APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Zella Balentine (“plaintiff”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court of Hardin County seeking to have that court declare Simon White (“defendant”) to be the natural father of the parties’ minor child, Ashley Balentine. The Hardin County General Sessions Court, in its role as Juvenile Court, found defendant to be the father of the child and awarded plaintiff retroactive child support dating back to November 1, 1992. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding retroactive child support back to the date of the child’s birth. For the reasons stated, we find that the trial court did abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we reverse as to this issue and remand this cause to that court for further proceedings.

This is a case involving a trustee’s improper accounting procedures and misuse of funds regarding a trust set up to receive Social Security Insurance payments. At issue is whether Tennessee state courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a dispute between a beneficiary and his representative payee over alleged misuse of Social Security benefits. The trial court found it had jurisdiction. We affirm.

This is an action for negligence in the conducting of a paternity test. The  trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the appellees, Gary D. Niblack, M.D., Laboratory Investments, Inc. and Ren Laboratories, Inc. d/b/a Ren Histocompatibility Laboratory, a joint venture, and John Doe. The appellants, Melanie Miller, individually and as next friend for Ashley Miller Luna, a minor, and next friend of Gregory Luna, deceased, have appealed presenting the single issue of whether the trial court erred in doing so. For reasons hereinafter set forth, we affirm in part and reverse in part the  judgment of the trial court.

Woods filed suit against various defendants; however, the judgment before us enters summary judgment in favor of Omaha only and was rendered final by the trial court in accordance with Rule 54.02 T.R.C.P. Thus, Omaha is the only Appellee for purposes of this appeal. This case concerns the validity of a “Compromise Settlement Release” executed by the appellant, Howard A. Woods (Woods), in favor of the appellee, Mutual of Omaha (Omaha). Woods challenges its validity on the ground of mental incapacity. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Omaha  Woods has appealed. For reasons hereinafter expressed, we affirm.

The issue in this case is whether plaintiff can combine an original action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with a petition for judicial review under the Uniform Administration Procedures Act when the sole relief requested under the Section 1983 claim is an award of attorney fees. We affirm the Court of  Appeals’ decision allowing plaintiff an award of attorney fees.

In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff, Ethel Faye George, appeals from the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, Clyde Wayne Alexander, M.D. and Phillip R. Jones, M.D. This case presents the following issue for our determination: whether a defendant in a negligence case must, pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, plead comparative fault as an affirmative defense if the defendant wishes to introduce evidence that a person other than itself caused the plaintiff’s injury. We conclude that the defendant is required to affirmatively plead comparative fault in such a situation; and because that was not done in this case, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I agree with the result reached by the majoirity however, resolution of the important principles of comparative fault and rules of pleading and evidence presented in this case requires, in my view, a more precise articulation and analysis of the pleadings, the facts, and the legal issues.  As an example, the statement of the issue decided in themajority's introductory paragraph - if the defendant wishes to introduce evidence that a person other than itself caused the plaintiff's injury - encompasses various situations controlled by different rules and cannot be decided as stated. Since the ruls of substantive law. pleading and evidence are correlated, I can best state my views in an integrated opinion rather than in a commentary on the majority's opinion.

In this case we are faced with the issue of the continued viability of the zone of danger test as a limitation on liability when plaintiff is neither physically injured nor in an area where physical injury is possible. We conclude that in cases such as this, in which plaintiff sensorily observes the injury and resulting death of his mother, recovery should be allowed under circumstances in which the incident which produces the emotional injuries and the emotional injuries are reasonably foreseeable.

In this workers' compensation case, we are asked to review the trial court’s determination that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6- 207(4)(A)(i) is unconstitutional and that plaintiff is entitled to life-time workers’ compensation benefits. Having considered the positions of the parties, the plain language and the legislative intent of the statute, and relevant authority in other jurisdictions, we reverse.

The wife of a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed for divorce, claiming that her husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. The husband answered and counterclaimed, and moved the court to order the wife to file a Bill of Particulars, setting forth the facts she was relying upon as grounds for the pending divorce. The court did not respond to the husband’s motion, nor did it respond to the husband’s Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum, but granted the wife an absolute divorce without affording the husband the opportunity to present any evidence. We reverse, and vacate the trial court’s order.

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the criteria for determining the
validity of antenuptial agreements announced in Randolph v. Randolph, ___
S.W.2d ___, ___ (Tenn. 1996)1 should be applied to reconciliation agreements.
I also agree with the majority’s determination that the reconciliation agreement
involved in this case is not enforceable because Mr. Smith has not demonstrated
by a preponderance of the evidence that he disclosed the value of his interest in
National Sheet Metal Company to Ms. Smith or that Ms. Smith had independent
knowledge of the nature, extent and value of this interest. Accordingly, I agree
that the trial court erred by enforcing the reconciliation agreement.

The counter-plaintiff, Connie Argo Smith, appeals from the Trial Court’s judgment awarding her a divorce on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment. The Trial Court also awarded her the marital residence and contents, a 1990 Astro Mini Van, and $100,000.00 cash. The Trial Court required the counter-defendant, Jimmy E. Smith, to pay all marital debts including the mortgage on the home. The court also awarded Mr. Smith a farm, commercial property, the “Smart Station” property, a houseboat, a bass boat, a Chevrolet truck, Mercedes automobile, riding mower, tractor, personal effects and unspecified stocks.

This is a suit by a judgment creditor to set aside a fraudulent transfer of assets and to subject said assets to the satisfaction of the judgment.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Dana D. Defriece (Mother) to her son, John Defriece (John)(DOB: Januar 9, 1988). Mother appeals, raising three issues that present the followig questions: