APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mr. Fields says that Joe Torrence, the Circuit Court Clerk of Davidson County, charged him an excessive fee for a certified copy of a traffic citation, for which he attempted to seek redress in General Sessions Court of Knox County. He says that the Judge of the Knox County General Sessions Court and the Clerk thereof refused to allow him to file his warrant, whereupon he attempted to file it in Davidson County, and was rebuffed; he thereupon attempted to file a redressing action in the Davidson Chancery Court, and was again rebuffed. He returned to Knox County, and filed this pro se action for damages against Judge McGee and Clerk Bean, asserting that they violated his civil rights under 42 U. S. C. §1983, by refusing to allow him to file the action against Clerk Torrence. The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendants at the close of the plaintiff’s case, holding that he had failed to make out a prima facie case.

This complaint was filed by the Church of God of Prophecy against the Little Giant Mfg. Co. and Kick-Shaw, Inc., alleging that its property was destroyed by fire caused by a defective water heater manufactured by Little Giant and sold to the plaintiff by Kick-Shaw, Inc. Various defenses were interposed by the defendants, none of which is relevant to the issue before us. Thereafter, the complaint was repeatedly amended; new parties came and went; and, in its present posture, the plaintiffs are Aetna Insurance Company and Church of God of Prophecy and the defendants are Little Giant Mfg. Co., Inc. and Emerson Electric Company.

The purpose of this litigation was to establish the boundary line between property owned by the Plaintiff, Bradley Mark Butler, and the defendants, Prince E. Spradlin and Sylvia S. Spradlin. Each party presented several witnesses and exhibits including the testimony of their respective surveyors. Upon completion of the evidence, the chancellor made findings of fact including a finding that the plaintiff had established his title by a clear preponderance of the evidence. The court accepted the survey of Eddie Coleman, the surveyor who testified in behalf of the plaintiff, and established the property line according to the Coleman survey.

In this divorce case Dorothy H. Long (“Wife”) filed suit for divorce in the Chancery Court of Shelby County from David G. Long (“Husband”) alleging inappropriate marital conduct. Husband filed an answer and a cross-complaint. The parties stipulated that Husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. The chancellor entered an order awarding Wife a divorce on these grounds.
The chancellor at the same time appointed a Special Master and assigned him the responsibility of ascertaining if either party had dissipated or secreted marital assets during the marriage, determining the value of certain marital property and the current ownership of same and recommending to the court an appropriate division of marital assets, along with alimony, if any, as well as the assessment of costs and fees. After several hearings, the Special Master filed his final report to the chancellor covering the scope of his assignment. The chancellor affirmed the findings of the Special Master and included the Master’s findings in his final decree.

Appellant, Reginald Fentress (Fentress), appeals from the summaryjudgment entered
by the trial court in favor of the appellee, Memphis Housing Authority (MHA). The issue before us is whether the trial court was correct in doing so upon finding, as a matter of law, that Fentress was not entitled to a grievance hearing prior to his termination of employment with MHA. For the reasons expressed hereafter, we affirm.

Georgeanne M. Hofer (“Wife”) filed suit for divorce in the Chancery Court of Shelby County against James P. Hofer (“Husband”) seeking a divorce, division of marital property and alimony. Following a bench trial the chancellor awarded Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. In addition, he awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony for three years, ordered Husband to pay a portion of Wife’s fees and expenses as alimony in solido and divided the m arital property between the parties.

This case originated i the trial court as a boundary line dispute. Before we examine the merits of the issues raised on appeal, however, it is necessary for us to address a preliminary issue, i.e., was a notice of appeal timely filed. If a notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. See Rule 4, Tennessee Rule s of Appellate Procedur e .

This is an action for damages for personal injury and the negligent, mailicious, and wrongful destruction of real and personal property of the plaintiff, Harry Gray Smith. Plaintiff filed suit in the Chancery Court for Knox County alleging that the defendant destroyed three pieces of his property, located at 1417 Magnolia Avenue, 1421 Magnoli Avenue, and 400 Winona Street North, without preper notice. Plaintiff claimed that, not withstanding a "No Trepassing" sign he had erected on the premises, employees of the City destroyed the structure without service of any final condemnation or demlition notice. He further asserts that the defendant refused to allow him to remove medical equipment from one of the structures in which he was living. He further alleged that as a result of the demolition and verbal threats of bodily harm which he claims were made by agents of the defendant, laintiff suffered a heart attack necessitating hospitilization.

This action was instituted by the plaintiffs to recover a prorata share of monies they were required to pay on a guaranty agreement where in the defendants were co-guarantors. The trial court found that  there were three co-guarantors, Mr. Squibb, James H. Widener and Ted C. Smith (defendant).  He apportioned liabilit y equally among the three.  The court found that the purported signature of Ms. Smith on the guaranty agreement was not her signature.  The case was dismissed as to the defendant, Rose E. Smith.  No appeal was taken from the action of the court dismissing the case as to Ms. Smith.  Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs, John P. Squibb and wife Martha Jo Squibb, in the amount of $45, 402.04 plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum from April 10, 1991 to April 9, 1996, in the amount of $22, 701.02 for a total judgment of $68, 103.06.  A like judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, Widener.  From these judgments, the defendant appeals.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellants to this action are either current or retired firemen for the Division of Fire Services of Memphis, Tennessee (Division).1 They appeal from a judgment of the trial court in favor of Appellees, City of Memphis, Tennessee (City), the Division, Dr. W. W. Herenton, Mayor, Westelle Florez, Director of the Division of Personnel, and Charles Smith, Director of the Division, on their action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the appellees’ method of computing pension benefits for those firefighters employed by the City for 30 or more years. After review of the record, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We set forth our reasons below.

The issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s suit for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff sued the defendants alleging he was wrongfully evicted from property located at 3211 Ashwood, Memphis, Tennessee. He further alleged that the defendants were in further violation of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act set forth at T.C.A. § 66-28-101 et seq. as follows: § 66-28-501 (noncompliance with rental agreement by landlord); § 66- 28-502 (failure to supply essential services) and § 66-28-504 (unlawful ouster, exclusion, or diminution of service).

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion filed by Appellant, Eastera Bell Porter, individually and as surviving spouse and next friend of Jasper D. Porter, deceased, under Rule 60 T.R.C.P., to set aside the summary judgments entered in favor of the appellees, Jesse McGee, M.D. and Methodist Hospitals of Memphis (Methodist). After review of the record, we find an absence of abuse by the trial court in this regard and affirm. We set forth our reasons below.