APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves a dispute over child custody and division of marital property as decreed by the trial court in a divorce case.

Plaintiff, Cynthia D. Gentry, appeals from the order of the chancery court that affirmed the final administrative order of the Department of Human Services (DHS). The controversy in this case arose from the receipt by Mrs. Gentry's husband of a lump sum social security disability payment in July, 1991. At the time of the payment, Mrs. Gentry was the recipient of Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits. DHS determined that the lump sum payment constituted income sufficient to render Mrs. Gentry ineligible for AFDC benefits for a period of four months. Mrs. Gentry was notified by DHS that her benefits would be terminated for four months because of the receipt of the lump sum social security payment.

Appellants, Terry J. Kyte and Terry F. King, appeal from the judgment entered by the chancery court, affirming the decision of the commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Safety (Department) to grant the Department's motion for default in a contested case proceeding concerning the seizure of Appellants' property.

This appeal arises from the chancery court's reversal of a final order of the Tennessee Civil Service Commission (the Commission). The Commission's final order reinstated Appellant, Frank Mahon, an employee who had been dismissed by the Cocke County Department of Human Services (Cocke County DHS). The chancery court reversed the Commission's final order, finding that the final order was unsupported by substantial and material evidence in the record before the Commission.

This appeal involves a dispute over child support for two pre-teen boys. Two years after their divorce in the Chancery Court for Sumner County, the parents returned to court seeking resolution of their disputes concerning the custody and visitation arrangements and the amount of child support. A special judge awarded the mother sole custody of the children, modified the father’s visitation schedule, and directed the father to pay child support in accordance with the child support guidelines. The father takes issue on this appeal with the amount of his child support. We have determined that the amount of the father’s child support should be modified to take all his income into consideration.

Appellant, Nashville Park Hospitality, Inc. ("Nashville Park"), is the owner of the Budget Lodge, a motel in Nashville consisting of three separate buildings identified as the 100, 200 and 300 Buildings. Ninety-six suites compose the 100 and 300 Buildings, with 92 available to the public and rented on a weekly basis. The 200 Building consists of standard motel rooms which are rented nightly. Appellee, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County ("Metropolitan Government"), filed suit seeking to enjoin Nashville Park from operating the Budget Lodge in violation of the Hotel, Food, Service Establishment and Public Swimming Pool Inspection Act of 1985, T.C.A. § 68-14-301 et. seq. ("Act").1 After a hearing, the trial court granted Metropolitan Government's application for a permanent injunction, enjoining Nashville Park from operating Budget Lodge in violation of the Act. The court, however, refused to entertain the issue of whether the Act applied to the suites rented weekly,2 citing Nashville Park's failure to first exhaust its administrative remedies. Nashville Park has appealed, challenging that determination by the chancellor. For reasons to be discussed, we reverse that portion of the judgment holding the trial court without jurisdiction to decide the issue prior to an exhaustion of the administrative process.

The petitioner, Edward Rabie, appeals from the trial Court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The single issue presented for review is whether the extradition documents were legally sufficient to authorize the governor of this state to detain and return the petitioner to Kentucky.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a suit to recover damages for personal injury and property damage arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiffs, Ollie H. Davis and R. D. Davis, appeal from the judgment of the trial court on a jury verdict for the defendant, Horace Hall.

I concur wholeheartedly in the majority opinion. I write separately to address the plaintiffs' contention that their sister married Richard Anthony Hendricks "in jest." Even assuming, for the purpose of argument, that the common law requirement of mutual intent to be bound is still a requirement for a valid marriage in Tennessee, an allegation that the parties married in jest is conclusory in nature. Furthermore, it is not supported in the complaint by factual allegations and hence not conceded to be true by the defendant's motion to dismiss. Such a
pleading admits well-pled facts, not conclusions of the pleader. See Swallows v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 543 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tenn. 1976); Dobbs v. Guenther, 846 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tenn. App. 1992). Therefore, the conclusory allegation of a marriage in jest does not render the trial court's action of dismissal inappropriate. The well-pled facts, liberally construed in favor of the plaintiffs, do not make out a cause of action.

