APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this estate proceeding, the original petitioner, an adult child of the decedent, filed a petition for letters of administration, averring that the decedent had died intestate. The trial court initially granted the petition, designating the petitioner as the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. The decedent’s surviving spouse subsequently filed a petition requesting the trial court’s acceptance into probate of a holographic will, purportedly executed by the decedent, which the surviving spouse presented to the court. The original petitioner and another adult child of the decedent then filed motions contesting the validity of the holographic will. Following a bench trial, the trial court found the holographic will to be valid, accepted the will into probate, and named the surviving spouse as the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. The adult children contesting the holographic will have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The issue presented is whether the Shelby County Fire Department provided a firefighter with sufficient notice of the reasons for his termination. The Fire Department advised the firefighter that he was facing possible termination for violating two specific Fire Department rules. After further investigation and a meeting with the firefighter, the Fire Department gave him a termination letter that recited the two rules and detailed the factual basis for his termination. The firefighter appealed, and the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board upheld the termination in a written decision that stated the facts and reasons supporting the termination. The trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the firefighter did not receive adequate notice of the reasons for his termination. We hold that the Shelby County Fire Department provided the firefighter with sufficient notice to satisfy the requirements of due process. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration of pretermitted issues.

This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. In terminating the parental rights of the children’s father, the trial court found that two grounds for termination had been properly established: abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistent conditions. The trial court also determined that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate the father’s parental rights. In addition to terminating the father’s rights, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother. On appeal, we conclude that considerations of fundamental due process require us to vacate that portion of the final order terminating the rights of the mother. We also conclude that one of the grounds relied upon for terminating the father’s parental rights, persistent conditions, must be vacated due to the trial court’s failure to consider all required elements of the statutory ground. The termination of the father’s parental rights is otherwise affirmed, however, for the reasons stated herein.

I concur in the affirmance of the decision to terminate the parental rights of David S. (“Father”). I write separately to address the majority’s decision to vacate the judgment terminating the parental rights of Cecilia S. (“Mother”) despite the fact that no party to the appeal has raised an issue with respect to the judgment against Mother. The issue not being raised is perhaps understandable. As the majority points out, the one person most likely to raise an issue with the termination of the Mother’s parental rights, Mother, may not have been served with process and may be completely unaware that her parental rights were being terminated.

This appeal presents the question of who has the duty to set a case for trial de novo when a defendant appeals a delinquency conviction from juvenile court to circuit court. The then-minor child S.L. (“Defendant”) was charged with rape and incest.1 After a trial, the Blount County Juvenile Court (“the Juvenile Court”) found that Defendant had committed these delinquent offenses. Defendant appealed to the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Circuit Court”) for trial de novo as provided for by statute. Defendant proceeded to do nothing regarding his appeal for around two years. Eventually, the State of Tennessee (“the State”) filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, which the Circuit Court granted. Defendant appeals to this Court arguing that, notwithstanding his long stretch of inactivity, he has a right to trial de novo. We hold that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(c) it was the Circuit Court’s duty—not Defendant’s—to set his case for trial. We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand for Defendant to have his trial de novo, which is to be expedited.

Because I conclude that Regions Bank had standing to challenge the issuance of the sign permit to 150 4th Ave N Tenant LLC (“WeWork”), I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion. As did the trial court, I would hold that the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking the WeWork sign permit. But like the majority, I agree that the issue of the brightness of the skyline signs was not properly before the BZA, so I concur in that portion of the opinion.
  

