APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff’s residential property in Hamilton County was sold for delinquent property taxes after default judgment was entered against Plaintiff, the property owner. Plaintiff brought suit against the subsequent tax sale purchaser, and others, to set aside the default judgment and sale, asserting process had not been served properly on him in the delinquent tax suit. The Trial Court found that certified mail return receipts signed by Plaintiff’s wife were sufficient proof of service under T.R.C.P. 4.04(10) and T.C.A. § 67-5-2415(e)(1), and granted summary judgment to the tax sale purchaser of the property and the other Defendants. Plaintiff argues on appeal that he was not served properly with process, first arguing that he was not served at all and then arguing that the statutory service procedure relied upon by the Trial Court violates due process. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. 

In this workers’ compensation case the sole issue is whether the death of a traveling employee by
drowning is compensable as arising out of and in the course of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer. We granted the employer’s motion for review filed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5)(1999) and have determined that the employee’s death may have arisen out of and in the course of the employment. It results that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer is error, and the cause is remanded.

The plaintiff, a mid-level executive of the Town of Oliver Springs, “borrowed” various sums of money from a citizen of the Town over a three-year period which she repaid with sexual favors. When this activity came to light she was fired by the Mayor and City Administrator. Her suit, claiming breach of contract and discriminatory employment practices, was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. This appeal resulted. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
 

Judge Franks.
The majority affirms the Trial Judge’s summary dismissal of plaintiff’s action, and
I concur in the affirmance of the dismissal on the basis that plaintiff was either estopped or has
waived her right to maintain this action.

Following entry of judgment on a jury verdict, the Trial Court granted Defendants a new trial based upon allegations in the affidavit of one of the jurors. Plaintiff was granted interlocutory appeal limited to whether or not the Trial Court erred in granting Defendants’ Motion For New Trial based
on the information contained in the juror’s affidavit submitted by Defendants in support of their Motion For New Trial. Because the affidavit does not fall under any of the three exceptions to exclusion of juror testimony found in T.R.E. 606(b), the Trial Court erred in accepting the affidavit
into evidence on the issue of a new trial. No other evidence supported Defendants’ motion for new trial. Because no admissible evidence was properly before the Court, the Order for new trial is reversed and this lawsuit remanded for enforcement of the judgment previously entered on the verdict of the jury. 

This appeal arises from a dispute over whether a commercial lease was renewed. After lessors notified lessee that the lease had not been renewed, lessee filed for declaratory judgment on the issue of whether renewal notice was given timely, asserting an alternative ground of equitable relief from performance under the “special circumstances” doctrine. Lessors asserted the equitable maxim of unclean hands, averring that lessee created false evidence to attempt to establish timely compliance with the lease renewal requirement. Both sides moved for summary judgment, and the Chancellor entered judgment for lessee based upon the finding of “special circumstances” to excuse untimely performance by lessee, noting that issues of material fact exist as to timely notice. On this appeal, lessors allege error by the Chancellor’s award of equitable relief without resolving the unclean hands issue, along with error in the finding of “special circumstances,” and error in denying lessors’ counterclaim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Because resolution of the issue of whether or not renewal notice was given timely is both necessary and dispostive of all other issues raised in this lawsuit, the order of the Chancellor awarding summary judgment to lessee is reversed, and this lawsuit remanded for trial.

The defendant was initially tried and convicted in Rutherford County for the crime of rape of a child. On appeal, this Court found that the defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective and remanded the case for a new trial. After remand, the defendant was indicted in Wilson County. The Wilson County Criminal Court found that the double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution prohibited the State from prosecuting the defendant and dismissed the indictment. The State appealed the dismissal. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for a trial.

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court properly awarded as discretionary costs fees of the defendant’s expert witnesses who did not testify because the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit on the day of trial before any proof was taken. The fees in question were charged by the defendant’s medical experts for reserving time in their schedules to testify, thereby precluding any other income-producing professional activities. The award of discretionary costs is affirmed.

Defendant was convicted in the Criminal Court, Davidson County, Wyatt, Randall J., of felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. The defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals, Smith J., held that: (1) the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress his statement; (2) there was sufficient evidence that the defendant murdered a bystander in the perpetration of a robbery to support conviction for felony murder; and (3) the defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial.

