APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Parents, on behalf of their children who are public school students, and an education-focused parents’ rights organization brought suit against the Williamson County Board of Education, arguing that the Board’s adoption and implementation of a particular curriculum violates Tennessee law. The Plaintiffs argue the curriculum violates a state law restricting the use of Common Core textbooks and instructional materials in public schools and violates another state law that bars the teaching of certain prohibited concepts in public schools. The School Board moved to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion on two justiciability grounds. The trial court concluded that the parents and the parents’ rights organization lacked standing to maintain either claim. The trial court also concluded that the Plaintiffs were required to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to their prohibited concepts claim and had not done so. The Plaintiffs appealed. With the exception of a family that left the county public school system and has not expressed in their pleadings an intent to return, we conclude that trial court erred in finding the Plaintiffs lacked standing. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the prohibited concepts claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We reverse, however, the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ Common Core claim and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Benjamin Cloe Byrer, was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2018). The Defendant was sentenced to nineteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a divorce action involving, inter alia, the classification of property, equitable valuation and division of marital property, and support for an alleged disabled adult child beyond the age of 21. After our exhaustive review, we find that the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s determinations in this matter. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respect.

Petitioner, Daniela Valderrama, filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Ms. Valderrama’s petition for recusal appeal fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 10B, section 2.03. Due to Ms. Valderrama’s failure to comply with Rule 10B, the appeal is dismissed.

Plaintiff alleged that actions of defendant tow truck driver led to John Doe driving into plaintiff’s vehicle and causing injury. Towing company and driver moved for summary judgment based on the lack of evidence as to the cause of John Doe’s actions. The trial court agreed, granting summary judgment for lack of evidence that towing company or driver was the cause in fact of plaintiff’s injury. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A mother sought to move to another state with her minor child. The child’s father opposed the move and petitioned to be named the child’s primary residential parent. The mother responded with a counter-petition seeking approval of the move and a modified parenting plan. Using the best-interest factors applicable to child custody disputes, the court granted the mother permission to relocate and modified the parties’ parenting time accordingly. On appeal, the father argues the parental relocation statute applied and, regardless of which best-interest factors were used, the evidence preponderates against the court’s best-interest finding. We affirm.

A condominium owner appeals from a final judgment awarding past due fees and assessments to a homeowners association. Because the owner did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Malik DeWayne Hardin, appeals the denial of his motion for resentencing
for his guilty-pleaded conviction of possession with the intent to sell less than .5 grams of
cocaine in a drug free school zone, which resulted in a sentence of twelve years at 100%
as a Range II offender. The Defendant asserts that the trial court issued a fundamentally
illegal ruling and palpably abused its discretion by comparing the sentence the Defendant
received pursuant to his negotiated plea agreement to the sentence he faced if convicted of
the greater charged offense and concluding that he would not receive a lesser sentence
under the 2022 amendment to the Drug-Free School Zone Act. The Defendant therefore
requests that this court, in the interest of justice, convert his improperly filed Rule 3 appeal
into a common law writ of certiorari and reverse the ruling of the trial court. Because the
Defendant has not shown that his case warrants review pursuant to a writ of certiorari, we
dismiss the appeal.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to exclude his experts and to grant summary judgment to the defendant. Because plaintiff has appealed a non-final judgment and the record on appeal is incomplete, we dismiss this appeal.

The cabinets delivered from a Turkish company for a Tennessee construction project did not meet United States formaldehyde standards and could not be used as they were. The construction management company filed an insurance claim. The insurance company denied the claim and the construction management company sued. The trial court found for the construction management company and the insurance company appealed. We have determined that the trial court’s order was not final and, therefore, dismiss the appeal and remand the matter for further consideration.

In this termination of parental rights case, Brian T. and Samantha T., the maternal grandparents of Rori H., appeal the trial court’s ruling that termination of the parental rights of Rori’s father, Brennan H., is not in the child’s best interests. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding as grounds for termination that the father abandoned the child by failing to pay support in the four months preceding the petition. Having found no grounds for termination, we do not reach a best interests determination. Ultimately, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition for termination. We remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-117(b)(4). Finally, we conclude that the father is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

This is the petitioner’s second petition to recuse based on the same allegations. Therefore,
we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

This is an appeal of a termination of a mother’s parental rights to her son. Ashley D.
(“Petitioner”), who has maintained custody of Matthew D. (“the Child”) since he was four
months old, sought termination of the parental rights of Natalie D. (“Mother”).1 The
Circuit Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”) found that clear and convincing
evidence established the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to support and that it
was in the best interest of the Child that Mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother
appeals. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Carlos Stokes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his convictions for first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, reckless endangerment, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment plus fifty-four years. He contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and requests that this court appoint a special judge to preside over this case on remand. We conclude that the Petitioner is entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations. As a result, the judgment of the coram nobis court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition. We decline to appoint a special judge for subsequent proceedings.

