APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This controversy arose as a result of a contract entered into between Robert E. Leonard and his wife, Vickie J. Leonard and Butler Markland. The contract provided that Mr. Markland would build a house on a lot owned by the Leonards at a total cost of $96,000.

We granted this appeal to determine whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-105(a) mandates submission of a newly proposed zoning classification amendment to the regional planning commission following the commission's rejection of a similar but different proposed classification. The Court of Appeals held that the statute does not require futile resubmissions of revised proposals. We, however, find that the proposal in question was not merely a revised prior
proposal but was a new and previously unsubmitted proposal. The statute clearly mandates submission of new proposals to the regional planning commission. We reverse the Appellate Court and hold that the new zoning proposal should have been submitted to the regional planning commission.

This is an action for breach of an employment contract and deprivation of civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff employee. We
reverse.

The question in this case is whether a state employee protected by civil service has a right to be heard before being reclassified to the unprotected executive service. The Chancery Court of Davidson County held that the employee had a right to grieve the reclassification. We affirm.

In this action for separate maintenance, the trial court awarded Ann Elizabeth 2 Dudenhoeffer (“Wife”) a decree of separate maintenance and dismissed George Daniel Dudenhoeffer’s (“Husband”) counter-complaint for divorce. The trial court ordered Husband
 to maintain Wife as an insured on his medical insurance policy until Wife reaches age sixty-five and ordered Husband to maintain his three preexisting life insurance policies designating Wife as the sole irrevocable beneficiary. Wife was awarded the following: the marital residence, an automobile, Wife’s IRA account, Husband’s IRA account, one-half of Husband’s retirement benefits, the remaining balance of Husband’s 401-K account, a certificate of deposit, eighty-eight shares of Tenneco stock, the proceeds from a savings account, all savings bonds in Wife’s possession, two burial plots, an annuity, and the parties’ jointly owned personal property and household goods which Wife had in her possession. Husband was awarded the personal property which he had in his possession, a truck, a bass boat, a motor, a trailer, boating accessories, and proceeds previously withdrawn by him from his 401-K account. The trial court awarded Wife $6,638.50 as alimony in solido to aid Wife in paying her attorney fees and alimony in futuro in the following amounts:
$2,000.00 per month beginning 10/1/95 and ending 12/31/95;
$1,800.00 per month beginning 1/1/96 and ending 12/31/96;
$1,500.00 per month beginning 1/1/97 and ending 12/31/98;
$1,200.00 per month beginning 1/1/99 and ending 9/5/2001,

Wife’s sixty-fifth birthday; and $600.00 per month from 9/2001 until Wife’s death or remarriage.

This appeal involves the classification of property in a divorce case. The wife filed for divorce in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County after seventeen years of marriage. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced and awarded the wife custody of the four minor children. In its division of the parties’ property, the trial court classified the parties’ home as marital property and awarded it to the wife but classified the household furniture, funds inherited by the wife, and a limited partnership interest in an athletic club as the wife’s separate property. The husband takes issue on this appeal with the allocation of the responsibility for the debt on the home, the classification of separate property, and the overall distribution of the marital estate. We have determined that the trial court should have allocated the debt secured by the home to the wife and that the trial court correctly classified the disputed assets and equitably distributed the marital estate.

The question in this case is whether the alimony set by the court was subject to modification.  The trial judge terminated the alimony upon the wife’s remarriage.  We affirm.

This appeal followed a long course of post-divorce litigation that prevented the parties from enjoying the peace that should have come from the dissolution of their unhappy marriage. The trial court found the husband guilty of five counts of criminal contempt for failing to comply with the court’s orders regarding division of marital property and payment of alimony in solido, and ordered him to serve ten days in jail for each count. On appeal we reverse the trial court as to four of the five counts.

This is the second appeal concerning a dispute between a prisoner and the Department of Correction over the calculation of the prisoner’s sentence reduction credits. After the Department summarily denied his second request for recalculation of his sentence credits, the prisoner filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that the Department had miscalculated his sentence credits. The trial court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment, and the prisoner again appealed to this court. We have determined that the summary judgment dismissing the prisoner’s ex post facto claims should be affirmed but that the summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims must again be vacated.

In this divorce action, Danny Joe Melton (hereinafter, “Husband” or “Mr. Melton”) appeals the trial court’s determination regarding the division of the marital estate, custody of the parties’ minor child, and the award of certain farm equipment to his former father-inlaw.
 

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on two grounds: (1) probable cause and (2) damages -- neither of which is presented with  much clarity in the briefs. But the issues are of such importance to the practice of law in this state that I feel they should be addressed.

This is an appeal by defendant/appellant, Thomas E. Watts, Jr., from the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Davidson County finding Mr. Watts liable for malicious prosecution and awarding plaintiff/appellee, Helen S. Rogers, $18,000.00 in damages. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

In this case involving a breach of a real estate contract, the appellant asserts that the evidence preponderates against the amount of damages found and the award of prejudgment interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This medical malpractice suit arises out of surgery performed on Sandry Scott's freet by Dr. Gerald Calia on May 17, 1989. Ms. Scott contends that Dr. Calia was negligent in his medical care of her. She insists on appeal that the Trial Court was in error in directing a verdict against her at the close of her proof.

This case is before the court on an extra ordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10, Tennessee Rules of  Appellate Procedure.  The sole issue which we are called upon to decide is whether Tennessee recognizes the tort of  "intentional interference with prospective economic advantage" (The tort ). The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the premise that Tennessee does not recognize the tort, citing Kultura, Inc., v. Southern Leasing, 923 S. W. 2d 536, (Tenn. 1996), quoting from Quality Auto Parts v. Bluff City Buick, 876 S. W. 2d 818, 823 (Tenn. 1994).

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Chancery Court of Knox County, affirming the decision of The Department of Employment Security Board of Review in denying all the appellants unemployment compensation benefits.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Delisa Ribbins Leak and Meshi Leak, by next friend, Delisa Ribbins Leak, appeal an order of the Circuit Court dismissing their case against Laurie Goodwill. The case had purportedly been appealed from the General Sessions Court pursuant to an order of two Judges of that Court granting a writ of certiorari. The appeal on related to one Defendant, Laurie Goodwill, and not the other Defendant, AT&T Service, Inc. Upon motion of Ms. Goodwill, the Circuit Judge dismissed the case against her, apparently on the grounds raised in the motion, that their appeal was not timely, and thereupon remanded the case to the General Sessions Court for "further hearing as to AT&T Service, Inc."

This is a medical malpractice case. Plaintiff, Reba V. Davis brought suit, individually and on behalf of her infant son, Tyler, against Dr. Elbert Cunningham, Harriman City Hospital and the City of Harriman, for injuries sustained by Tyler shortly after his birth. After reaching a settlement with Dr. Cunningham, the physician who delivered Tyler, Ms. Davis amended her complaint to include allegations of negligence against the attendant Harriman City Hospital nurses.

This is a breach of an employment contract case. Defendant, Cleo, Inc. (Cleo), appeals the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, Anthony P. Guiliano (Guiliano).

This case is a procedural quagmire. The dispositive issue on appeal, though not of the merits, of the case, is whether the Chancellor was correct in declining to assume jurisdiction of it.