Affirmed.

This appeal involves a dispute over the proceeds of the sale of a family farm by a life tenant with an unlimited power of disposition. Following the life tenant’s death, the remaindermen named in the life tenant’s husband’s will filed suit in the Chancery Court for Marshall County against the executrix of the life tenant’s estate, the estate itself, and the beneficiaries named in the life tenant’s will asserting that the life tenant lacked capacity to sell the farm, that the executrix had unduly influenced the life tenant to sell the farm, and that the executrix had tortiously interfered with their inheritance from the life tenant’s husband. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found no lack of capacity or undue influence but determined that the remaindermen have an interest in the proceeds of the sale of the farm. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees to the lawyer the remaindermen had discharged earlier in the proceeding. The life tenant’s estate and her executrix now appeal the conclusion that the remaindermen named in her husband’s will have an interest in the proceeds of the sale; while the remaindermen appeal from the dismissal of their lack of capacity, undue influence, and intentional interference with inheritance claims and the award of fees to their former lawyer. We have determined that the trial court correctly concluded that the life tenant was capable of selling the farm, that her executrix did not unduly influence her decision, and that the remaindermen’s former attorney was entitled to payment. We have also determined that the life tenant’s sale of the farm terminated the remaindermen’s interest as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment awarding the remaindermen $269,420.89 and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
 

Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, the defendant pled guilty in Davidson County Criminal Court to two counts of assault and one count of accessory after the fact. She received an effective sentence of two years. The defendant appeals the trial court’s order that her sentence be served in the workhouse rather than in some alternative form, asserting that the trial court erred in considering her arrests while on bond as indications of her unsuitability for alternative sentencing; in making its determination based solely on her arrests while on bond; and in failing to consider her participation in a counseling program. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a negligent supervision lawsuit. The plaintiff rented a unit from the defendants' selfstorage facility. An employee of the self-storage facility stole the plaintiff's property and disappeared. The plaintiff sued the storage facility and its owners, alleging negligent supervision of the dishonest employee. A jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded compensatory damages. The defendants appeal. We reverse, finding that the plaintiff submitted insufficient evidence to support a finding of negligent supervision.
 

In this appeal of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court, the defendant contends that his de novo appeal from a judgment of the General Sessions Court was erroneously dismissed at a status hearing. Because the Criminal Court Clerk failed to provide notice of the status hearing to defendant's counsel of record, the judgment of dismissal is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a hearing.

Plaintiff, a licensed affiliate real estate broker, sued to collect a commission for locating a particular property for a prospective buyer. When the sellers refused to sell the property, the prospective buyer abandoned efforts to obtain the property. About six weeks later, the prospective buyer contacted one of the sellers and was able to negotiate with all of the sellers for purchase of the property and ultimately consummated the purchase for a higher sale price than originally contemplated. Plaintiff alleges that she had an oral agreement for $150,000.00 commission, or, alternatively, that she was acting as a facilitator and entitled to a commission for her services as such. From the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant, plaintiff has appealed. Tenn.R.App.P. 3, Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court affirmed
 

This appeal arises from a dispute over whether Defendant Robert Shropshire personally guaranteed the debts of Defendant Inn-Way, Inc., to Plaintiff Custom Interiors & Supply Company, Inc. Custom Interiors sued Inn-Way to recover the sum of $54,537.30 for orders placed by Inn-Way after October 1996. Custom Interiors also sued Inn-Way’s president and owner, Robert Shropshire, contending that Shropshire had personally guaranteed Inn-Way’s debts to Custom Interiors. After Inn-Way filed for bankruptcy protection, Custom Interiors proceeded to trial against Shropshire. The trial court entered a judgment finding that Custom Interiors had failed to carry its burden of proof and that Shropshire was not a personal guarantor of Inn-Way’s debts to Custom Interiors. We affirm the trial court’s judgment based upon our conclusion that the evidence does not preponderate against these findings. 

An inmate presently in custody in the Whiteville Correctional Facility sued the warden and the CEO and Chairman of Corrections Corporation of America in a pleading styled Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. He seeks release from that facility contending that the State of Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) released him when it surrendered him to a facility outside the borders of the State of Wisconsin for incarceration. The trial court dismissed the cause of action and we affirm.