APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff, a resident of Hawaii, contracted to buy D & K  Auto Salvage from the defendants in August 1994, for $450, 000.00.  He employed Tom Gargone to manage the business.

We granted this appeal by the State of Tennessee to address the issue of jury unanimity in cases where the State relies on alternative theories of guilt to convict an accused under a single count indictment. In this case, the appellee, James Lemacks, was charged with driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI). The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the appellee of DUI based upon evidence that he operated his automobile while intoxicated or that he was criminally responsible for allowing his friend, Clinton Sanchez, to drive the automobile while intoxicated. The jury returned a general verdict convicting the appellee of DUI.

This case is before us for automatic review of the Court of Criminal Appeals’
affirmance of a death sentence imposed upon Donald Ray Middlebrooks in a
Davidson County resentencing hearing for first degree murder.

Because the opinion filed by the Court of Criminal Appeals states the view I take, I respectfully dissent from the view held by the majority of my colleagues and would adopt the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The appellant, Michael D. Hawkins, appeals as of right from the trial court’s revocation of his suspended sentence. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the appellant had violated conditions of his probation and ordered execution of the entire sentence as originally entered. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court should have granted intensive probation or an alternative sentence, specifically Community Corrections.

We granted this Tenn. R. App. P. 11 appeal to determine the appropriate standard of review of a trial court’s decision to admit a breath-alcohol test result under State v. Sensing, 843
S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1992). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting the test result of the defendant, Jerry Wayne Edison.1 We affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate court and conclude that a trial court’s Sensing decision must be presumed correct on appeal unless the preponderance of the evidence is to the contrary.

This appeal is brought from the Claims Commission’s order dismissing the 2 appellant’s petition. Petitioner, a Tennessee Department of Correction inmate, was attacked by another inmate and sustained injuries as a result. Petitioner alleged in his complaint that the State of Tennessee was negligent in not providing adequate security. For the following reasons we affirm the Claims Commission’s order granting the State’s motion for summary judgment

Defendant Diane Jones (“Jones” or “Appellant”) appeals the judgment of the trial court awarding Plaintiff Carolyn Whitemore (“Whitemore” or “Appellee”) the sum of $1,250.00 as reimbursement for money given to Jones by Whitemore for investment in an illegal “pyramid scheme.”

This is a divorce case. In dividing marital property, the trial court awarded the wife 50.5% of the marital property and awarded the husband 49.5%. The trial court did not award the wife alimony or attorney’s fees. The wife now appeals the division of marital property, and the failure to award alimony and attorneys’ fees. We affirm.

This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiffs and the defendant orally agreed to each submit applications to the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to obtain a license to construct and maintain cellular phone operations. The parties agreed to share the profits if any one of them was awarded a license. The defendant was awarded a license, and the plaintiffs sued to enforce the agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant finding the contract was illegal under FCC rules and therefore unenforceable. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This case involves an appeal from the SumnerCounty Circuit Court’s de novo review of a case from General Sessions Court, in which only one of the General Sessions Defendants perfected an appeal to circuit court.

Appellant David A. Humphrey commenced this pro se appeal to challenge the trial court's Final Decree granting a divorce to Appellee Cheryl Lynn (Douglas) Humphrey on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. He asserts that the divorce should have been granted to him or the court should have simply declared the parties divorced. He also challenges the trial court’s child custody and visitation order, asking that in person visitation be required. Finally, he objects to the assessment of costs against him.

This case involves a contest of Tennessee sales and use tax assessed by the defendant Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue. The plaintiff satellite programming television company argues that its services are not taxable telecommunications because, as “broadcast[s] . . . for public consumption,” the satellite television services are excluded from the definition of taxable telecommunications. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff satellite programming television company. The defendant Commissioner appeals. We affirm.

Defendant, Richard Allen, was indicted for the first degree murders of David Lee Day and James Kevin Huckaby. A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of the lesser offense of second degree murder of David Lee Day and acquitted him of the Huckaby homicide. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to twenty-five years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, defendant contends that his conviction must be reversed because of insufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. The state prosecuted this accomplice for first degree murder, sought the death penalty, and allowed him to plead guilty to second degree murder during the accomplice's trial. The state has now changed its position and argues that he was not an accomplice. This is, however, impermissible. Since this felon-accomplice provided the only testimony linking the defendant to the crime, the long-standing, firmly established law in this state requires us to REVERSE the conviction.