APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant appeals from the revocation of his probation, contending that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this suit the Plaintiffs seek damages for injuries received by Barbara Jo Heck when she slipped on a patch of ice and fell on property owned by the City of Sevierville. The Trial Court found that the City had no actual or constructive notice of the presence of the ice causing Mrs. Heck to fall and, accordingly, dismissed the complaint. We affirm under Rule 10(a) of the Court of Appeals.

The defendant, Tiffany R. Weatherspoon, pled guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to the Class B felony of unlawful possession of over .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell. She received the agreed-upon sentence of eight years, as a Range I offender, and a $2,000 fine. The trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered that the defendant be incarcerated. She appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the order of the trial court.

The petitioner, who is currently in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, entered pleas of guilty in 1974 in the Shelby County Criminal Court to the offenses of assault and battery with intent to rape and attempt to commit a felony, to wit: crime against nature. In 2000, he filed a petition to vacate and set aside these sentences, claiming that his pleas of guilty were not voluntary, that his counsel had been ineffective, and that he was innocent of the charges. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely, the statute of limitations having expired before it was filed; and the petitioner timely appealed. Based upon our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition as untimely.

In this case the plaintiffs are seeking damages for personal injuries received in a vehicle accident. The plaintiffs were exiting the interstate and were bumped from the rear by the vehicle driven by Mrs. Warren. While other facts relating to the accident were disputed, it was undisputed that there was no physical injury to either of the vehicles or their contents. The police were not called to the scene and no report was made. The plaintiffs filed suit to collect damages for injuries to Mrs. Hapney's neck which she claimed were received in the accident. The jury found no negligence on the part of the defendants. One of the doctors, who saw Mrs. Hapney, testified for the defendants in the case as to causation of Mrs. Hapney's injuries. In their motion for a new trial and on appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the doctor. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. The plaintiffs appeal challenging the jury verdict and the admission of the doctor's testimony. We affirm the trial court.

This appeal arises from a landlord-tenant dispute over damage to residential property. After the landlords obtained a $3,600 judgment in the Smith County General Sessions Court, the tenants appealed to the Circuit Court for Smith County. A jury awarded the landlords $4,500. On this appeal, the appellants assert that the trial court erred by (1) permitting the landlords' lawyer to exercise a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner, (2) permitting the landlords' lawyer to make prejudicial statements to the jury during opening argument, (3) providing a supplemental instruction in response to the jury's question, and (4) failing to enter a detailed order denying their motion for new trial. We find nothing deficient in the trial court's order denying the motion for new trial. In addition, the absence of either a transcript or a statement of the evidence or proceedings prevents us from considering the substance of the tenants' other issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and find that the appeal is frivolous.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child abuse. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of two years for the homicide charge and twenty years for the aggravated child abuse charge. In this appeal as a matter of right, the defendant alleges (1) he was incompetent to stand trial, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict for aggravated child abuse. The defendant was indicted in count one for aggravated child abuse by treating the child in a manner so as to inflict injury; the defendant was indicted in count two for aggravated child abuse by neglecting the child so as to adversely affect his health and welfare; the jury was instructed to consider count two only if the defendant was found not guilty of count one; the jury found guilt only as to count one; the jury never returned a verdict on count two; and the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict under count one. Although the evidence overwhelmingly establishes guilt of aggravated child abuse by neglect as alleged in count two, the jury's failure to return a verdict on this count requires a remand for retrial on count two. We affirm the conviction for criminally negligent homicide.

This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner serving a 99-year sentence and the Department of Correction regarding the calculation of the prisoner's release eligibility date. After the Department declined to issue a declaratory order changing his release eligibility date, the prisoner filed an action in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that the Department had incorrectly classified him as a Class X felon because he had not been convicted of a Class X crime, and he had not received credit for jail time served prior to his prison sentence. The Commissioner of Correction moved to dismiss the complaint, and the trial court, after converting the Commissioner's motion to a motion for summary judgment, dismissed the prisoner's complaint. On this appeal, the prisoner essentially reargues the same issues raised in his complaint. We have determined that the trial court correctly concluded that the material facts are not in dispute and that the Commissioner is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment

The biological father appeals the termination of his parental rights which allowed the adoption of his two children by the stepfather after the mother's death. Although the evidence that the father abandoned his children was clear and convincing, the proof, when supplemented with post-judgment facts, was insufficient to determine whether termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children. We remand for a hearing on the children's best interests.

This case concerns the modification of a child support award. In addition to the child for whom support was set in the instant case, the obligor father had three other children. At one point in the past, he was required by court order to support these three other children; but, by the time of the hearing below, his obligation had been terminated except for an arrearage on which he was continuing to pay. In determining the proper award in the instant case, the trial court considered the father's other three children and deviated from the Child Support Guidelines due to the father's "hardship." The State, as assignee of the mother's right to child support, appeals. We modify the trial court's award.

The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for delayed appeal regarding his petition for post-conviction relief. We remand the case to the trial court.

The controlling issues in this appeal are (1) whether under the terms of an employee policy manual the dismissed employee was something other than an employee at will, and (2) whether the action of the Board of the Shelbyville Housing Authority in upholding the dismissal was arbitrary or illegal or lacked material evidence to support it. The Chancery Court of Bedford County reviewed the record and found that the Board’s action was supported by substantial and material evidence and was not arbitrary nor illegal. We affirm.