This dispute arose from the issuance of a skyline sign permit to a high-rise office-building tenant. The permit allowed the tenant to erect two 495-square-foot signs on the building’s northwest and southeast facades. Another tenant with skyline signs on the northeast and southwest facades appealed the issuance of the permit by filing an application with the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) for interpretation against the zoning administrator. The complaining tenant contended, inter alia, that its brand was harmed because the juxtaposition of the new and existing signs would blur the relationship between the two tenants and asserted that the new signs caused the building to exceed the maximum signage permitted under the zoning code. The BZA determined that the new signs violated the zoning code and revoked the permit. On a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Davidson County Chancery Court held that the BZA erred by relying on a zoning map rather than the code’s plain language and found the new signs complied with the code’s requirements. This appeal followed. We have determined the complaining tenant failed to establish standing because it failed to demonstrate that it was aggrieved by the issuance of the permit. There is no competent evidence to show that the signs’ juxtaposition would create public confusion about or signal a business relationship between the two tenants. Accordingly, the record fails to demonstrate that the complaining tenant’s alleged injury “falls within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the [law] in question.” See City of Brentwood v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 149 S.W.3d 49, 55–56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Further, based on the facts of this case, the BZA lacked the ability to provide meaningful redress. For these and other reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, albeit on different grounds, and remand with instructions for the trial court to order the BZA to dismiss the complaining tenant’s application and to reinstate the new sign permit as issued in June of 2017. As for a separate issue that a neighboring homeowners’ association attempted to raise during the BZA hearing—whether the northwest sign exceeded brightness standards—that issue was not properly before the BZA or the trial court. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s decision to remand the brightness issue to the BZA.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Tanya Nicole Slimick, of first degree premeditated murder. The Petitioner appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, numerous aspects of the jury instructions, and the State’s use of a demonstrative aid during closing argument. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. State v. Tanya Nicole Slimick, No. M2014-00747-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 9244888, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 17, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 6, 2016). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging that her trial counsel was ineffective. In an amended petition, she added claims challenging the jury instructions and asserting prosecutorial misconduct. Thereafter, the Petitioner abandoned her claims as to ineffective assistance of counsel, and the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the remaining allegations had either been waived or previously determined on appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains her challenge to the trial court’s failure to properly charge the jury and assertion of prosecutorial misconduct. For the first time on appeal, she argues that a juror violated the trial court’s instruction not to communicate via social media during the trial. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Dondre Johnson, was convicted of first degree felony murder and received a life sentence. He filed a post-conviction petition, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not file a motion to suppress the evidence stemming from his seizure. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment denying relief.

The Defendant, Stevie Williamson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class C felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-17-1324 (2018) (employment of a firearm), 39-17-1307 (2018) (firearm possession by a convicted felon), 39-13-103 (2018) (reckless endangerment). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of twenty years for attempted second degree murder, fifteen years and twelve years for the firearm convictions, and six years for reckless endangerment, for an effective fifty-three-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by admitting evidence of the Defendant’s previous convictions and (2) by imposing consecutive service of the sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Ashley H. (“Mother”) appeals the March 2019 order of the Lawrence County Chancery Court (“Trial Court”) terminating her parental rights to the minor children, Noah H. and Gracie H. Y. (collectively, “the Children”). Bobby H. (“Father”) surrendered his parental rights to the Children prior to trial and did not revoke his surrender. Upon petition of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), the Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children upon the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to visit prior to her incarceration, abandonment by wanton disregard, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the Children. The Trial Court further found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother timely appealed. We reverse the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in all other respects including the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

An organization of developers brought suit against Williamson County seeking a declaratory judgment that an impact fee imposed on new developments to fund improvements to schools throughout the county exceeded the authority granted to the county by the legislature, or alternatively, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-3-413(b) exempted the organization’s members from paying the impact fee because their property rights vested prior to adoption of the impact fee. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county, concluding that the impact fee did not exceed the authority granted to the county and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-3-413(b) did not apply because the impact fee did not constitute a development standard. We affirm.   

The Petitioner, Samuel Gregory Dorsey, filed a post-conviction petition seeking relief from his conviction of attempted aggravated sexual battery, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a petition to terminate the parental rights of a father to his child for the purposes of adoption. The petitioners, the child’s mother and her new husband, alleged that the father had abandoned the child both by willfully failing to visit and by willfully failing to support. Following a trial, the court concluded that the petitioners had failed to show that the father’s failures to visit or to support were willful. So the court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioners contend that the evidence was clear and convincing that the father willfully failed to support his child. After a review of the record, we affirm.

