Defendant now appeals his conviction, arguing (1) that insufficient evidence was presented to support his conviction; and (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction, and we conclude that the Defendant received adequate representation at trial. We thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Lisa White, a/k/a Lisa Croft, appeals her conviction for aggravated robbery. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and alleges she was prejudiced by allegedly improper remarks by the prosecutor during opening arguments. After a thorough review of the record, this Court disagrees and affirms the appellant's conviction.

The defendant, Mary Christine Whiteside Cook, seeks to appeal as of right from the trial court's denying her petition to enforce a plea bargain agreement and her request for a writ of habeas corpus. She asserts that pursuant to the agreement, she is entitled to immediate release from her imprisonment, which results from her 1986 conviction upon her plea of guilty to first degree murder. We are constrained to dismiss the appeal because of the lack of jurisdiction.

The issues in this interlocutory appeal by the state, as we view them, are straightforward: (1) whether the Supreme Court of Tennessee has the authority by rule to prohibit a full-time municipal judge from representing a defendant or otherwise practicing law after 180 days from assuming judicial office; and (2) if so, whether the Supreme Court of Tennessee intended exactly what the rule says. We conclude that it does and did. We further conclude that a violation of this Supreme Court Rule is prejudicial to the judicial process, and the issue is not waived by the failure of the opposing party to request disqualification at its first opportunity to do so. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court which declined to disqualify defendant's attorney, a sitting judge, from further participation in this case.

The Appellant, Waylon D. Knott, was indicted by a Stewart County Grand Jury on one count of manufacturing methamphetamine, one count of possession with intent to sell methamphetamine, and one count of felony possession of drug paraphernalia. Following a traffic stop for improper registration, Knott, after first refusing, granted consent to search his vehicle, which resulted in the seizure of a quantity of drugs. Knott moved to suppress the evidence upon grounds that consent was not voluntarily given. The trial court granted Knott's motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment, finding that the "search was unconstitutional because the officer had no reasonable, articulable suspicion of further criminal activity to justify the request to search the vehicle and further detain [Knott]." The State appeals from the trial court's ruling asserting that Knott's consent was voluntary and therefore the search was valid. We find that the dispositive issues presented are: (1) whether Knott was unlawfully detained at the time that he consented to the search and, if so; (2) whether Knott's consent to search was voluntarily given. Because no findings were entered relevant to these issues, we are required to remand for findings of fact on these questions. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded.

The Appellant, Donald W. Rhea, Jr. was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery stemming from a single criminal episode. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Rhea pled guilty to the lesser offenses of robbery and attempt to commit robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, the Davidson County Criminal Court sentenced Rhea to the maximum sentence of six years for robbery and three years for attempted robbery. The court, finding Rhea's history of criminal activity extensive, further ordered that these sentences be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of nine years in the Department of Correction. Rhea appeals to this court, contending that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. After review of the record, we affirm.

The defendant appeals from the trial court's imposition of the maximum sentences within the range. The State agrees that the trial court erred in applying enhancement factor (7). After review, we conclude that neither enhancement factor (7) nor (15) is applicable under these facts. Therefore, the defendant's sentence is modified to the statutorily required sentences of eight years in the Department of Correction at 100 percent for the aggravated sexual battery offense and to three years on each attempted aggravated sexual battery offense.

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition. He claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and his plea of guilty was involuntarily entered. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, he contends that the trial court denied him an opportunity to have a full and fair hearing on the merits of his claim. After review, we agree with the trial court and affirm the dismissal.

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because trial counsel failed to call certain witnesses and did not call the petitioner to testify on his own behalf at trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petitioner any relief.

The appellant, Ronald W. Byrd, was convicted in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of attempt to commit aggravated kidnapping, aggravated criminal trespass, and resisting arrest. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of six years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court should have permitted the jury to consider the issue of whether the appellant's conduct was fairly motivated by his desire to make a citizen's arrest; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction of attempted aggravated kidnapping. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Phillip Michael Cisson, entered pleas of guilt on two counts of burglary and two counts of theft over $1,000. The plea agreement provided for concurrent two-year sentences on each conviction. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court erroneously denied probation. The judgment is affirmed.