APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves post-divorce petitions for change of custody and child support. The mother, Elizabeth Davis Black (Tepas), has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court transferring custody of the eleven year old daughter, Chelsea, from the mother to the father, Michael Walter Black, and relieving him of the obligation of child support while the child was in the custody of the father by agreement of the parties.

The defendant, Melvin Lewis Peacock, appeals as of right from his jury convictions in Davidson County for possession with intent to sell three hundred grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, a Class A felony, and for the unlawful possession of a weapon, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twenty years in the custody of the Department of Correction for the cocaine possession conviction and to a concurrent two-year sentence in the custody of the Department of Correction for the weapon possession conviction. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve the twenty-year sentence consecutively
to an earlier sentence. The defendant presents the following issues for our review:

(1) the trial court erred when it denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized by the police pursuant to a search warrant on the basis that an exact copy of the warrant was not left with the defendant;
 

(2) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion in limine to preclude the state from introducing into evidence five car titles found in a safe; and
 

(3) the trial court erred in permitting the state to recall Curtis Peacock as a witness during its case-in-chief.
 

We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

The appellant, Billy Joe Bourff, appeals as of right the Campbell County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce action, the wife appeals from the Trial Court’s Order of child support and the evaluation of the marital estate and its distribution.

The defendant was indicted in December 1996 for rape of a child. A Shelby County jury found him guilty and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence a chart depicting the victim’s injuries. The defendant also argues that his sentence is excessive. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the court below.

In this divorce case, the appellant Etta Mechelle Parks argues that the trial court erred in awarding her former husband, Craig Dewayne Parks, custody of their two boys, ages seven and almost four. We do not find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s custody decree. See Rule 13(d), T.R.A.P.; Hass v. Knighton, 676 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tenn. 1984). Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in placing the children’s sole custody with Mr. Parks. See Grant v. Grant, 286 S.W.2d 349, 350 (Tenn.App. 1954).

Johnny Akins was found guilty by a jury of aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to fifteen years in Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial. He appeals. The sole issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of
conviction.

In this post-divorce case, the trial court denied the petition of Terri Lee Wooten, formerly Wolfe (“Mother”), seeking sole custody of the parties’ daughter, Kelsea Wolfe, age five and a half. In the same order, the court granted the counterclaim of Patrick Alan Wolfe (“Father”) by modifying Mother’s visitation rights. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to change the child’s custody. She also claims that the court erred in modifying the visitation schedule set forth in the divorce judgment.

Following the trial of this matter, the court ordered the parties, Leslie A. Hassell (Wife) and Thomas W. Hassell (Husband), to be entitled to a divorce pursuant to T.C.A . § 36 -4 -129 ( b ) . Husband was ordered to pay Wife $500 per month as alimony in futuro and that award is the sole issue presented by Husband to this court on appeal.

The Trial dismissed plaintiffs’ causes of action for personal injury on the basis that the statute of limitations had run before the action was properly brought, pursuant to Rule 3, T.R.C.P.

We granted this appeal to determine whether summary judgment was properly granted in this case involving claims for recision of contract and unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on both issues. Upon review, we affirm the appellate court as modified.¹

This case involves the possession of real estate after foreclosure proceedings. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that Appellees were entitled to possession of the real estate in question. We affirm.

Samuel L. Banks, a doctor, and Cathy J. Stancil, a nurse, appeal a jury verdict rendered against them in favor of their former patient, Jacqueline Sue Rogers.  Ms. Rogers brought two actions of medical malpractice in the Hamilton County Circuit Court.  One action was brought against Dr. Banks, her treating  physician.  The other action was brought against Nurse Stancil.  Nurse Stancil performed the majority of the procedure in question. Judge Robert M. Summitt denied motions for directed verdict after Ms. Rogers presented her case and again after Dr. Banks and Nurse Stancil presented their case.  Both actions were submitted to the jury.  The jury returned a general verdict against both Dr. Banks and Nurse Stancil for $60,000.  Dr. Banks and Nurse Stancil both filed motions for judgments not withstanding the verdict as well as motions for a new trial.  Judge Summitt overruled these motions and upheld the jury award.  We now reverse the judgment below and dismiss boith suits with prejudice.

This suit was initiated by Plaintiff-Appellant, Wendell Goodwin, against Defendants-Appellees, Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, and a number of  other Defendants, seeking damages because of an illness Mr. Goodwin contracted -- specifically a stomach cancer known as peritoneal mesothelioma -- resulting from his occupational exposure to asbestos products manufactured and distributed by the Defendants, including Pittsburgh Corning and Owens-Corning. The Trial Court, in sresonse to the answers supplied by the jury through special interrogatories hereinafter set out, entered a judgment in favor of the Defendants because the Plaintiff's claim was barred by the applicable statute of repose, T.C. A . 29 -28 -103(a).

This case arose out of a petition for order of contempt filed by the Board of
Professional Responsibility alleging that Danny Kaye Dockery violated an order of
suspension previously entered by this Court by failing to comply with Tenn. Sup. Ct.
R. 9, § 18. The provisions of Rule 9 require a suspended attorney to notify clients of
an order of suspension, move for withdrawal from pending cases, provide notice to
adverse attorneys when clients have not obtained substitute counsel, and refrain
from accepting new clients.

This case arose out of a petition for order of contempt filed in this Court by the Board of Professional Responsibility against John Mark Hancock. The petition alleged that Hancock violated an order of suspension previously entered by this Court by failing to comply with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 18, which requires a suspended attorney to notify clients of an order of suspension, move for withdrawal from pending cases, provide notice to adverse attorneys when clients have not obtained substitute counsel, and refrain from taking new cases.

The incidents both involved physical altercations, one of which resulted in Davis’s conviction for simple assa ult. This matter is before the Court to determine whether the respondent, Guy S. Davis, should be held in contempt for practicing law after the entry of a thirty-day temporary suspension.

We granted permission to appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 11 to Howard E. King, the appellant, in order to address the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b)(2) (Supp. 1994),1 which requires trial courts to instruct juries regarding parole and release eligibility when a jury instruction on the sentencing range is requested by either party. Because we find that the statute does not violate the separation of powers doctrine or deprive the appellant of his due process right to a fair trial, we conclude that the statute, as applied under the circumstances of this case, is constitutional.