APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

W. Hudson Connery, Jr., et al., v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, et al.

01A01-9709-CH-00529
Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Davidson County Supreme Court 07/01/98
In re: Jason Ryan Stephens, Pamela Renee Stephens, v. James Callaway

01A01-9801-JV-00043

This appeal involves a biological father's obligation to support his thirteen year old son.

Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Originating Judge:Judge David Loughry
Rutherford County Court of Appeals 07/01/98
Boiler Supply Company, Inc., v. Lunn Real Estate Investments

01A01-9605-CH-00246

This appeal involves a dispute over the interpretation of a provision allocating the responsibility for paying legal expenses in the event of a default or breach of two leases. The lessee filed suit against the lessor in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a declaration that the leases had expired and requesting its attorney’s fees in accordance with the provisions of the lease agreements. The trial court granted the lessee’s motion for summary judgment and declared that the leases had expired but denied the lessee’s claim for legal expenses. The lessee has appealed. We have determined that the trial court correctly interpreted the lease agreements and, therefore, affirm the summary judgment.

Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Davidson County Court of Appeals 07/01/98
James F. Cook, Jr., D/B/A Cook Properties, v. Consolidated Stores Corp., Belz Investco, L.P., Urco, Inc., Union Realty Co. LTD., and South Plaza Co.

01A01-9605-CH-00245

This appeal involves a dispute over a real estate commission on four retail properties in Memphis. After a former client leased these properties, a real estate broker filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a commission from its former client and the lessors of the four properties. The trial court granted the former client’s motion for summary judgment and, following a bench trial, dismissed the broker’s claims against the four lessors. On this appeal, the broker asserts that the trial court erred by granting his former client’s summary judgment motion and that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s dismissal of his claims against the four lessors. We have determined that the trial court properly granted the summary judgment motion and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s judgment in favor of the four lessors.

Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Chancellor Robert S. Brandt
Davidson County Court of Appeals 07/01/98
Jerry J. Roberts v. George Beeler, Etc., et al.

01S01-9710-CH-00216
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Chancellor
Davidson County Workers Compensation Panel 07/01/98
Thomas Huggins v. Royal Insurance Company

01S01-9708-CH-00178
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:William S. Russell
Davidson County Workers Compensation Panel 07/01/98
Gallatin Aluminum Products, Inc. v. Rosie L. Harris

01S01-9710-CV-00238
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:William S. Russell
Sumner County Workers Compensation Panel 07/01/98
Martha M. Eden v. Employers Ins. of Wasau Mutual Co., et al .

01S01-9710-CV-00210
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:William S. Russell
Trousdale County Workers Compensation Panel 07/01/98
State of Tennessee vs. Ronnie L. Ingram

02C01-9707-CR-00260

The defendant was indicted, charged, and convicted of burglary and sentenced as a career offender to twelve years imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for burglary since the State failed to prove intent to commit theft. Finding no merit in the defendant’s argument, we affirm.

Authoring Judge: Judge John H. Peay
Originating Judge:Judge Joseph B. Dailey
Shelby County Court of Criminal Appeals 07/01/98
In the matter of: S.M.L. (DOB 12/26/88), C.B.L. (DOB 4/14/92), D.K.J. (DOB 5/8/93) Children under the age of 18.

07-93-017-CC

C.L.H. has filed a timely Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition for rehearing and a Tenn. R. App. P. 14 motion to consider post-judgment facts. She asserts that our original opinion filed on June 12, 1998 misapprehends material facts with regard to her more recent self-improvement efforts, and she offers new evidence regarding her educational attainments and the stability of her living environment.

 

Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Dickson County Court of Appeals 07/01/98
State vs. Kestner

03C01-9611-CR-00390
Washington County Court of Criminal Appeals 06/30/98
State vs. Tanner

03C01-9703-CR-00101
Sullivan County Court of Criminal Appeals 06/30/98
State vs. Elroy Kahanek

01C01-9707-CC-00298

Originating Judge:Donald P. Harris
Williamson County Court of Criminal Appeals 06/30/98
Bradson Mercantile vs. Joseph Crabtree

02A01-9710-CV-00272
Shelby County Court of Appeals 06/30/98
01C01-9702-CR-

01C01-9702-CR-
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 06/30/98
State vs. Dominic Amari

01C01-9703-CR-00077
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 06/30/98
Henry Collier vs. Methodist Hosp., et al

02A01-9607-CV-00165

Originating Judge:Dick Jerman, Jr.
Haywood County Court of Appeals 06/30/98
Guadalupe Mendez vs. State

01C01-9703-CC-00076

Originating Judge:James E. Walton
Montgomery County Court of Criminal Appeals 06/30/98
02A01-9707-CH-00157

02A01-9707-CH-00157

Originating Judge:W. Michael Maloan
Obion County Court of Appeals 06/30/98
Shelley Sackett v. Hal Roseman

