APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A white college professor denied tenure sued his university employer for breach of contract and racial discrimination. The Chancery Court of Davidson County dismissed both claims. We reverse the judgment dismissing the contract claim and affirm the ruling on the discrimination claim.

This appeal involves a dispute between partners. Plaintiffs-Appellants, Robert D. Fulcher III, Eleanor Fulcher, and Allen-Fulcher Partnership, appeal the trial court’s ruling in favor of Appellees, R. Chancellor Allen, H. Stanley Allen, and Harwell-Allen Partnership.

Although I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the grant of custody to the father, I write separately to condemn the appearance of impropriety this case exudes. As the United
States Supreme Court stated in Offutt v. U.S., 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13, 99 L. Ed. 11, 16 (1954), “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” The trial court’s actions in this case do not satisfy that appearance.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court properly ruled that the prosecution abused its discretion by failing to consider all of the relevant factors in denying the defendant’s application for pretrial diversion, and whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that the prosecutor’s written letter denying diversion did not discuss all of the relevant factors, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing to allow the prosecutor to testify as to the factors that were considered in denying pretrial diversion.

We granted the appeal in this child custody case to determine whether the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony regarding the effects of an interracial relationship on the child and in later excluding the trial court’s comments from the statement of evidence.

I disagree with the majority's holding in this case that the district attorney
general abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. The defendant has
committed an extremely serious offense in this case. She has admitted to
embezzling approximately $27,400.00 from her employer. Her crime was not an
isolated incident but a complicated, calculated, and deliberate criminal scheme
that occurred repeatedly over a course of two years until she was ultimately
caught.

On October 15, 1997, the defendant was convicted of delivering cocaine and he was sentenced to serve four years in the penitentiary.  The defendant was tried along with a co-defendant Reggie Barton. In the course of the trial, statements made by Barton implicated the defendant.  The defendant raises the following issues:  1. Whether the defendant’s Motion To Sever the trial should have been granted?  2. Whether the co-defendant’s statement to the confidential informant should have been excluded or redacted?  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Burson and Simpson Lodge Developments, Inc. ("Burson & Simpson") appeals from the trial court’s affirmance of a decision rendered by the Nashville and Davidson County Metropolitan Planning Commission (the “Planning Commission”), whereby the Planning Commission characterized a proposed amendment to a planned unit development as a “basic change in development concept,” and whereby the Planning Commission disapproved the amendment. We find that, based upon the record before this Court, the Planning Commission’s disapproval of the proposed amendment was illegal, arbitrary, or capricious and, therefore, we reverse the holding of the trial court.

This premises liability action involves a disabled person who was injured when he tripped on a floor mat while entering a convenience market in Decherd. The patron’s suit against the market, originally filed in the Chancery Court for Franklin County but later transferred to the Circuit Court for Franklin County, alleged that the market had created a dangerous condition, especially for patrons using crutches, by placing the floor mat at its entrance. The market moved for summary judgment, relying on the deposition testimony of the patron, two employees of the market, and the market's surveillance camera videotape of the patron’s fall. The trial court granted the motion, and the patron has appealed. We have determined that the market is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and, accordingly, affirm the summary judgment.
 

The petitioner, William D. Pewitt, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Williamson County Circuit Court. He seeks relief from his 1994 convictions for witness coercion, a Class D felony, and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. His convictions were affirmed on appeal. State v. William D. Pewitt, No. 01C01-9411-CC-00375, Williamson County (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 1996), app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 1, 1997). The petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without appointing counsel, allowing amendment of the petition with the aid of counsel, or holding an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the petition for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiff Steve Anderson appeals the trial court’s order which dismissed his complaint seeking specific performance and other relief against Defendants/Appellees Hacks Crossing Partners and Exxon Corporation. We affirm.
 

After a careful review of the remaining issues, we find that the appellant was improperly convicted of multiple inchoate offenses, attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder, for the criminal conduct against his ex-wife, Gina Sanjines. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-106(a) (Supp. 1994). Neither the defense nor the State considered section 39-12-106(a) when they constructed the plea agreement in this case. We conclude that the error was prejudicial and, accordingly, reverse the conviction of attempted murder.2 The remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed.

This is a suit to enforce a mechanics’ and materialmen’s lien. The plaintiff asserted it made improvements to real property based on an agreement with the owner of the property. The property owner moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no evidence of an agreement between the parties. The trial court granted summary  judgment to the defendant property owner, and the plaintiff appeals. We affirm.