APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In 2017, the Petitioner, Winford Paul Wilhoite, pleaded guilty as charged in case number 25743 to possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine, simple possession of Lortab, possession of drug paraphernalia, criminal impersonation, and driving on a revoked license (second offense). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-434, 3917-418, 39-17-425, 39-16-301, 55-50-504. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, in part, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel for the Petitioner was appointed, and an amended petition was filed. The postconviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.  

This appeal arises from a mother and a stepfather’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights to his daughter. The mother and father were married and had a son and a daughter. When they divorced, they agreed to a permanent parenting plan allowing the father equal parenting time with their son but no parenting time with their daughter. In the three and a half years preceding the filing of the petition to terminate the father’s rights, the father fully exercised his parenting time with their son, but he had no contact with their daughter and did not request a modification of the permanent parenting plan. The petitioners alleged three grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights to his daughter—abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and -113(g)(1), and failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). The trial court determined that the petitioners proved one of the three grounds, abandonment by failure to visit; however, it found that they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the daughter’s best interests to terminate the father’s rights. Accordingly, the court denied the petition to terminate the father’s parental rights to his daughter. On appeal, the petitioners contend the trial court erred in denying their petition because the evidence clearly and convincingly established that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the daughter’s best interests. They also contend the trial court erred in finding that they did not prove the father failed to manifest an ability or willingness to assume physical custody as codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). For his part, the father contends his failure to visit was not willful; therefore, the petitioners failed to prove any ground for termination of his parental rights. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the father abandoned his daughter by failure to visit during the requisite period of time as codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). We affirm its determination that the petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the essential elements of the ground codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). We also affirm the trial court’s determination that the petitioners failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the daughter’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the petition.

The Defendant-Appellant, Madaryl Hampton, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury with multiple counts of drug and weapon related offenses, all stemming from a single encounter with the Jackson Police Department (JPD). These counts were severed into two trials, one dealing with the drug related offenses and the other the weapon related offenses. In the first trial, the Defendant was convicted of two counts of simple possession of marijuana. In his second trial, the Defendant was convicted of four counts of being a felon in possession of a weapon. The trial court merged each of these counts and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to twenty years’ imprisonment for the weapon offenses to be served consecutively to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment for the possession of marijuana convictions. While the issues presented in this appeal as of right involve facts from the Defendant’s first trial, the Defendant challenges only the felon in possession of a weapon convictions in arguing that: (1) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to admit evidence that the Defendant was in possession of marijuana, digital scales, and cash; (2) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to comment on the credibility of the Defendant and the witnesses during closing arguments; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Calvin M. Courter, pleaded guilty to reckless aggravated assault, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102, for which he received a three-year probationary sentence, with an additional 30 days to be served on weekends. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

The Petitioner, Yangreek Tut Wal, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his guilty pleas to two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of especially aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of forty years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which resulted in his guilty pleas being unknowing and involuntary. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Anthony Lebron Vance, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of rape, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-503 (2018). The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years at 100% and imposed the sentence consecutively to the Defendant’s ten-year sentence in another case. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Gabriel Buchanon, was found guilty by a jury of three counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated burglary, and he received an effective twenty-three-year sentence. After this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief contending that trial counsel was ineffective. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Delshun Jones, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Santos Morales, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B Felony. See T.C.A § 39-13-504 (2018). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years at 100% service and ordered the Defendant to register as a sexual offender. See T.C.A § 40-39-201 (2019). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Lamar Hudson, filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty plea for attempted second degree murder and the resulting ten-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to obtain body camera footage and that the resulting guilty plea was, therefore, entered involuntarily. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner relief.

The petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and evading arrest. In this appeal, the petitioner alleges that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and that the
post-conviction court erred by denying his motions for a continuance and to inspect grand jury materials. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, a state prison inmate, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for a declaratory judgment, in which he alleged that the respondents, Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”); TDOC Sentence Management; TDOC Commissioner Tony Parker; and CoreCivic, Inc., Records Officials (“CoreCivic”) (collectively, “Respondents”), miscalculated his release eligibility date and sentence expiration date. The trial court dismissed the petition upon finding that the petitioner had failed to comply with the court’s two orders notifying the petitioner that his case would be dismissed if he did not pay the initial partial filing fee required under Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-807, file an affidavit of indigency, and submit copies of his petition and summons for each respondent with the court clerk. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. 

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Bobby Joe Young, Jr., appeals the revocation of the sentences of probation imposed for his convictions of aggravated assault, robbery, and escape, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of the total effective sentence in confinement and that the trial court miscalculated the remaining balance of the total effective sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Warren County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua Travis Griffith, of three counts of aggravated statutory rape, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of three years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court: (1) erroneously allowed the State to present evidence outside the scope of the indictment, as well as evidence of his transmission of hepatitis B to the victim, which should have been excluded pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) erroneously failed to declare a mistrial after the State’s motion to amend the indictment in the presence of the jury; and (3) erroneously failed to grant his motion for judgments of acquittal. He lastly contends that the cumulative effect of the errors violated his right to a fair trial. After review, we conclude that errors occurred during trial; however, consistent with our conclusion that those errors were harmless, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

The Appellant, Ralpheal Cameron Coffey, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of various offenses, including four counts of possession of more than one-half gram of cocaine with intent to sell and deliver within one thousand feet of a school, Class A and B felonies, and two counts of vehicular homicide, Class C felonies. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged some of the convictions and ordered that the Appellant serve an effective forty-eight-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support some of the convictions, that the trial court erred by admitting the cocaine into evidence because there was a “break” in the chain of custody, and that his effective forty-eight-year sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Randy Massey, appeals the Giles County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his six-year sentence for aggravated assault in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a divorce involving one minor child. In fashioning an initial parenting schedule, the trial court named the mother primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and entered a parenting plan awarding 242 days of parenting time to the mother and 123 days to the father. The father appealed. Because we conclude that the trial court’s order regarding the residential parenting schedule does not contain sufficient findings of fact such that meaningful appellate review is possible, we vacate the order as to the parenting plan and remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review.   

The issue in this appeal is whether the Plaintiff’s lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  The Plaintiff originally filed suit against the Defendant in the Circuit Court for Shelby County in May 2014.  Unbeknownst to the parties, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the lawsuit for failure to prosecute.  Upon learning of the dismissal over ten months later, the Plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal.  The trial court denied the Plaintiff’s request to set aside the dismissal but, articulating an erroneous reading of Rule 41.02(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, entered an order that stated the dismissal did not bar the Plaintiff from refiling its lawsuit.  When the Plaintiff refiled its lawsuit in August 2017, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of res judicata.  Despite language to the contrary in its prior order, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion, holding that the dismissal of the original lawsuit operated as an adjudication on the merits.  A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the second lawsuit.  We conclude that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the Plaintiff’s lawsuit.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and reinstate the Plaintiff’s lawsuit.

After being denied parole and exhausting all administrative remedies, an inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The chancery court dismissed the petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 because the inmate had unpaid court costs from previous litigation. Finding no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, James Yates, of aggravated robbery and assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for entry of a judgment form in count 2.

The petitioner, Mario Norfleet, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Casey L. Redmon, appeals from the McNairy County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his 2014 guilty-pleaded conviction of burglary. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily denying his petition for being untimely filed. Specifically, he argues that he is serving an illegal sentence based upon the Tennessee Department of Correction’s (TDOC) incorrect calculation of his sentence and that an illegal sentence can be remedied at any time. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Derious Grandberry, was convicted at trial of carjacking and aggravated robbery. He received an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offenses, that the trial court erred by failing to weigh the evidence itself as the thirteenth juror, that the trial court erred in allowing the State to admit the victim’s photographic lineup identification of him into evidence, and that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Nathan Craig, pled guilty to robbery and was sentenced to four years, suspended to a ten-year sentence of supervised probation. Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant alleging that Defendant had violated the terms of his probation. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of the four-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.