APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County jury convicted Petitioner, Juan Vargas, of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. Petitioner filed a pro se Post-Conviction Petition, and after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct require a new trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals from the summary dismissal of his latest petition for habeas corpus relief challenging the judgment for his 2003 aggravated robbery conviction. Petitioner claims that an amended judgment entered by the trial court which ordered the sentence to run consecutively to his prior sentences is void. The habeas corpus court found that the amended judgment was not void and that Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Cortney R. Logan, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of attempted first degree murder and employing a firearm during the flight or escape from the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. Petitioner received consecutive sentences of 25 years and 6 years for a total effective sentence of 31 years. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the ruling of the trial court suppressing the results of toxicology testing conducted on the blood sample that the defendant, Pamela Kidd Hafer, provided to the police. The State asserts that the trial court erred because the defendant voluntarily consented to the warrantless drawing of her blood. In the alternative, the State contends that the trial court should have concluded that the good faith exception to the warrant requirement obviated the need to suppress the challenged evidence. Because the evidence establishes that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant twice voluntarily consented to the drawing of her blood, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we have concluded that the defendant voluntarily consented to the warrantless blood draw and because the good faith issue was not fully litigated below, we do not consider the State’s claim that the evidence was admissible via the good faith exception.

Matthew Whitehair, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of simple assault, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, two counts of sexual battery, five counts of attempted incest, one count of incest, one count of statutory rape by an authority figure, and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. Petitioner was found not guilty of two counts of incest and two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Matthew Whitehair, No. M2014-00883-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 880021, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016). Subsequently, Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged various instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel, among other things. After a lengthy, multi-day hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief. After our review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to relief. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I join fully in the majority’s conclusion that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages enacted by our legislature does not violate either the separation of powers clause or the equal protection clause in the Tennessee Constitution. A much closer question is presented on whether the statutory cap violates the clause in the Tennessee Constitution guaranteeing a right to trial by jury. I agree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion on this issue but write separately to further explain my reasoning. 

The employee appeals from the trial court’s denial of workers’ compensation benefits. The employee asserted that a slip and fall suffered at work aggravated pre-existing degenerative conditions in his left shoulder and neck, causing injuries that are compensable under Tennessee’s workers’ compensation laws. After a trial, the trial court reviewed the testimony at length and held that the employee had failed to establish a compensable injury. The employee’s appeal has been referred to this Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for oral argument and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We accepted certification of the following questions of law from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee regarding the constitutionality of Tennessee’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102: “(1) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate a plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury, as guaranteed in Article I, section 6, of the Tennessee Constitution?; (2) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate Tennessee’s constitutional doctrine of separation of powers between the legislative branch and the judicial branch?; (3) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate the Tennessee Constitution by discriminating disproportionately against women?” Upon review, we answer each of the District Court’s questions in the negative.

I respectfully concur in results with Judge Wedemeyer’s majority opinion. I am unable to join with that portion of the opinion addressing Defendant’s Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) “unlawful detention” issue. I agree the issue is waived as a result of the failure of Defendant’s trial counsel to raise a pre-trial Gerstein challenge to suppress evidence obtained after his warrantless arrest. The State on appeal asserts the issue is waived. If this court concludes in this particular case that the issue is waived, we should stop our analysis there.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Ronald Taylor, of first-degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed the statutorily required life imprisonment sentence. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the: (1) denial  of his motion to suppress; (2) sufficiency of the evidence; (3) omission of a jury instruction; and (4) admission of an officer’s testimony regarding a video prior to admission of the video into evidence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Tennessee Constitution guarantees that the “right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102 (2012) (“the damages cap statute”), which forbids awards for noneconomic damages that exceed $750,000 (or $1,000,000 in catastrophic injury cases), is an unconstitutional invasion of the right to trial by jury. Thus, it cannot stand.  

I dissent. I would hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102(e) (2012) violates article I, section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution by usurping the jury’s essential and constitutionally protected fact-finding function.  

