APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Daryl Turner, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1993, appellant was convicted of selling a Schedule II controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, and was sentenced to twelve (12) years as a Range III persistent offender. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. See State v. Darrel Tucker1, No. 01-C-01-9310-CR00347 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 6, 1994), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1995). The appellant, thereafter, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, malicious prosecution, and invalid “reasonable doubt” jury instructions.2 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed appellant’s petition upon finding no ground to warrant post-conviction relief. We affirm the  judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The appellant, Daryl Turner, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1993, appellant was convicted of selling a Schedule II controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, and was sentenced to twelve (12) years as a Range III persistent offender. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. See State v. Darrel Tucker1, No. 01-C-01-9310-CR00347 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 6, 1994), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1995). The appellant, thereafter, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, malicious prosecution, and invalid “reasonable doubt” jury instructions.2 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed appellant’s petition upon finding no ground to warrant post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

This appeal involves an automobile accident and the subsequent wrongful death action brought by the daughter of the decedent. Plaintiff-appellant, Patricia Herndon, filed suit against
Michael Hughes, the driver of the other automobile, the driver’s wife Jeanette Hughes, co-owner 2 of the vehicle, and Jeff McAlpin & Associates, Inc., (McAlpin), the car dealership that sold Mr. Hughes the automobile. Ms. Herndon appeals the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to McAlpin.

Plaintiff/Appellant, Ronald E. Nelson (“Nelson”) appeals the judgment of the trial court granting defendants/appellees’, James P. Everett (“Everett”) and Memphis Publishing Company, Inc., d/b/a The Commercial Appeal (“Memphis Publishing Company”) (collectively “defendants”), motion for summary judgment. For reasons stated hereinafter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, Meese & Associates, Inc. (“plaintiff”), appeals the judgment of the trial court 2 awarding Intervening Plaintiff/Appellee, Rebecca Kirklin (“Kirklin”), the real estate commission for the sale of Defendants/Appellees’, Eddie Powers (“Powers”) and David Hicks (“Hicks”) (collectively “defendants”), property by Kirklin. For reasons stated hereinafter, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand.

Plaintiff Russell Keith Berry, brought this action on behalf of himself and his grandmother. He alleged that his grandmother, Lorena Beryl Berry, is mentally incompetent and physically ill and that the defendants, his brother and sister-in-law, gained unfair advantage of her incompetency by fraudulently taking control of all her worldly possessions. The plaintiff also alleged the defendants converted his personal property while he was incarcerated. Defendants move for summary judgment. The motion was granted and the complaint dismissed. This appeal resulted. We find there are genuine issues of material fact and revers the trial court's judgment.

This appeal involves a payment dispute between the plaintiff, Don Conseen, a subcontractor doing business as DC Service & Sales, and defendants Jimmy R. Reagan and Howard Sexton, doing business as Precision Construction Company, a general contractor. Plaintiff sued for payment for construction work which he testified was requested and approved by defendants, and for which he was promised payment by the defendants. An evidentiary hearing was held. The defendants presented no proof at trial. The chancellor granted plaintiff a judgment for $19, 267.45, the amount sought by the plaintiff. The defendants appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Randy Hicks appeals the McMinn County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his "Motion for New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence Rule 22, FRCrP." The lower court considered this "motion" under the law applicable to motions for new trial, petitions for writ of error coram nobis, and petitions for post-conviction relief, found it without merit, and summarily dismissed Hicks's claim without conducting a hearing. Hicks's underlying conviction is for criminal facilitation of first degree murder, for which he is serving a 25 year sentence. State v. Hicks, 835 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). In his pro se appellate brief, Hicks never directly attacks the lower court's denial of his "motion," but he does raise several issues relating to the admission of evidence, denial of a severance and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence at his trial. He also filed with his pro se appellate brief a document entitled Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, in which he alleges that the district attorney knowingly and willfully submitted false evidence in his trial.1 Having painstakingly reviewed the record and Hicks's brief, we affirm the trial court's summary dismissal of the claim. Likewise, we find the petition filed in this court proper for dismissal.

In this action plaintiff sought job-related disability benefits from his pension plan, administered by the City of Chattanooga Firemen’s and  Policemen’s Insurance and Pension Fund Board (“Board”). The Board, after an evidentiary hearing, voted 3 to 2 to deny benefits. An appeal was taken to the Chancery Court, and the Chancellor overturned the decision of the Board and awarded benefits. For reasons hereinafter stated we affirm and adopt from the Chancellor’s Opinion.

At approximately 1:00 on Christmas morning of 1995, a pickup truck which had been stolen from the defendant Atlantic Soft Drink Company's business compound, crashed into the plaintiffs' residence, allegedly causing property damage and personal injury to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, in their complaint asserted that the defendant was negligent in leaving the keys inside the unlocked
truck and providing inadequate security for the parking lot where company vehicles were left. The plaintiffs also sought to impose liability on the defendant under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The defendant moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted and the complaint dismissed. This appeal resulted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered i favor of Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, an unnamed party brought before the court pursuant to T.C.A. § 5 6 - 7 - 1 2 0 6 .  The question before us is whether the plaintiff, Steven Renfro, is an insured within th emeaning of Ohio Casualty's uninsured motorist (UM) policy provisions. The precise issues, whether the plaintiff, at the time of his injury, was "occupying" the covered vehicle as that term is defined in the policy under consideration. The trial court fond, on motion for summary judgment, that the plaintiff was not "occupying" the ehicle. we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court allowed the plaintiff a recovery of a commission for the sale of real estate. The defendant appeals, insisting that (1) the plaintiff was not a party to the sales agency contract and thus had no standing to file this action, (2) the agency contract expired before performance, (3) the plaintiff “performed no useful work,” and (4) the record “cannot support a judgment for anyone.” Each of these issues alleges that the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment.

This complaint sought a writ of mandamus to require the City to issue a sign permit, or, alternatively, to review the action of the City in denying the application for a permit. The Chancellor found that the action of the Board of Zoning Appeals in denying the permit was arbitrary and ordered the issuance of the permit. We affirm.

In this boundary line dispute the defendants appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, insisting that the evidence established their right to the disputed area by adverse possession.

This is an action to recover profits the plaintiff contractor alleges he would have made had he been allowed to construct an additional four warehouses similar in design and usage to a fifth warehouse he constructed and for which he was paid.

The issue with which we are confronted is whether the State may be liable to a county employee for employment discrimination under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA") when the county employee is under the  supervision of a state judge who commits quid pro quo sexual harassment against the county employee. The trial court answered the question in the negative holding that the State was not the plaintiff's employer under the THRA. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the THRA imposed liability on the State under an economic realities test. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm as modified the appellate court's reversal of the trial court's judgment.

During a wide-ranging investigation, law enforcement officers located and seized several items of property thought to be used in the conduct of an illegal drug enterprise. Criminal charges followed the several seizures, and Page Stuart, the appellant, pleaded guilty to offenses involving delivery and conspiracy to deliver large quantities of marijuana. The State thereafter instituted administrative proceedings under Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-11-201 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1992) for the forfeiture of the property seized. Although Stuart challenged the forfeiture of some of the property,1 he was not successful, and both the Chancery Court and the Court of Appeals upheld the forfeiture. We granted Stuart’s application for review under Rule 11