APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Anthony Lee Carter, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court conviction for driving as a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”), for which he received a six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that after his arrest and before his trial, our legislature amended the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act such that the Defendant was entitled to the benefit of a lesser penalty under our criminal savings statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-112 (savings statute), 55-10-601 (MVHO Act). Following our review, we conclude that when the legislature removed the offense of driving as a MVHO and the associated penalty and replaced it with a mechanism for MVHOs to petition for reinstatement of their driver’s licenses, the legislature enacted a lesser penalty. As a result, the Defendant should benefit from the lesser penalty pursuant to the criminal savings statute.

The Defendant, Lashawn Shannon, appeals his convictions for aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of nine years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Quinton Devon Perry, entered guilty pleas to eighteen counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony, and six counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor where the number of exploitive materials exceeded twenty-five, a Class B felony under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-17-1004(a)(1) and (2).  The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing and imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment.  In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues the trial court erred in applying certain enhancement factors and in imposing partial consecutive sentencing.  Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

We granted this extraordinary appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the trial court considered the proper statute, the relevant facts, and the arguments advanced by the parties, we conclude that the application for an extraordinary appeal was improvidently granted. We therefore dismiss this appeal.

The Defendant, Riley Christopher Wilburn, was convicted of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, by a Giles County Circuit Court jury. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2020). The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with thirty days to be served in jail and the balance to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the basis that the indictment was fatally flawed because it alleged two offenses in a single count. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his son. The trial court found grounds for termination based on persistent conditions and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody or financial responsibility. It also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child. We reverse the trial court’s finding of persistent conditions but otherwise affirm the termination of parental rights and remand.

In this health care liability action, an initial jury trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant physicians. The plaintiff filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court granted. Prior to the second jury trial, the trial court determined that the trial should be bifurcated such that the first phase would address only the applicable standard of care and whether the defendants deviated therefrom, and the second phase would address causation. Following completion of the standard of care phase, the jury again ruled in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff filed a second motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. The plaintiff timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this consolidated appeal, the Petitioner, Robert Jason Burdick, appeals the denial of his two post-conviction petitions and dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. With regard to his post-conviction petitions, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to challenge the trial court’s enhancement of his sentence and failure to file a motion to suppress the State’s warrantless attachment of a GPS tracking device to his vehicle. With regard to the petition for writ of error coram nobis, the Petitioner argues that the coram nobis court erred in summarily dismissing his petition and that he is entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations. After review, we affirm the judgments of the lower court.      

This case arises from a defamation and false light lawsuit filed in the General Sessions Court for Wilson County (the “general sessions court”). The action was dismissed pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (the “TPPA”) and the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Circuit Court for Wilson County (the “circuit court”). After concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the circuit court transferred the case to this Court. On appeal, the parties dispute whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction, and the defendant argues that the ruling of the general sessions court should be affirmed. We conclude that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide this appeal and, discerning no error, we affirm the decision of the general sessions court dismissing the plaintiffs’ legal action pursuant to the TPPA. 

The Defendants, Glenn Brown and Thomas Byrd, were jointly tried before a Knox County Criminal Court jury on a number of drug and gun-related offenses. At the conclusion of the trial, both Defendants were convicted of possession with the intent to sell/deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, possession with the intent to sell/deliver a controlled substance analogue, and possession of marijuana. Defendant Brown was alone convicted of the various gun-related charges, including employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been previously convicted of a felony. In this consolidated appeal, Defendant Byrd challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his felony convictions and argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his failure to contest the forfeiture of the large amount of cash seized from him. Defendant Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his felony drug and employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony convictions and argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of the traffic stop and in issuing inconsistent oral and written jury instructions that prevented unanimity of the verdicts. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a foreclosure sale of the plaintiff’s property. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s action alleging, in part, that the action violated the statute of limitations. In response, the plaintiff alleged that his action was timely due to equitable estoppel. The Trial Court granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants. Taking the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint as true, the plaintiff pled sufficient facts in his complaint to support a claim of equitable estoppel for purposes of the statute of limitations. Therefore, we hold that the Trial Court erred by granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6).

This is a detainer action concerning real property owned by the decedent and sold at a trustee’s sale. The trial court granted possession of the property to the purchaser. We now affirm the decision on appeal.

In this Rule 10 extraordinary appeal, the plaintiff seeks review of the trial court’s decision to grant a new trial on the basis of an improper comment made during closing arguments, despite the fact that a curative instruction was given. Having reviewed all of the grounds asserted in support of the motion for new trial, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion.

