APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a case arising out of the Teacher Tenure Act. A tenured middle school teacher sought review of a decision of the board of education upholding his termination for inefficiency, incompetence, and neglect of duty. The chancery court affirmed the board’s decision, sustaining the teacher’s termination. Teacher appealed to this Court. We reverse the chancery court’s findings with respect to neglect of duty. However, we affirm the chancery court’s findings with respect to inefficiency and incompetence, and thereby affirm the teacher’s termination.

The Defendant, Robert William Ward, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree murder with serious bodily injury, a Class A felony, and possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-202 (2014) (first degree murder), 40-35-501(k)(5) (2014) (amended 2015, 2016) (sentencing for attempted first degree murder with serious bodily injury), 39-17-1324 (2014) (firearms possession). He received an effective thirty-five-year sentence, to be served consecutively to his sentence in another case. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted first degree murder with serious bodily injury conviction, (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s prior conduct, (3) the court erred in failing to strike hearsay testimony from the record, (4) the court erred in admitting a State’s witness’s prior statement, (5) the court erred in limiting his cross-examination of a State’s witness, (6) cumulative trial error requires relief, and (7) his attempted first degree murder sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court held that Appellant failed to meet her burden to prove her claims of assault and battery. Appellant appealed. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s appellate brief, we do not reach Appellant’s substantive issues and dismiss the appeal.  

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Jocelin Williams, of firstdegree, premeditated murder of Delvin Brown, the victim in this case. She was also convicted of murder during the perpetration of robbery, especially aggravated robbery, and theft of property valued over $500. The trial court merged the murder convictions and imposed an effective sentence of life plus twenty years’ imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress a statement which was given while she was alleged to have been impaired; and (2) whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support her convictions of first-degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Upon our review, we affirm.

In appealing a non-final order, Appellant asks this Court to adopt a jurisdictional exception to the final judgment rule that would allow an immediate appeal of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion under Rule 60.02 where the trial court purportedly lacked jurisdiction to do so. We decline to adopt a per se exception to Rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure where the trial court grants a Rule 60.02 motion. We likewise decline to suspend the finality requirement in this particular case. As such, this appeal is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This premises liability action involves allegations of negligence and negligence per se. The trial court dismissed the case at summary judgment, opining that no duty was owed to the plaintiff and holding that the plaintiff’s negligence per se claims were legally insufficient. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Shawna N. Henson, was indicted by a Campbell County grand jury for tampering with evidence and possession of drug paraphernalia in Case No. 17592, and for theft over $500 in Case No. 17593. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103; 39-16-503; 39-17-425. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant pled guilty to all three charges. The trial court sentenced her as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective term of nine years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges her sentence as inconsistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-102 and 103. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff, a health club member, seeks damages from the health club based on its alleged failure to protect him from sexual assaults in the locker room by another club member. The complaint alleges that the health club “knew who the assailant was, and was aware that [the assailant] had engaged in such actions many times prior to” assaulting the plaintiff. The health club denied liability insisting it had no prior knowledge of sexual assaults by the assailant or anyone else. It also contended the claims were barred by the exculpatory provision in its membership agreement, which released the club from liability for injuries “resulting from” the plaintiff’s “use of [the] facilities.” The trial court found the exculpatory provision was unambiguous and summarily dismissed the claims. Thereafter, and while this matter was on appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court revised the standards by which the enforceability of an exculpatory agreement should be determined. See Copeland v. Healthsouth/Methodist Rehabilitation Hospital, LP, 565 S.W.3d 260 (Tenn. 2018). We have determined that the plaintiff failed to present competent evidence that the health club knew or should have known of prior assaults by the assailant or anyone else. Because there is no genuine dispute of fact, the health club is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the issue regarding the enforceability of the exculpatory clause is moot. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment, albeit on other grounds than found by the trial court, and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint.

Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights as to her minor child. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in allowing Mother’s counsel to withdraw the morning of trial, without considering whether Mother had notice of the withdrawal, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for a new trial.

This appeal arises from a re-filed health care liability action brought by the wife of a hospital patient, individually and on behalf of her now-deceased husband, against the hospital. In the first action, the plaintiffs attempted to rely on the 120-day extension to the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, which also required the plaintiffs to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization to potential defendants. The complaint asserted that one of the hospital’s doctors and four of its nurses were negligent in treating the husband in the hospital’s emergency department on July 26, 2009, and that the hospital was vicariously liable. The doctor and nurses, but not Saint Francis, successfully moved for summary judgment based on the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with § 121. On interlocutory appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of § 121’s pre-suit notice requirement. This court affirmed the trial court’s determinations that § 121 was constitutional, was not preempted by HIPAA, and did not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of state and federal law. Accordingly, this court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the doctor and nurses. Because the claims against the hospital remained, we remanded the case for further proceedings. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the first complaint against the hospital in April 2016. Eight months later, the plaintiffs sent the hospital a new pre-suit notice and medical authorization. Sixty-four days after that, the plaintiffs filed their second complaint against the hospital. The hospital moved to dismiss, asserting the second complaint was timebarred because the plaintiffs failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization in the first action and, thus, the 120-day extension was not available and the original complaint was time-barred. The plaintiffs responded by asserting that a HIPAAcompliant medical authorization is unnecessary to obtain the 120-day extension and challenging the constitutionality of § 121, including a challenge based on the right to privacy in medical information. The trial court found that § 121 requires a HIPAAcompliant medical authorization before the 120-day extension applies, the law of the case doctrine barred the plaintiffs from re-litigating all constitutional challenges except that based on the right of privacy, and the right to privacy was not implicated. Based on these findings, the trial court dismissed the second complaint as time-barred. This appeal followed. We affirm.