The Defendant, Toscar Smith, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s revocation of his nine-year probationary sentence for his conviction for aggravated assault. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering his sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Tyran Rollins, of aggravated robbery, and he was sentenced to serve eight and a half years in prison. The Defendant appeals his conviction, asserting that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict and that the composition of the jury violated his constitutional rights. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and that the issue regarding the composition of the jury has been waived. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by M.E. Buck Dougherty (“Father”), seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case involving modification of a parenting plan. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Father we find that the order of the Chancery Court for Fayette County (“Trial Court”) did not sufficiently comply with Rule 10B. We, therefore, vacate the Trial Court’s January 30, 2020 order and remand this case to allow Father to amend his petition and for the Trial Court to either grant the motion or enter an order that states in writing all the grounds upon which the motion is denied.

Defendant, Jeffrey Van Garrett, was charged with one count of possession of oxycodone, a Schedule II substance, with intent to sell or deliver. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement under Rule 11(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which he pled guilty to the charge with an agreed four-year sentence as a Range I offender to be served on probation. Defendant attempted to reserve three certified questions of law under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. After review, we conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the certified questions because the certification did not meet the requirements of State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

A plaintiff who developed tendonitis after taking medication prescribed by a nurse practitioner filed a malpractice action against the nurse practitioner and the pharmacy that filled the prescription. Two years later, the plaintiff amended her complaint to add the
nurse practitioner’s employer and supervising physician as defendants. The new defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims against them were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and repose and that the plaintiff failed to provide them
with pre-suit notice of a potential medical malpractice claim. The plaintiff responded that fraudulent concealment tolled the statutes and constituted extraordinary cause to waive pre-suit notice. The trial court agreed and denied the motions. The defendants then moved for summary judgment on other grounds, which the court granted. It is undisputed that the plaintiff’s claims against these defendants were filed beyond the time allowed by the statute of repose for medical malpractice actions. Because we conclude that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the fraudulent concealment exception, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the statute of repose. So we affirm the dismissal of the claims against these defendants on summary judgment but on different grounds.

In this termination of parental rights action, the father has appealed the trial court’s final order terminating his parental rights based on several statutory grounds. The maternal grandparents of the minor child, Bentley Q. (“the Child”), filed a petition to terminate the mother’s and father’s parental rights and to allow the maternal grandparents to adopt the Child. As pertinent to this appeal, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the father had (1) abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit the Child and (2) failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court also found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest that the father’s parental rights be terminated. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey McCoy, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more and one count of burglary of a building other than a habitation. The trial court imposed a twelve-year effective sentence to be served consecutively to a previous sentence in South Carolina. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner maintains that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The State concedes error. After a review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for appointment of counsel and further proceedings consistent with the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

The is an appeal from an order terminating a father’s parental rights. Because the father did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

I concur with the majority opinion in its analysis that Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner’s counsel failed to raise specific issues regarding the lack of sufficient evidence to sustain two convictions, and the issues had merit. However, I disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusion as to the relief to which Petitioner is entitled. This is a unique post-conviction case. I am unable to recall ever before reviewing an appeal wherein the petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief because, following a thorough review of the evidence at trial taken in the light most favorable to the State, it is clearly shown that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions of especially aggravated robbery of one victim and aggravated robbery of another victim. Petitioner’s counsel failed to make the appropriate argument for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case and failed to argue the issue in the direct appeal to this court. That failure established deficient performance. The review of the evidence at trial, the result of which is stated above, clearly established prejudice to Petitioner as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Reversing the judgment of the post-conviction court is appropriate. However, remanding the matter to the trial court for Petitioner to have the opportunity to file a motion for new trial denies Petitioner the relief to which he is entitled. As will be discussed herein, it may also be in violation of Petitioner’s constitutional rights to be protected from double jeopardy.

The Petitioner, William Boatwright, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and two aggravated assault convictions, for which he is serving a forty-seven-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel, reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, and remand this case for a limited motion for a new trial regarding the sufficiency of the evidence issues addressed in the appeal.

In this post-divorce dispute, Appellant Mother and Appellee Father filed cross-petitions seeking modification of the permanent parenting plan for their minor child. Father sought a change in primary residential parent, and Mother sought modification of the parenting schedule and decision-making authority. On its finding that the parties stipulated to a material change in circumstance, the trial court granted Father’s petition and denied Mother’s petition. Because the trial court failed to delineate between the burden of proof for modification of custody and the burden of proof for modification of parenting schedule, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-101(a)(2)(B), (C), we vacate the trial court’s order and remand.