| Todd Hutcheson v. Irving Materials
M2002-03064-COA-R3-CV
Plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract and negligence alleging that concrete provided by Defendant did not meet specifications. Defendant filed counterclaim for Plaintiff's unpaid bill. Plaintiff failed to timely respond to requests for admissions. Defendant filed motion to have requests deemed admitted, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff took no remedial action until seven months later, after Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment that was primarily based on the now disputed admissions. Plaintiff then filed Tenn. R. Civ. P. 36.02 motion for relief from the admissions. Trial court denied Plaintiff's motion for relief, granted Defendant's summary judgment, awarding damages against Plaintiff, and dismissed Plaintiff's cause of action against Defendant. This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Plaintiff's motion for relief pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 36.02, and the trial court's granting of Defendant's motion for summary judgment, rendering judgment in favor of Defendant. We affirm the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank Clement, Jr.
Originating Judge:Robert E. Burch |
Cheatham County | Court of Appeals | 01/16/01 | |
| John Rogers, Sr. vs. Est. of Newton Russell, Larry Holbert, Pers. Rep .
E2000-01054-COA-R3-CV
Plaintiff's claim in Probate Court against the estate of his stepfather was denied by the Probate Court because it was not filed timely. The Probate Court advised Plaintiff, who appeared at the hearing pro se, that he should seek counsel if he wished to challenge the ruling of the Probate Court. Although Plaintiff immediately retained counsel, no further action was taken on the matter for eleven months. With new counsel, Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Set Aside Order Denying Claim pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 60.02. This Motion was heard on the pleadings, documents in the case file, including the Affidavit of Plaintiff, and arguments of counsel. The Probate Court dismissed the Motion. We affirm the Judgment of the Probate Court.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Hugh E. Delozier |
Blount County | Court of Appeals | 01/16/01 | |
| Sheila Goodner and Amy Goodner vs. Arthur Sass
E2000-00837-COA-R3-CV
The Trial Judge granted defendant's Motion to Dismiss for insufficient process. We reverse and remand.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Originating Judge:L. Marie Williams |
Hamilton County | Court of Appeals | 01/16/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. James E. (Junebug) Ligon
M1999-02461-CCA-R3-CD
A Cheatham County jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated burglary and theft for breaking into his neighbor's home and stealing two television sets, a VCR, and a computer. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years for the aggravated burglary count and as a career offender to twelve years for the theft count, with the sentences to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; the failure of the trial court to order a mistrial based on testimony alluding to the defendant's criminal past; and the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the crime of accessory after the fact on the theory that it is a lesser-included offense of both indicted offenses. Finding the evidence sufficient and no other reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Originating Judge:Judge Allen W. Wallace |
Cheatham County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 01/12/01 | |
| Anna D. Nicholson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
M1999-01137-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the SpecialWorkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded. The employee or claimant, Nicholson, commenced this civil action on May 8, 1996, seeking recovery of medical and disability benefits under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law, for an injury that occurred in November, 1994. After a trial on the merits, the trial judge found that the claimant became aware that her injury was work related on April 25, 1995, thirteen days more than one year before the suit was filed, and concluded the action was therefore barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-23. The court further found that there was no evidence of a voluntary payment of benefits on behalf of the claimant by the employer, Wal-Mart, within one year of the date of commencement. The claimant contends the record does contain such evidence. It is significant that the trial judge also found that the injured employee's claim for the employer's group health insurance benefits and employer's group short term disability benefits were denied on June 5, 1995 and June 24, 1995 respectively, because her injury was work related. It is also significant that the trial judge found that her claim for workers' benefits was not denied until August 9, 1995. We note that no issue is taken with respect to these three events, all of which occurred within one year of commencement of this civil action. Appellate review of findings of fact by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). This standard requires the panel to examine in depth the trial court's findings and conclusions. This tribunal is not bound by the trial court's factual findings but instead conducts an independent examination to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Carol A. Catalano, Chancellor |
Montgomery County | Workers Compensation Panel | 01/12/01 | |
| Richard Scott Stainforth v. Chemetals, Inc.,
M1999-00459-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant gradually developed pain in his hands and arms at work, which he reported to the employer on March 9, 1998. He was referred to Dr. Wade Reynolds, who diagnosed tendinitis of the thumbs, restricted him from repetitive use of the thumbs and prescribed non-narcotic medication. The claimant continued working with pain and was later referred to Dr. John McInnis, who treated him for swollen thumbs, but did nothing to alleviate the pain in his hands and arms. Dr. McInnis prescribed pain medication, which was helpful, but the claimant continued to suffer from pain in his hands and arms and swelling in his thumbs. In his deposition, Dr. McInnis said the claimant had arthritis in both thumbs and opined the injury would not cause any permanent medical impairment. The claimant was evaluated by Dr. Joseph Boals, who made a report on a form prescribed by the director of the workers' compensation division and a narrative report, both of which are included in the record. Dr. Boals diagnosed overuse syndrome in both upper extremities, manifested by mild carpal tunnel syndrome, severe arthritis of the thumbs and decreased grip strength, causally related to the work the claimant was doing. He estimated the claimant's permanent impairment at twenty percent to each arm. The trial judge found that the claimant suffered an injury byaccident arising out of and in the course of employment and awarded, inter alia, permanent partial disability benefits based on sixty- two and one-half percent to both arms. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The reviewing tribunal is not bound by a trial court's factual findings but instead conducts an independent examination to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:C. Creed Mcginley, Judge |
Scott County | Workers Compensation Panel | 01/12/01 | |
| Gregory Childress v. Winsett-Simmonds, Inc. & Usf&G Ins. Co.