M2002-00587-COA-R9-CV
This interlocutory appeal was brought to determine whether the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Joint Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Originating Judge:Muriel Robinson
Davidson County Court of Appeals 06/30/98
Connatser vs. Connatser

03A01-9801-CV-00005
Court of Appeals 06/29/98
King vs. King

03A01-9710-CH-00441
Court of Appeals 06/29/98
Doris Barnes v. Cigna Insurance Company

02S01-9710-CV-00087
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court held the plaintiff had sustained a 4 percent permanent partial disability to the right arm1 and a 3 percent permanent partial disability to the left arm as a result of a gradually occurring injury which arose in the course of and in the scope of her employment with Martin Marietta Ordnance Systems, Inc. ("Martin Marietta"). The defendant, Cigna Insurance Company, appeals and raises the following issue about the award to the left arm: "1) Whether the trial court's award of 3% permanent partial disability to the left upper extremity was contrary to the weight of the evidence given the 6.35% anatomical impairment awarded by the evaluating physician and the zero percent (%) anatomical impairment awarded by the treating physician?" We find the award of 3 percent to the plaintiff's left arm was not contrary to the weight of the evidence and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Julian P. Guinn,
Carroll County Workers Compensation Panel 06/29/98
Ingram Book Co. v. Stacey Fitzgerald

01S01-9712-CV-00268
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Ingram Book Company, contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings that (1) the employee's injury was one arising out of and in the course of employment, (2) the award is not barred by the last injury rule and (3) the claimant retains a twelve percent vocational disability award. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Twenty-eight-year-old Stacey Fitzgerald was hired as an executive secretary by Ingram Book Company in September of 1994. Between late February and mid March, she told her supervisor, Terry Cook, she was experiencing right arm pain and requested an ergonomic keyboard. In early June, 1995, a non-work related back injury caused Ms. Fitzgerald to take a temporary leave of absence. Upon her return to work in late August, she requested a part-time position to aid her recovery. Due to continued pain in her right arm, Ingram Book Company sent Ms. Fitzgerald to the Baptist Occupational Medicine facility on or about October 23, 1995. There, she was treated with anti-inflammatorymedicine, a wrist splint, and an elbow band. In November, 1995, Ms. Fitzgerald missed several days of work due to strep throat, a death in the family, and hospitalization for pneumonia. Ingram Book Company terminated her employment during her hospital stay. Following her termination, Ms. Fitzgerald was referred to Dr. Arthur Cushman, whom she saw twice. He concluded Ms. Fitzgerald had a zero percent anatomical impairment rating and assigned no permanent restrictions. Ingram Book Company then arranged for her to receive treatment from Dr. William Jekot. On January 17, 1996, Dr. Jekot diagnosed Ms. Fitzgerald as having mild cubital tunnel syndrome and tendinitis of the right elbow. During March of 1996, Ms. Fitzgerald obtained employment with the Daily News Journal running a newspaper route. However, she quit three months later claiming her preexisting condition caused problems in executing her duties. On May 21, 1997, Dr. Jekot requested a reevaluation visit with Ms. Fitzgerald to prepare for his deposition. Dr. Jekot diagnosed chronic 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III,
Rutherford County Workers Compensation Panel 06/29/98
James Ed Linkous, Jr. v. Federated Rural Electric

01S01-9709-CH-00191
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant, Reliance Insurance Company, insists (1) the chancellor erred in applying the successive or "last injurious injury" rule and (2) the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Linkous, is in his late thirties with a high school education, a few junior college courses, apprenticeship training as a journeyman lineman and twenty years' experience as a lineman. On September 13, 1993, he fell from a bucket truck and was injured. After conservative treatment and work hardening, he returned to work in April of 1994 with no permanent medical impairment or restrictions. He performed the same duties as before the accident, until July of 1994, when he suffered a second injury at work. The second injury was surgically treated and the claimant has again returned to his same duties, but with restrictions and a permanent impairment rating. The primary dispute before the trial court was whether disability and medical benefits should be the responsibility of the insurer at the time of the first or second injury, a factual dispute. The trial judge invoked the successive injury rule, long recognized in Tennessee, and sometimes referred to as the last injurious injury rule. Because both issues involve questions of fact, our review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review. Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 315 (Tenn. 1987). As to the first issue, Reliance Insurance Company, the insurer in July of 1994 argues that it should not be subjected to liability because the July 1994 injury was merely an onset of increased pain resulting from the first injury, citing Cunningham v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 811 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1991) as authority. In that case, the trial court found that plaintiff's condition was due to a general arthritic condition predating his employment at Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company and that, although his employment may have aggravated his preexisting condition by increasing his pain, there was no connecting industrial injury or accident that might be considered the triggering incident producing an acceleration of his condition. That finding was supported by expert medical evidence. The medical proof in the present case is quite different. The doctor who 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Jeffrey F. Stewart,
Marion County Workers Compensation Panel 06/29/98