APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiffs, purchasers of house from defendants, were awarded damages for defects in house not revealed by defendants. Plaintiffs appeal, asking punitive damages and an increase in compensatory damages. We affirm.

Plaintiff's car was caught between the minivan in front of him and the dump truck behind him when the minivan and Plaintiff's car stopped to avoid an obstruction in the roadway. The dump truck was unable to stop and hit Plaintiff's car. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff for $225,000. The jury allocated 80 percent of the fault against the dump truck driver and owner and 20 percent of the fault against Plaintiff's uninsured motorist insurance carrier on behalf of the unknown driver of a truck which dropped the obstruction onto the road. The dump truck driver and owner appeal, raising issues of law including the introduction of claimed inadmissible evidence, prejudicial final argument, improper and incomplete jury instructions, jury misconduct and the failure of the Trial Court to grant Defendants' motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Court has accepted for decision two questions of law certified by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 23, Supreme Court Rules, which questions are as follows:

( l ) Whether the tort of negligent misrepresentation applies only to professinals and others who  specialize in providing information as a service; and not to commercial entities or businesses which allegedly supply misleading information for the guidance of others in their business transactions; and

(2) Whether a party alleging negligent misrepresentation, in order to recover 'economic losses," must be in privity of contract with the defendant. The decision of the Court is that liability for the tort of  negligent misrepresentation is not limited to 'professionals'; however, the record in this case does not establish the essentials of that cause of action.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employer, Famous Hospitality, Inc., defendant-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Shelby County finding that the employee, Debra Lambert, plaintiff-appellee, sustained a 60 percent permanent impairment to the whole body due to a workrelated shoulder injury. The trial court also directed the employer to pay various medical and litigation related expenses incurred by the employee, but did not require the employer to pay for future medical treatment by doctors that had been selected by the employee and who had treated her before trial. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5), affirmed the trial court. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel’s decision pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-225(e)(5)(B). We granted the motion to determine whether the employee should have been authorized to seek future medical treatment, at the employer’s expense, from doctors selected by her who had treated her injuries. After carefully examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment except to the extent that the judgment does not authorize future medical treatment by the employee’s treating physicians at the employer’s expense.

QUESTION CERTIFIED Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules,1 we have accepted a question certified to us by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The bankruptcy court has asked: Which of the following is the correct interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E): (1) Once asserted in any judicial proceeding, the exemption in alimony described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective with respect to all subsequent executions, seizures or attachments of alimony; or (2) The exemption in alimony described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective only if claimed in each judicial proceeding in which execution, seizure or attachment of alimony is sought. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the alimony exemption set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective only if claimed in each judicial proceeding in which execution, seizure, or attachment of alimony is sought.

We granted the State's appeal to consider whether the defendant's federal or state constitutional right of confrontation was violated by the admission into evidence of surveillance photographs taken at the scene of the robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals decided that the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated and that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, they reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction.

The trial court granted the parties a divorce, ordered joint custody of the parties' minor son, and divided the marital property. On appeal, Ms. Wagner contends that the trial court's award of joint custody on an alternating week basis was improper, that the division of marital property was inequitable, and that the trial court's order requiring her to bear one-half of the child's medical insurance was improper. We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Jeffrey Bivens appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Although the petition was filed outside the one year limitations period, the post-conviction court excused the "late-filed" petition "in the interest of justice." Following a hearing upon the merits of the petition, the court denied post-conviction relief. Because the petition was time-barred, the post-conviction court was without jurisdiction to conduct a hearing on the merits. For this reason, dismissal of the petition is affirmed.