M1997-00164-SC-WCM-CV
The appellant-employee argues that the employee proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a work-related injury which caused him permanent injury. The employee also argues that the trial court erred by ordering the appellant to pay the cost of the entire transcript. The employer argues that the trial court erred in not allowing the employer to be reimbursed for previously paid workers' compensation benefits. The employer also argues that the trial court was correct in its determination of what items were to be included in the appellate court record. As discussed below, the panel has concluded that the trial court should be affirmed on all points.
Authoring Judge: Thomas W. Brothers, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Ellen Hobbs Lyle, |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 01/11/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Danny Wayne Ratliff
E2000-00673-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant appeals his conviction of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and vandalism under $500.00. He contends the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict of the jury, the sentence of two years was excessive, and the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to community corrections with the condition that he serve 200 days in the county jail. We find no error and affirm the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Acree
Originating Judge:Judge Phyllis H. Miller |
Sullivan County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 01/11/01 | |
| Jesse Daniel Hall v. State of Tennessee
W2000-01712-CCA-R3-PC
This is a post-conviction appeal. In 1988, appellant was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and received a life sentence. Thereafter, the appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, attacking his conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief, and this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Subsequently, the appellant filed the instant three petitions for post-conviction relief. Two of appellant's petitions attack the validity of the petitioner's convictions for grand larceny and third degree burglary, which were used to enhance his 1988 sentence for robbery with a deadly weapon. The third petition addresses the 1988 sentence and attacks the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to another of petitioner's prior convictions. The trial court summarily dismissed the petitions for failing to comply with the applicable statute of limitations and failing to state an appropriate ground upon which a successive petition could be lodged. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the petitions is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Originating Judge:Judge Bernie Weinman |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 01/11/01 | |
| Javius vs. Javius
M2000-00314-COA-R3-CV
After a stormy and sometimes violent marriage, the trial court awarded a divorce to the wife, divided the marital property, and ordered the husband to pay alimony. The husband claims on appeal that the wife's fault should have resulted in the divorce being granted to both parties; that the property was divided in an inequitable manner; and that the trial court should have ordered rehabilitative alimony rather than alimony in futuro. We affirm the grant of divorce to the wife and the property division, but modify the alimony award.