A tax group performed tax credit services on a contingency fee basis for a corporation that owned several hospitals in California. Four and half years after the corporation completed a transaction referred to as a “spinoff,” the tax group informed the corporation that the spinoff triggered a reorganization provision of the parties’ contract that entitled the tax group to a fee for unused tax credits related to one of the hospitals involved in the spinoff. The corporation filed suit requesting a declaratory judgment that no fee was owed because the spinoff did not trigger the contract’s reorganization provision. After conducting discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied the tax group’s motion and granted summary judgment to the corporation after concluding that the parties’ conduct prior to the dispute showed that they intended the term “reorganization” to have a tax-based meaning that corresponded to the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of the term and that the spinoff did not constitute a reorganization under that definition. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellants, lawyers and their law firms, appeal the trial court’s denial of their petition to dismiss this lawsuit under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that Appellants failed to establish that this claim relates to the protected right to petition. As such, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

In this case, the plaintiffs sued the former attorneys of her opponent in a multitude of unsuccessful actions involving family trusts. In their complaint, the plaintiffs argued that they were damaged by the tortious conduct of the attorneys under the tort of another doctrine. The defendant-attorneys filed a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the basis that the act was inapplicable. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises out of proceedings in which a trial court denied a motion to recuse. The parents of the minor child at issue have attempted to appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. Because the parents did not timely file a petition for recusal appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

Petitioner, Larry B. Sexton, appeals as of right from the Lawrence County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his conviction for aggravated statutory rape, for which he received a sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. On appeal, Petitioner contends that, during trial, his right to due process of law was violated when the trial court permitted the State to reopen proof following his motion for judgment of acquittal. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to: (1) communicate the State’s plea offer to him; (2) request a trial continuance following the issuance of an amended indictment; (3) prepare a mistake of fact defense and interview potential witnesses to support this defense; (4) request a jury instruction on mistake of fact; (5) argue at sentencing and on direct appeal that NCIC entries are not “reliable hearsay” for purposes of sentencing; (6) object during sentencing when the trial court failed to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-106(b)(5) and raise the issue on appeal; and (7) adequately argue during trial and on appeal the issue of the reopening of proof. Following a thorough review, we affirm.

This appeal arises out of a property dispute. Although we agree with the Appellant that the trial court erred in pointing to the “good faith” of one of the Appellees when denying the Appellant any damages for Appellee’s construction of a fence on the Appellant’s land, and therefore remand this case for the entry of a judgment awarding the Appellant nominal damages for trespass, we conclude that the remainder of the Appellant’s grievances, and requests for additional relief, are waived due to insufficient briefing.

This is an appeal from an order striking a demand for a jury trial. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This appeal concerns standing and subject matter jurisdiction. Brett and Ceree Houghton (“Plaintiffs”) were the sole shareholders of Great Wakes Boating, Inc. (“GWB”), a Malibu Boats, LLC (“Defendant”) dealership. Defendant ended its dealership agreement with Plaintiffs, and GWB failed. Plaintiffs sued Defendant in the Circuit Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and promissory fraud. The jury awarded Plaintiffs $900,000 in damages for loss of equity in certain real property owned by GWB. Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and/or for a new trial. At a hearing on the motion, Defendant argued for the first time that Plaintiffs lacked standing. The Trial Court agreed and entered an order dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, deeming the other issues in Defendant’s motion moot. Plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Defendant’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ standing went to the merits and did not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ standing is waived as untimely raised. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The defendant, Brittany Linda Lou Davis, appeals her Lincoln County Circuit Court jury convictions of delivering and selling .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting a recording of the controlled buy, that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, and that the trial court erred by sentencing her as a Range III offender. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case concerns the denial of a variance by the Board of Fire and Building Code Appeals of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (“the Board”). Landowners applied for a building permit to construct an auto repair shop on undeveloped property. The local fire code required new buildings of this type and size to have, inter alia, a water source that could supply 180,000 gallons at 1,500 gallons per minute for two hours. The property at issue did not have the requisite water supply. Thus, as a variance to the fire code, the landowners proposed to construct a 20,000-gallon water tank on the property and to install a “dry” fire suppression system inside the building. When their plan was rejected by the fire marshal, the landowners appealed to the Board and asked for approval of a variance. The Board denied the variance request, citing concerns over the safety of people, including firefighters and first responders. The owners then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Board misapplied the law by failing to consider whether strict enforcement of the fire code would result in “manifest injustice.” Finding that the Board failed to distinguish the landowners’ request for a variance from an appeal, the trial court vacated the Board’s ruling and remanded the matter to the Board for review of the variance request. This appeal followed. For the reasons set forth below, we respectfully disagree with the trial court’s conclusion, reverse its judgment, and remand with instructions to affirm the decision of the Board.

This appeal concerns the award of attorney’s fees in a post-divorce dispute. Clayton Sugg Wilson, Jr. (“Father”) and Rebecca Lynn Blocker Huston (“Mother”) were divorced in 2017, at which time Mother was named the primary residential parent of the parties’ one minor child, and Father was ordered to pay child support as well as one-half of their child’s uninsured medical expenses. Four years later, Father filed a petition to modify his child support obligation, claiming that his income had decreased so much that Mother should pay him child support. Mother opposed Father’s petition and filed a petition for civil contempt and to enforce the parties’ permanent parenting plan, claiming that Father had repeatedly failed to pay his child support obligation and his share of their child’s uncovered medical expenses. The trial court found Father in civil contempt and awarded Mother an arrearage judgment. Based on his 2020 income, the court reduced Father’s monthly child support obligation. The court awarded Mother her attorney’s fees in bringing the contempt action. Father then filed a motion for apportionment of Mother’s attorney’s fees, which the trial court denied, finding that the fees awarded to Mother were reasonable. Father appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for apportionment of fees. We affirm the trial court in all respects. Finding that Mother is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5- 103(c), we remand for a determination and award thereof.