The Petitioner, Ed Loyde, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective sentence of thirty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The petitioner, Jamarius Gant, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, David Burrows, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated kidnapping. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to discover his intelligence quotient (“IQ”) of 76 and in failing to seek a mental evaluation. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

We granted permission to appeal to the Defendant, Alexander R. Vance, to determine whether the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the State to elicit testimony about a statement made by a non-testifying codefendant whose trial was severed and whose statements were the subject of a motion in limine the trial court had granted. The trial court permitted the testimony after determining that defense counsel had “opened the door” during cross-examination and that the doctrine of curative admissibility permitted the testimony in order to correct a misleading impression created by the cross-examination. The defense objected to the testimony on various grounds. Those grounds did not include constitutional claims under the state and federal confrontation clauses. After the close of proof, the jury convicted the Defendant of one count of second degree murder, an alternative count of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction and imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-one years. In his motion for new trial, the Defendant reiterated his arguments against the admission of the “curative” testimony and raised for the first time a contention that the testimony violated his constitutional rights of confrontation. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments. Applying plain error review to the Defendant’s constitutional claims, we hold that, while the trial court erred in admitting the contested testimony, substantial justice does not require that plain error relief be granted. We also hold that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on the claims he preserved for plenary review. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A lessee contended that its right of first refusal to purchase leased real estate was triggered when its lessors transferred the real estate to a general partnership. The lessors disagreed. They contended that the lessee’s right only arose upon receipt of a “bona fide offer from an unrelated third party to purchase” the property and that there was no such offer. The lessee sued the lessors and the general partnership, including its partners and a related individual, seeking specific performance or damages. The trial court dismissed the lessee’s claims on summary judgment. On appeal, we conclude that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

The mother has filed a notice of appeal from an order granting the father’s motion to continue the trial. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The Appellant, James Arnold Demoss, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and driving on a revoked license, fourth offense, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in confinement for aggravated burglary and to a concurrent sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days for driving on a revoked license, fourth offense. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State appealed the trial court’s application of the Criminal Savings Statute to the Defendant’s conviction for “Theft over $500,” arguing that the court improperly imposed a misdemeanor sentence for the Defendant’s guilty plea to Class E felony theft and that the amendments to the theft grading statute changed the elements of the offense, rather than the punishment for the offense. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (2014) (generic theft statute), 39-14-105 (2014) (amended 2017) (theft grading statute). Upon review, a majority of this court dismissed the appeal after concluding that the State had no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 or Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-402. State v. Harley Crosland, No. M2017-01232-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3092903 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 21, 2018), perm. app. granted and case remanded, No. M2017-01232-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Dec. 5, 2019) (order). On December 5, 2019, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s opinion in State v. Menke, No. M2017-00597-SC-R11-CD, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2019 WL 6336427 (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2019). Harley Crosland, No. M2017-01232-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Dec. 5, 2019) (order). Upon further review, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Defendant’s theft conviction, we reverse the portion of the judgment stating that this theft conviction is a Class E felony, and we remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment form reflecting that the Defendant’s amended offense and conviction offense are theft of property valued at $1,000 or less and that this theft conviction constitutes a Class A misdemeanor.

Petitioners appeal the dismissal of a petition for civil and criminal contempt related to alleged violations of a permanent injunction against the Respondent. In response, the Respondent appeals the dismissal of two protective orders she concurrently sought against the Petitioners. As the trial court’s order failed to provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law for review, we vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand the matter for further consideration.

The Defendant, Nikki Bodie Pate, pleaded guilty to two counts of custodial interference. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and placed the Defendant on probation for eighteen months. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellants were injured in a car accident and, with the permission of their insurance company, Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), settled with the at-fault driver for his policy limits under his coverage with United Services Automobile Association (“USAA”). To fully recover for their injuries, Appellants notified State Farm of their willingness to settle or submit their underinsured motorist (“UIM”) claim to binding arbitration. After evaluating Appellants’ claim, State Farm informed Appellants that it would not offer a settlement for the UIM claim because it believed they had been fully compensated by the payment from USAA. Appellants, in response, demanded that State Farm elect to either participate in binding arbitration or decline arbitration and preserve its subrogation rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1206 (“the Statute”). Believing that its obligation under the Statute was never triggered, State Farm refused to make an election. Appellants filed an action for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to declare that State Farm failed to comply with the Statute. On competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted State Farm’s motion and denied Appellants’ motion. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, James Edward Bostic, Jr., appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief and denial of related motions. On appeal, he asserts that the Tennessee Department of Correction refuses to comply with an order by the trial court awarding him jail credit and that the matter should be remanded to the trial court for the trial court to resolve. He also asserts for the first time on appeal that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective because she failed to assist him in his fight for jail credit. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves the denial of a motion to dismiss and to compel mediation and arbitration. The Trial Court determined that the plaintiff had properly challenged the mandatory arbitration provisions of the contract, including the delegation clause, on the basis of fraudulent inducement of the contract including the delegation clause. The Trial Court, therefore, denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and to compel mediation and arbitration. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.