APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A mother and a father appeal the termination of their parental rights. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of four statutory grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights and five statutory grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights. The court also determined termination was in the child’s best interest. After a thorough review, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

This matter concerns prior restraint on speech. Patrick M. Malone (“Father”) is a party to
an action in the Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Trial Court”) against
maternal grandparents James William Rose and Jennie Adams Rose (“Respondents”)
concerning Father’s minor child, Rosie (“the Child”). Father’s father, Michael P. Malone
(“Petitioner”), testified voluntarily at a hearing on Father’s motion to set bail pending
appeal of Father’s convictions for criminal contempt. In two written orders, the Trial Court
ordered Petitioner not to discuss the legal proceedings of Father’s case with the Child.
Petitioner, a non-party, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court seeking reversal
of the Trial Court’s orders against him as he contends they were improper. We granted the
petition. The Trial Court’s restrictions lack an adequate evidentiary basis. In addition, the
Trial Court erred in abridging Petitioner’s constitutional right to free speech when
Petitioner is a non-party who lacked the benefit of notice or a hearing. We reverse the
provisions of the Trial Court’s orders dated August 15, 2023 and August 17, 2023
restraining Petitioner from discussing the legal proceedings of Father’s case with the Child.

This appeal arises from a divorce after a short marriage. The husband appeals from the ruling of
the trial court as it relates to the division of marital assets, the number of days he was awarded in
the parenting plan, and the alimony award to the wife. Upon our review, we find the order appealed
from is nonfinal and must be dismissed.

A Tipton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for especially aggravated kidnapping,
especially aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault by strangulation. Prior to trial,
counts one and two of the indictment were amended to aggravated kidnapping and
aggravated burglary. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated assault by strangulation, and aggravated criminal trespass. The
trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective eight-year sentence. Defendant appeals,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated
kidnapping and aggravated assault by strangulation. Following our review of the entire
record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial
court.

A Gibson County jury convicted the defendant, Antonio Demetrius Adkisson a/k/a Antonio Demetrius Turner, Jr., of two counts of second-degree murder, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the juvenile court erred in transferring the defendant to circuit court and (2) that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the defendant’s statement. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this delayed appeal, Defendant, Shatara Evette Jones, appeals her conviction for first degree murder for which she received a mandatory life sentence. On appeal, Defendant challenges: 1) the trial court’s restricting her right to cross-examine a State’s witness; 2) the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss, pursuant to State v. Ferguson, based on the State’s failure to preserve evidence; 3) the trial court’s denial of her motions to suppress her statement to police and cell phone data; 4) the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of the victim’s gang involvement and a rap video in which he is depicted holding a gun; 5) the trial court’s omission of an instruction in the written jury instructions; and 6) the sufficiency of the evidence of her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A woman asserting that she is a child’s great-grandmother filed a petition to establish paternity and for grandparent visitation. On the face of the petition, the purported great-grandmother brought the action both on behalf of herself and, acting with a power of attorney, on behalf of her grandson, the alleged biological father of the child. The parties agree that a power of attorney was never properly executed by the alleged father. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition in full. With regard to the paternity suit, the trial court found that the great-grandmother lacked the authority to file a paternity suit on the alleged biological father’s behalf and did not have standing to bring it on her own behalf, and therefore the paternity action was due to be dismissed. With regard to the grandparent visitation action, the trial court held that without a pending contested paternity suit, the grandmother lacked standing to bring an action for grandparent visitation, and in the alternative, that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action. We affirm.

In this easement dispute involving a shared driveway between adjoining real property
owners, the petitioners filed an action for declaratory judgment, alleging that the
respondents had interfered with their use of the driveway and requesting that the court
declare the “rights and obligations of the parties.” Acting without benefit of counsel, one
of the two respondents filed a response opposing the petition and subsequently filed a
motion for summary judgment asserting multiple counterclaims. The trial court
dismissed the respondent’s counterclaims in an order not included in the appellate record.
The trial court conducted a bench trial, during which all parties were represented by
counsel. At trial, the petitioners sought an implied easement and an easement by
necessity. The trial court determined, inter alia, that the parties had shared driveway
easements and that the petitioners had carried their burden to prove an implied easement
and an easement by necessity. The court included in its judgment parking limitations on
the parties’ use of the shared driveway. The respondent who initially filed pleadings pro
se has appealed, again acting without benefit of counsel. Discerning no reversible error,
we affirm

Police officers in this case obtained a confession from a juvenile by threatening him with the death penalty, repeatedly denying his requests for his mother who was present at the station, and interrogating him for over six hours in the middle of the night. After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, I would have concluded that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress because the Defendant’s Miranda waiver was invalid and his confession was involuntary. I also would have concluded that the juvenile court erred in finding probable cause that the Defendant committed the offenses. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.

This appeal arises from a divorce action following a short-term marriage. There were no children born of the marriage, and the only issue on appeal pertains to the classification of real property. At issue is the Wade Springs property, which the husband purchased using his separate property. He closed on the purchase of the Wade Springs property the day after the parties married, and the property was deeded in the husband’s name only. Because the property was used as the marital residence during the two-year marriage and marital assets were used to maintain the property, the wife contended that the property became marital property by transmutation, commingling, or Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121. The trial court found that the Wade Springs property was the husband’s separate property at the time of purchase and it remained his separate property. The court further found that the wife’s contributions to the property could easily be extracted and awarded her, inter alia, a cash judgment in the amount of her contributions to the home. Determining that the evidence does not preponderate against these findings, we affirm.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his three children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (3) the persistence of conditions which led to removal; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court’s ultimate termination decision.

After four creditors filed separate claims against the estate of Elga Jean Epley (“the
estate”), the estate timely filed sworn exceptions to each separate claim. The creditors are
(1) JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., (2) Bank of America, N.A., (3) Phillips & Cohen
Associates, Ltd on behalf of Citibank, and (4) Maury Regional Health System (collectively
“the creditors”). Following a hearing on the claims and the exceptions thereto, during
which no testimony was introduced and no representative appeared on behalf of any of the
creditors, the trial court denied the exceptions to each of the claims. This appeal by the
estate followed. None of the creditors have filed a brief. Thus, none of the creditors have
presented arguments in opposition to the issues raised by the estate, as required by
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(b) and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of
Appeals of Tennessee. Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments presented
by the estate, we reverse the judgment of the trial court for the reasons set forth below and
remand with instructions to deny all of the claims asserted by the appellees and to enter
judgment in favor of the estate.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from a complaint wherein the plaintiff alleged that he had a confidential relationship with his alleged biological daughter and that she induced him, by a promise that she would take care of him, to grant her a remainder interest in his real property. After a bench trial, the trial court found that a confidential relationship existed between the plaintiff and defendant and that suspicious circumstances existed to support a finding of undue influence. As such, the trial court entered an order divesting the defendant of any interest that she had in the property and restoring the plaintiff’s interest in the property to be held by his estate. The defendant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this intrafamily dispute, a son sued his mother and various other family members following the death of his father. The claims included, inter alia, breach of contract, libel and slander, and wrongful death. The defendant family members eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that statutes of limitation barred several of the son’s claims, and that there was no evidence the son could point to in support of his additional
claims. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed the suit. The son appeals. Having determined that the son’s brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of briefing in this Court, we conclude that his issues purportedly raised on appeal are waived and the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Kesean Dewayne Hall, appeals his jury convictions for second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and criminal trespass. For these convictions, he received an effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the denial of his motion to sever the separate shooting episodes; (2) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence; (3) the admission of video footage showing the Defendant trespassing on the housing development’s property; and (4) the admission of “video evidence related to Crime Scene 3.” He also raises a claim of cumulative error and a challenge to his sentence. Following our review, we conclude that due to inadequacies in the Defendant’s appellate brief, all of his issues are waived save sufficiency of the evidence. First, relative to the sufficiency of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s criminal trespass conviction, and that conviction must be reversed and dismissed. Next, the evidence’s being sufficient to support the Defendant’s remaining convictions for second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, those convictions are affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Rutherford County jury found Defendant, Lavondas C. Nelson, guilty of two counts of sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school (Counts 1 and 2), and sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine (Count 3). The trial court sentenced him to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to establish that he sold cocaine within a school zone, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on entrapment, and his sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of revised judgments in Counts 1 and 2 that reflect the proper release eligibility for those offenses.

The Petitioner, Nicholas D. Brooks, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions for two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Adrian Moore, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and received an effective sentence of forty-six years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Chancery Court for Knox County (the “Trial Court”) granted the motion for partial summary judgment filed by Haren Construction Company, Inc. (“Plaintiff”), concluding that Olen Ford d/b/a Olen Ford Masonry and Construction (“Defendant”) had breached his contract with Plaintiff. The Trial Court awarded a judgment to Plaintiff against Defendant in the amount of $64,971.40. Defendant has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Antonio Turley, of attempted first degree murder, attempted first degree murder with serious bodily injury, and reckless endangerment with a dangerous weapon. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the admission of certain evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence. He also alleges prosecutorial misconduct. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Patrick Marshall, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. Based on our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner, Carl Franklin Pendergrast, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for four counts of sale of methamphetamine less than .5 grams, two counts of sale of hydrocodone, one count of sale of cocaine less than .5 grams, and one count of conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine less than .5 grams, for which he received a total effective sentence of twenty-six years’ incarceration. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his guilty pleas were the product of coercion and, therefore, not voluntarily entered. Following a thorough review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

For events in 2001, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Nakomis Jones, of murder, kidnapping, and gun related charges, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life in prison plus thirty-eight years. The Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his convictions, as well as filed for post-conviction relief, Federal habeas corpus relief, and motions to reopen the denial of relief in each instance. As relevant here, in 2022, the Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act of 2021. He sought fingerprint analysis of the palm print and a handgun collected during the investigation. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A tenant sued its landlord for allegedly breaching the parties’ lease agreement. The tenant,
however, failed to comply with the parties’ discovery schedule. After conferring, the
parties established a new discovery deadline, agreed that failure to meet the deadline would
result in dismissal with prejudice, and filed an agreed order to that effect, which was
approved by the trial court. The landlord asserted that the tenant failed to meet the new
deadline and sought dismissal with prejudice. A hearing was scheduled. Before the
hearing, the tenant filed a notice nonsuiting the case, and the trial court granted the tenant
a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. The landlord filed a motion to alter or amend,
arguing the dismissal should have been with prejudice. The trial court denied that motion.
The landlord appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.