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Originating Judge:Jeffrey S. Bivins |
Williamson County | Court of Appeals | 01/11/01 | |
| Clarence Lewis vs. State
M2000-01529-COA-R3-CV
A prisoner in the custody of the Department of Correction suffered a severe hand injury while working in a prison industries workshop. He submitted a claim to the Tennessee Claims Commission, contending that negligence on the part of his supervisors caused his injuries. Following a hearing, the Commissioner dismissed his claim, finding that the prisoner's own negligence was more than 50% of the cause of his injuries. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
|
Court of Appeals | 01/10/01 | ||
| Madge Fell,e t al vs. Gloria Rambo, et al
M2000-02100-COA-R3-CV
This case is before the Court on appeal from the action of the trial judge in overruling a Rule 60.02 Motion for Relief From a Final Judgment. Non-jury trial on the merits of the case resulted in a judgment of the trial court finding no lack of capacity of Nannie Bell Crockett and no undue influence exerted upon her. That same final judgment held that Plaintiffs, as remaindermen, under the will of John E. Crockett, received at the death of Nannie Bell Crockett, the remaining proceeds from the sale of a farm during her lifetime, which farm had been willed to her for life by her husband, John E. Crockett, with unlimited power of disposition. On appeal, this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, finding that the pre-1981 version of Tennessee Code Annotated section 66-1-106 (1993) applied to the case, and that the sale of the farm by the life tenant with unlimited power of disposition, terminated the interest of the remaindermen, and that the remaindermen were not entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the farm still remaining in the possession of Nannie Bell Crockett at the time of her death. This judgment is now final and is reported in Fell v. Rambo, 36 S.W.2d 837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). On remand, the trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion in issue on this appeal and we affirm the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Originating Judge:Lee Russell |
Marshall County | Court of Appeals | 01/10/01 | |
| Lon Walker v. William Cameron
M2000-01903-COA-R3-CV
This is a legal malpractice action which was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. Fourteen months before suit was filed the plaintiff sent a holographic letter to the Disciplinary Counsel complaining, in considerable detail, of the defendant's purported shortcomings. The trial judge held that the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Judgment affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Originating Judge:John J. Maddux |
Putnam County | Court of Appeals | 01/10/01 | |
| State Dept. of Children's Services vs. T.M.L.
M2000-01785-COA-R3-JV
The juvenile court granted a petition to terminate parental rights to three of the children of a Nashville woman. On appeal, the mother challenges the termination in regard to her oldest child only, on the ground that it is not in the child's best interest to be permanently separated from her. We affirm the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Originating Judge:Betty Adams Green |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 01/10/01 | |
| Omawali Ashanti Shabazz, a/k/a Fred Dean vs. Donal Campbell, et al
M2000-01780-COA-R3-CV
Appellant, a prison inmate, filed suit under the Tennessee Public Records Act against the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and others seeking disclosure to him of various records alleged to be public records, together with injunctive relief. The Chancellor dismissed the complaint with prejudice and we affirm the Chancellor.
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Originating Judge:Ellen Hobbs Lyle |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 01/10/01 | |
| Shelby Abbott, et al. v. Blount County, Tennessee, et al.
E2004-00637-SC-R11-CV
This Court granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether summary judgment was appropriately granted by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the plaintiffs were made whole by the amounts paid by Blount County and the tortfeasors. As part of this determination, we find that issues of material fact also exist regarding whether Blount County has a right to reimbursement. Additionally, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Blount County waived its claim to subrogation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that summary judgment was inappropriate and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Originating Judge:W. Dale Young |
Blount County | Supreme Court | 01/10/01 | |
| Phelps and Amanda Lee Phelps v. Tennessee Woolen
M1998-00666-WC-R3
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to theSpecial Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6- 225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendants, Tennessee Woolen Mills, Inc. and The Travelers Insurance Company appeal the judgment of the Chancery Court of Smith County, where the Trial Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Lana Phelps, finding that there were no material factual issues in dispute on the issue of causation and that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law when the decedent, Joseph Phelps, sustained an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment at Tennessee Woolen Mills when he fell off a ladder and subsequently died of sudden cardiac death. The trial court incorporated its order of partial summary judgment in its final order awarding plaintiff a total recoveryof one hundred forty-five thousand two hundred and four dollars ($145,24.). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a hearing on the merits. Tenn. Code Annotated _5-6-225 (e)(1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court; Reversed and Remanded. WEATHERFORD, SR. J., in which BIRCH, J. AND RUSSELL, J. joined. Janelle S. Evyan, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellants, Tennessee Woolen Mills, Inc. and The Travelers Insurance Company Bratton H. Cook, II, Smithville, Tennessee and Jacky O. Bellar, Carthage, Tennessee for the appellees, Lana Phelps, individually and as next friend/guardian of her two minor children, Kurtis Tyler Phelps and Amanda Lee Phelps. MEMORANDUM OPINION The decedent, Joseph Phelps, was employed by Tennessee Woolen Mills, Inc. on January 2, 1995 as an electrician. He was married to Lana Phelps and they had two minor children, Kurtis Tyler Phelps and Amanda Lee Phelps, at the time of Mr. Phelps' death at age 56. According to Safety Manager, Roger Osborn's report at approximately 1:1 to 1: 15 p.m., on January 2, 1995, Joseph Phelps was "engaged in the process of installing a folding machine in the finishing department on the second floor. In