The pro se Petitioner, Peter D. Billington, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Appellant, Marick Pettis, pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and identity theft and received a total effective sentence of ten years. Thereafter, the Appellant filed a “Petition for Suspension of Sentence,” which was denied by the trial court. The Appellant appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Nicos Broadnax, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel’s admitting that the Petitioner was guilty of robbery in opening statement was “ineffective and prejudicial.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Craig Markeem Taylor, was convicted by a Madison County jury of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, attempted aggravated burglary, and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the felony murder convictions into the first degree premeditated murder conviction and sentenced the Defendant to life for the murder conviction, five years for each of the attempted aggravated robbery convictions, and three years for the attempted aggravated burglary conviction. The court ordered the attempted robbery sentences to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentence for first degree murder. The court ordered that the sentence for attempted aggravated burglary be served consecutively to the sentences for attempted aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of life plus eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court committed reversible error by excluding proposed witness testimony on the erroneous basis that it constituted alibi testimony for which the State had not received prior notice. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment in count five in order for the “Jury Verdict” box to be checked to reflect that the Defendant was convicted of the indicted offense pursuant to a jury verdict.

The Defendant, Germaine Markques Long, was found guilty by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of two counts of identity theft, a Class D felony, and theft of property valued at $1000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-150 (2018) (identity theft); 39-14-103 (2018) (theft); 39-14-105 (2018) (grading of theft). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of four years for each identity theft conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor theft conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se Defendant, Derrick Settles, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Robert Belt, of first-degree, premeditated murder of Delvin Brown, the victim in this case. He was also convicted of murder during the perpetration of robbery and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the murder convictions and imposed an effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years’ imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to convict the Defendant of first-degree murder; and (3) whether the trial court erred in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. Upon our review, we affirm.

Defendant, Perry Avram March, was convicted in Case No. 2004-D-3113 of second degree murder, abuse of a corpse, and destruction of evidence for his role in the death of his wife and in Case No. 2005-D-2854 of conspiracy to commit first degree murder for his plan to kill his in-laws. Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of fifty-six years. Defendant’s direct appeals were unsuccessful. See State v. March, 494 S.W.3d 52 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010) (“the conspiracy case”); State v. March, 395 S.W.3d 738 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) (“the murder case”). Subsequently, Defendant sought relief by filing a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, arguing that there was an error in one of the judgment forms with regard to the manner of service of the sentence. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Swift, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder; attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-202, -17-1324. The trial court later imposed a total effective sentence of life plus twenty-six years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for first degree premeditated murder; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Defendant’s motion to disqualify one of the prosecutors; (3) African-Americans were improperly excluded from the jury venire; (4) the State “intentionally mislead [the] jury” during the examination of one of its witnesses; (5) the trial court erred by allowing the admission of hearsay; (6) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to review transcripts of recorded jail phone calls as those recordings were played; (7) the State improperly displayed photographic exhibits during its closing argument; (8) the State withheld evidence; and (9) a new trial is warranted due to cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Linda Anne Dunavant, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and two counts each of first degree felony murder, aggravated child neglect, and aggravated arson. She challenges her convictions on appeal, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, specifically that the State did not negate her expert’s testimony that “the fire rekindled by accident,” and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to issue an instruction on setting fire to personal property or land, and its attempt, as a lesser-included offense of aggravated arson. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Lassiter, pled guilty to four counts of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more and four counts of theft of property valued at more than $1,000. He received an effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing and the imposition of partial consecutive sentences. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Makyle Love, was convicted of aggravated rape and was sentenced to twenty-three years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

The Defendant, Roddarous Bond, was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court merged the two convictions and imposed a twentythree-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the offenses; (2) the trial court erred in allowing witnesses to refer to letters that had been destroyed; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach the Defendant with a prior statement that the trial court had excluded. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Brenda Woods, appeals the McNairy County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from her convictions for three counts of procuring an illegal vote and resulting effective two-year sentence to be served on community corrections. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

Salvador Sandoval (“Employee”), an undocumented immigrant, suffered an injury while working for Tennessee Steel Structures (“Employer”). The parties settled the claim, and Employee failed to return to work at the end of the initial compensation period. Employee now seeks additional permanent disability benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 50-6-207(3)(B) because Employee cannot return to work after the injury as he is not eligible or authorized to work in the United States under Federal Immigration Law. Employee challenges the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) which does not allow for additional benefits set forth in subdivision (3)(B) for any employee who is not eligible or authorized to work in the United States. The Court of Workers’ Compensations Claims held that it had no jurisdiction to make this determination and denied Employee’s request for increased benefits. Employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Rule of the Supreme Court 51 section 1. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) is constitutional.