This is a suit by Bonnie Jo Miller against Thomas A. Parker seeking damages for personal injuries as a result of her being struck by an automobile being driven by him.

North American Rayon Corporation appeals a judgment of the Chancery Court for Carter County which upheld a Board of Review determination that Judy Howell was entitled to unemployment benefits incident to her termination by North American Rayon.

Earl Maney, the Plaintiff, and Paul J. Parker, the Defendant, were the parties to a written five-year lease for commercial property in Cleveland. Mr. Parker, who operated a woodworking/machine shop on the premises, took possession of the property on September 8, 1989. Late in 1990, after occupying the property for slightly more than one year, he vacated the premises. On May 6, 1993, Mr. Maney, the landlord, filed suit in the Chancery Court of Bradley County seeking back rent and damages for repairs to the building. After a trial, the Chancellor determined that Mr. Parker "had a right to abandon the premises, " but awarded damages to compensate Mr. Maney for expenses he incurred making repairs to the property. Mr. Maney appeals and presents the following issues for review.

This is a suit by Charles William Coulter and Donna Lee Coulter, brother and sister of Linda Diane Rose Hendricks, who died in an automobile accident on April 24, 1994, seeking to have her marriage on April 1, 1994, to Richard Anthony Hendricks, annulled. The Chancellor granted Mr. Hendricks' motion under Rule 12.02( 6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, which contended the complaint failed "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

First Tennessee has filed a petition for rehearing. The petition basically argues two points: first, that the undisputed material facts show that the defendants did not timely assert their claims of misrepresentation, and hence waived them; and second, that we erred in construing the parties' "First Modification, Renewal, and Extension Agreement and Apointment of Successor Trustee."

The Plaintiffs, Rick Haynes and his wife Karen Haynes, initially sued their adjacent landowners, Defendants John Walker and wife Rosa Mae Walker and Harold Woods. The Plaintiffs sought a declaration that they were entitled to a right-of-way to gain access to tract 8 of the Clint Jones property, a 15.72-acre tract owned by them in Jefferson County. Thereafter, Michael Woods and his wife Paula Young Woods, who acquired a portion of Harold Woods property, were added as party Defendants by an agreed order.

This is a suit to determine the boundary line between the Plaintiffs' and the Defendants' property and to confirm that the Plaintiffs have a right-of-way over the property of the Defendants.

This suit was brought against the City of Johnson City(Johnson City) pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), T.C.A. § 29-20-101, et seq. The plaintiff, 1 The wife's claim was for loss of services, companionship, consortium, etc. 2 Alfred Carroll Jones (Jones), was injured while working at the Towne Acres Elementary School, a facility owned and operated by Johnson City. At the time of the injury, the school was closed while an addition was being built to the existing structure. The trial court granted Johnson City's motion for summary judgment, holding that Jones expressly assumed the risk of his injury and "as a matter of law that [Johnson City] owed no legal duty to" Jones based on the undisputed facts. Jones and his wife, the
plaintiff Betty Jones1, appeal, raising the following issues:

The Appellant has appealed from a judgment denying its "Application for Execution." We affirm.

This is a post-divorce proceeding involving the custody of the parties' one minor child, Rex M. Massengale, Jr., whose date of birth is September 20, 1985. The parties were divorced by the "Final Judgment and Decree" of the Dade County, Georgia, Superior Court entered on October 19, 1993. That document approved and adopted the parties' agreement that the child's custody should be vested with his mother, Audrey L. Williamson1 (Mother2). The instant controversy was initiated by the child's father, Rex M. Massengale, Sr. (Father), on November 16, 1994, not quite 13 months after the divorce, when he filed a petition to change the child's custody. After a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the Father's petition. Father appeals, raising two issues:

Eddie Wililams, Jr. ("petitioner") filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Circuit Court of Laderdale County against the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC" or respondent"), seeking court review of actions taken by a prison disciplinary board, prison warden, and the department commissioner. Due process violations resulting therefrom were also alleged. The trial court granted summary judgment to respondent and petitioner has appealed. On appeal, a single issue was presented for review: whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. For the reasons stated hereinafter, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.