particular he was installing a metal support to which a folding machine would later be attached." Apparently, as described by workers in this area, Mr. Phelps was climbing up a ladder and about half way up when he fell. Judy Williams (sewing machine operator in the nearby area) observed Mr. Phelps falling via peripheral vision. Mrs. Williams also mentioned that she thought Mr. Phelps was carrying something in his hand. At the time Mr. Phelps made impact with the floor, a loud "bang" occurred. Several employees responded to the area after hearing this noise. Sometime thereafter, employees began to perform CPR. Approximately five to ten minutes later the ambulance arrived and transported Mr. Phelps to University Medical Center. The report also stated that, "Mrs. Hardin was the first person to see Mr. Phelps on the floor [and stated] that he `may have' hit his head on the hitch of a blanket truck in the near vicinity of the ladder." Scott Giles, D.O., Emergency Medicine Physician, treated Joseph Phelps in the Emergency Room in Lebanon, Tennessee. Dr. Giles testified that Mr. Phelps essentially had no vital signs when he arrived at the hospital and none of their resuscitative efforts were successful. Mr. Phelps was pronounced dead approximately ten minutes after his arrival. Dr. Giles assessed Mr. Phelps cause of death as "sudden cardiac death" which is caused by a massive heart attack or "an arrhythmic event." The plaintiff filed her complaint for workers' compensation benefits on April 19, 1995 alleging that the decedent sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment and as a consequence of the accident, plaintiff claimed that the decedent suffered a cardiac arrest which caused his death shortly after the accident. On October 19, 1995, the plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to add that the decedent's sudden cardiac death was (1) an accidental injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment with Woolen Mills, and alternatively (2) an occupational disease pursuant to Tenn. Code Annotated _5-6-31 et seq. The trial court granted the motion by order entered November 22, 1995. On April 2, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that she was entitled to judgment for statutory benefits due them as a matter of law, and filed the deposition of -2-
Authoring Judge: Weatherford, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:C.K. Smith, Chancellor |
Smith County | Workers Compensation Panel | 01/10/01 | |
| John Paul Miller v. Fleetwood Homes of Tennessee and
M1999-00275-WC-R3-CV
The plaintiff, John Paul Miller, appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court of Sumner County, where the trial court found: (1) that Mr. Miller failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a neck injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with Fleetwood Homes on or about August 4, 1997; (2) that had the neck injury occurred as alleged by Mr. Miller it was due to his own willful misconduct and his claim was otherwise barred under Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-11 (a); (3) and that Mr. Miller was not entitled to any further benefits for his hand/wrist injury of June 13, 1997. For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Weatherford, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:Thomas E. Gray, Chancellor |
Sumner County | Workers Compensation Panel | 01/10/01 | |
| Beatrice Scott Nall v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours and
M1999-00375-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation case has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee or claimant, Beatrice Nall, was 59 years old at the time of the trial, which began on October 9, 1998 and ended on October 12, 1998. She has a high school education, some business college and experience as a factory worker, waitress and secretary, as well as 16 years with DuPont, where she worked as a utility worker from 1977 until 1981, when she was promoted to a wet treatment operator. She suffered a previous injury in 1983, from which she received an award based on eighteen percent to the body as a whole. The claimant's duties as a wet treatment operator required her to unload railroad tank cars, which she had done for 12 to 15 years before suffering the present injury in 1993. Because some of the tank cars contained hazardous material, DuPont had established specific standard job procedures (SJP'S) for the unloading of railcars on the plant site. The claimant was intimately familiar with the SJP for unloading sulfuric acid cars. As the SJP'S were updated and changed, the claimant would review them again and initial them to document her review and understanding of the procedure. She last reviewed the SJP for unloading sulfuric acid from railcars on February 11, 1993, two months before her second acid related accident. All safety procedures were strictly enforced by the company. None of the several DuPont employees who testified was aware of anyone unloading acid cars without having on an acid suit. The applicable SJP required that the operator wear safety equipment and specifically required the wearing of an acid suit while unloading a railcar containing acid. On the day of her injury, the claimant attempted to inspect such a railcar, before commencing the unloading procedures, without donning the required safety equipment, particularly the acid suit. As she was doing so, she was sprayed with sulfuric acid and severely burned. The claimant initiated this action to recover medical and disability benefits as provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11 et seq. By its answer, the employer, DuPont, denied that the injury was compensable and affirmatively asserted, in general terms, that the injury was barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11. After a trial on the merits, the trial judge found that the injury was one arising out of and in the course of employment, that the employer had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant willfully violated a safety rule or refused to wear a safety device and that the claimant is permanently and totally disabled as a result of her injuries. The award was correctly apportioned between the employer and the second injury fund. The employer has appealed, contending (1) the trial judge erred in finding that the claim is not barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11(a) and (2) the trial judge erred in entering an order finding that the plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled. Our review of the trial court's findings is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The reviewing court is not bound by a trial court's factual findings but instead conducts an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Allen W. Wallace, Judge |
Scott County | Workers Compensation Panel | 01/09/01 | |
| Shirley Loope v. Institutional Jobbers Co., Inc.