Appellant, acting pro se, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his writ of mandamus for failure to state a claim and to comply with procedural requirements. We do not reach the merits of the appeal due to Appellant’s failure to comply with the briefing requirements outlined in Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee and Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Defendant, Joshua Williams, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated burglary, four counts of attempted first degree murder, twelve counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, four counts of aggravated assault, and two counts of felon in possession of a firearm and was given a total effective sentence of sixty-eight years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of attempted first degree murder. After thorough review, we disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Steven Dare Steelman, Jr., appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s order dismissing his petition for
post-conviction relief as untimely. The Petitioner’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 22 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that counsel’s motion is well-taken and, in accordance with Rule 22(F), affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Javaris Wilson, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and second degree murder under alternate theories of guilt for the same killing. The second degree murder conviction was merged into the first degree murder conviction, for which the Defendant received a life sentence. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Demetrie Darnell Owens, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of two counts of simple possession of cocaine, Class A misdemeanors; possession of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school or park with intent to sell, a Class B felony; attempted possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class C felony; two counts of simple possession of Xanax, Class A misdemeanors; two counts of simple possession of methamphetamine, Class A misdemeanors; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and simple possession of Suboxone, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to an effective term of twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing a State’s witness to testify concerning statements and text messages made by an unavailable witness; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (3) the trial court’s instruction that two individuals were accomplices as a matter of law amounted to a comment on the proof; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.   

This is an appeal from the trial court’s judgment finding Husband in civil contempt for his failure to comply with certain monetary obligations under the parties’ final decree of divorce. In addition to finding Husband in contempt, the court entered a monetary judgment against Husband and awarded Wife attorney’s fees in connection with the proceedings. Husband argues that the trial court erred in finding him in civil contempt, contending that he does not have the present ability to pay. He does not object to any other aspect of the trial court’s order, including the judgment entered against him. For her part, Wife raises an issue regarding the amount of the trial court’s award of her attorney’s fees. We vacate the trial court’s finding Husband in civil contempt and remand for reconsideration of Husband’s ability to pay, and we further vacate the trial court’s award of Wife’s attorney’s fees and remand for reconsideration.

A police officer pursued and shot a man whom she encountered outside her home at two in the morning. After the man died from his injuries, his parents and estate brought suit in the Bradley County Circuit Court against the officer, the sheriff who supervised her, and the county, alleging negligence and violation of the man’s rights under federal law and the United States Constitution. Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee (“the district court”). The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the federal civil rights claims and remanded the state law tort claims to the Circuit Court. On remand to the Circuit Court, the claims against the sheriff were voluntarily dismissed and the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment. In reliance on the district court’s legal conclusions, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the police officer based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel and to the Bradley County government based on governmental immunity. Plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, we hold that collateral estoppel bars the claims against both the police officer and the county. Accordingly, we affirm.

In this termination of parental rights action, the mother has appealed the juvenile court’s final order terminating her parental rights to the minor children, Aayden C. and Patrick C. (“the Children”), based on three statutory grounds. On October 11, 2019, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the mother’s and the father’s parental rights to the Children. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of both parents upon its determination by clear and convincing evidence that the mother and the father (1) had abandoned the Children by failing to provide a suitable home; (2) were in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and (3) had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Children. The juvenile court further found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Children’s best interest to terminate the parental rights of both parents.1 The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The defendant, Joseph Donald McIntire, pled guilty to attempted introduction of contraband into a penal facility and, after a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of eight years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in enhancing his sentence to eight years and requiring that he serve the entirety of his sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jeffery Combs, was found guilty by a jury of eighteen counts of forgery and one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, and he received a twelve-year sentence in confinement. After this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief contending that trial counsel was ineffective because trial counsel failed to: consult a handwriting expert and properly advise the Petitioner of the cost of retaining one; thoroughly investigate or pursue a misidentification defense by seeking professional assistance to enhance the surveillance video and interviewing witnesses; consult with the Petitioner prior to trial; and convey a plea offer. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. We affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Defendant, Blaze Valentino Burkett, appeals as of right from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and his being ordered to serve the remainder of his ten-year sentence for possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probationary sentence and that an alternative to full incarceration should have been imposed to allow him to seek treatment for his methamphetamine addiction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal of this action concerning the enforceability of a licensing ordinance applicable to sexually oriented businesses in the City of Knoxville. The trial court found the ordinance lawful upon remand from this court and granted summary judgment in favor of the City. We affirm.