APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a divorce case. Defendant, Billy Gene Ray (Husband), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dividing the marital property and awarding alimony to the plaintiff, Linda Gail Ray (Wife).

This appeal involves the lease of a grocery store in Nashville. Following
the landlord’s death, the trust succeeding to the landlord’s interest filed an
unlawful detainer action in the Davidson County General Sessions Court seeking
to recover possession of the property. The tenant appealed the adverse judgment
to the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The circuit court granted the trust’s
motion for summary judgment after finding that the tenant had breached the lease
by failing to make timely and sufficient lease payments. We have determined that
the summary judgment must be reversed because the trust has failed to
demonstrate that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

This case is on appeal for the second time. The Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Board and J. W. Luna, as Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (hereinafter “Board” or “Appellants”), have appealed from the judgment of the trial court declaring the appellee, Memphis Publishing Company (MPC), eligible for reimbursement from the Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund (Fund) for remediation expenses incurred as a result of a release from its underground storage tank in August 1987. The trial court’s decision came after remand from the Middle Section of this Court in Memphis Publishing Company v. Tennessee PetroleumUnderground Storage Tank Board, No. 01A01-9305-CH-00202, 1993WL 476292 (Tenn. App. Nov. 19, 1993), perm. app. denied, c.r.o. There, the court confronted the issue of whether MPC had a right to Fund reimbursement under the Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Act (Act), T.C.A. § 68-215-101 et seq., as originally enacted. 1 It was argued that MPC had no right to reimbursement because its release occurred prior to the effective date of the Act, July 1, 1988. This Court, speaking through Judge Lewis, held that the Act, as originally enacted, “was intended to cover, from a Fund reimbursement perspective, all releases regardless of date.” Upon remand, the trial court held the court of appeal’s decision “law of the case” and ruled as hereinabove set forth. It is urged on appeal that the decision rendered in Memphis Publishing is not the “law of the case” regarding MPC’s Fund eligibility and that the trial court erred in so holding. For reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm.

This case involves a dispute concerning an easement for ingress and egress. Respondents-Appellants, Gordon Bell and Sarah T. Bell, appeal from the order of the trial court 1 On October 24, 1995, Flora Scruggs transferred the property by quitclaim deed to her husband, John T. Scruggs, Sr. On January 23, 1996, the trial court entered an order substituting John T. Scruggs, Sr. in place of Flora Scruggs as the proper party in interest.However, because the trial court and the parties have continued to refer to the petitioner as Flora Scruggs, we will do likewise. 2 Scruggs actually purchased the land with John T. Scruggs, Sr. In 1982, John T. Scruggs, Sr. conveyed his interest in the land to Flora Scruggs making her the sole owner until she conveyed it back to him in 1995. 3 Old New Cut Road is referred to throughout the record as Old New Cut Road, New Cut Road, Triune, and Salem Road, or old dirt road. In this opinion, we will call the road “Old New Cut Road.” 2 granting an easement by estoppel to Petitioner-Appellee, Flora Pope Scruggs1, without compensation to the Bells.

This is an appeal by defendant, Mary Lou Dicus, from the decision of the chancery court to set aside the court’s order of 18 October 1993 which amended the court’s order of adoption filed on 24 August 1993. The facts  out of which this matter arose are as follows.

The defendants, Buster Crum and wife Patricia L. Crum, have appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court resolving a boundary dispute favorably  to the plaintiffs, George Avery Land and wife, Stella Faye Land. The sole  issue presented to this Court by the defendants/appellants is:  Whether the Chancellor erred by ruling that the common boundary line between the parties’ properties should be surveyed in the course and distance method when there were ample natural objects, landmarks, artificial monuments and lines of adjoining landowners sufficiently describing the common boundary line.