E1999-02503-WC-R3-CV
The trial court found a work-related injury and awarded a ten percent whole body impairment. The defendant argues the evidence preponderates against the finding of compensability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:Daryl L. Fansler, Judge |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 01/09/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. James M. Williams
W1999-01458-CCA-R3-CD
This appeal arises from the sentence that the Shelby County Criminal Court imposed upon James M. Williams, after a previous appeal to this court resulted in a modification of his original two-year incarcerative sentence to a sentence ordered to be served on probation. The defendant contests the trial court's authority to resentence him to serve 60 days in a correctional facility, with the balance of his two-year sentence to be served on probation. The defendant also challenges his new sentence as the product of judicial vindictiveness, and he claims that he is entitled to full probation based on the facts of the case. After a review of the record, we reverse the split-confinement sentence, order that the defendant serve his sentence on full probation with conditions, and remand for defendant to begin immediate service of his sentence.
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Originating Judge:Judge Arthur T. Bennett |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 01/09/01 | |
| Earl Wagner v. The Tennessee Coal Company
E2000-01013-WC-R3-CV
The trial court found the plaintiff sustained a ten percent permanent partial medical impairment as a result of a compensable injury and awarded him forty percent whole body vocational disability. The defendant says the evidence does not support the finding that the plaintiff suffered any permanent impairment and further says if he did, the award should have been restricted to two and one-half percent times the medical impairment because the plaintiff had a meaningful return to work. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:John Mcafee, Judge |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 01/08/01 | |
| Kathy Kay Scott v. Cantech Industries,
E2000-00728-WC-R3-CV
The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered carpel tunnel syndrome as a result of her work with Contech Industries, Incorporated, that the disability should be converted to an injury to the body as a whole, and that the plaintiff had sustained a forty-two percent vocational impairment to the body as a whole. The trial judge found that Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company was the workers' compensation carrier at the time the plaintiff became unable to continue to work, and therefore, was the carrier responsible for the coverage. Wausau raises the issue of whether the trial judge properly found it, rather than Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, liable for the award to the plaintiff. Wausau and Contech Industries Incorporated further argue the trial court erred in finding the plaintiff gave sufficient or timely notice of the carpel tunnel syndrome injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:Jean A. Stanley, Circuit Court Judge |
Scott County | Workers Compensation Panel | 01/08/01 | |
| Donald Picklesimer v. Mckee Foods Corporation
E2000-02694-WC-R3-CV
The trial court awarded the employee 72 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employee appealed insisting his disability was 1 percent. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Thayer , Sp. J.
Originating Judge:W. Frank Brown III, Chancellor |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 01/07/01 | |
| Melissa Suzanne Dew v. ProTemp, et al.
E2000-01750-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from a grant of summary judgment to Pro-Temp ("Defendant"), a temporary employment agency. Melissa Suzanne Dew ("Plaintiff") brought suit against her employer, Defendant, and Eagle Bend Manufacturing, Inc. ("Eagle Bend"). Defendant assigned Plaintiff to work in a temporary position at Eagle Bend where Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury. A few months later, Plaintiff received a reprimand from her Eagle Bend supervisor related to Plaintiff's work performance. Thereafter, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's assignment at Eagle Bend. Plaintiff claims Defendant terminated her employment in retaliation for exercising her worker's compensation rights. Plaintiff argues there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the granting of summary judgment to Defendant. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Chancellor William E. Lantrip |
Anderson County | Court of Appeals | 01/05/01 |
