APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The mother has appealed from a final judgment terminating her parental rights. Because the mother did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Earnest Costosteno Woodley, of four counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to four concurrent terms of life without parole. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), that the trial court erred by allowing irrelevant and highly prejudicial cross-examination of his mental health expert, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to show premeditation and because he established the defense of insanity. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Rico Vales, was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated assault by display or use of a deadly weapon and one count of being a felon in possession of a handgun. He received an effective sentence of 15 years. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, George Washington Matthews, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who knew that the Petitioner had been an inmate at the penitentiary; (2) failing to object to testimony that the Petitioner previously had been incarcerated; and (3) failing to advise the Petitioner of the State’s settlement offer of three years. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In October 2017, the Madison County Circuit Court revoked Jay R. Hassman’s (the Petitioner) probation for relocating to the State of Florida without permission and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Petitioner did not appeal the trial court’s revocation of his probation to this court. Instead, he filed a “Motion for New Revocation Hearing” in the trial court, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the revocation hearing. Jay R. Hassman v. State, No. W2018-00784-CCA-R3-PC, 2019 WL 244585 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2019). The trial court denied relief on the basis that the motion was untimely as a motion for reduction of sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 and that the motion could not be construed as a petition for post-conviction relief. Id. The Petitioner appealed the denial of his “Motion for New Revocation Hearing” to this court, which was recently denied. Id. Two months after he filed the “Motion for New Revocation Hearing,” on June 4, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, claiming that the State of Tennessee breached the terms of his plea agreement, which was alleged to have been conditioned upon the Petitioner’s ability to “move out of State.” The Petitioner further claimed that due process considerations should toll the untimely filing of the post-conviction petition because “the breach of the plea agreement did not become known to [him] until” his arrest for the probation violation in October 2017. By order on June 8, 2018, the trial court dismissed the post-conviction petition as time-barred and because “the issues raised by the petition could have been raised at the revocation hearing or on appeal.” On July 2, 2018, the Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a “Motion for New Trial,” “disagree[ing]” with the trial court’s June 8 order and findings, and respectfully requesting the trial court to reconsider. On September 12, 2018, by written order, the trial court denied the Petitioner’s “Motion for New Trial.” The Petitioner is now before this court and seeks review from the denial of his “Motion for New Trial.” Because no appeal as of right flows from the Petitioner’s filing, we decline review and dismiss.

Defendant, Dylan Brewer, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to eight years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to orally instruct the jury as to the definitions of intentionally and knowingly, that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery, and that the trial court erred in excluding Defendant’s written statement after deeming portions of the statement to be self-serving. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction. Additionally, we conclude that any error with regard to the exclusion of Defendant’s statement was harmless because the disputed portion was admitted to clarify an earlier mischaracterization and Defendant testified. However, we conclude that the trial court committed plain error by failing to read to the jury the written instructions defining the terms intentionally and knowingly because the mens rea is an essential element of the offense and was a contested issue at trial. Therefore, we reverse the judgement of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial before a properly instructed jury.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Spencer, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Vernon Charles Patton, Petitioner, seeks habeas corpus relief from a pending indictment for which he is being held on bail awaiting trial. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition because the petition failed to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements for filing for habeas corpus relief and failed to state a cognizable claim. We affirm.

This is a motor vehicle accident case. Following a jury trial, the Plaintiffs were awarded $250,000.00 in damages. On appeal, the Defendant challenges, among other things, the trial court’s admission of video testimony from a medical expert and the court’s decision to allow a vocational expert to testify as to loss of earning capacity damages. Because we are of the opinion that the Defendant’s evidentiary objections have merit, we vacate the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.

A plaintiff injured in a motor vehicle accident filed a civil warrant in general sessions court seeking damages for his personal injuries. The defendants claimed the action was barred by the statute of limitations and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion because the warrant was filed but not issued before the statute of limitations period expired. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on appeal.

A Sumner County grand jury indicted the defendant, James Wallace Norton, with ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor over one hundred images, twenty-three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Following trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of all counts, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in consolidating his two indictments, declining to force the State to make an election regarding which images constituted aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, admitting testimony regarding the defendant’s internet search history, and admitting the cell phone and contraband images without a proper showing of the chain of custody. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and the applicability of the enhancement factors used in determining his sentence. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, William Earl Clark, Jr., of aggravated robbery and drug and weapon offenses, and he received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the aggravated robbery conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Timothy Junior Parker, complains on appeal that the trial court improperly ordered him to serve the balance of his consecutive two-year sentences upon finding that Defendant had violated the conditions of probation. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a post-divorce proceeding for contempt. Mother filed a petition for contempt over Father’s alleged failure to pay certain expenses. The trial court granted the Mother’s petition and found the Father in contempt and awarded Mother attorney’s fees. We reverse the trial court’s decision ordering Father to pay expenses associated with a parental evaluation ordered by the trial court. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

In 1983, while incarcerated on other charges, the Petitioner pleaded guilty to the rape of another inmate. The trial court sentenced him to five years, to run concurrently with his existing sentence. In 2002, the Petitioner obtained parole, but his parole was revoked when he failed to register as a sex offender pursuant to the sex offender registry requirements. Sometime before 2010, the Petitioner filed his first petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that his sentence for rape was illegal because the application of the sex offender registry to his sentence violated ex post facto principles. The petition was denied, and that decision was affirmed by this court on appeal. Joseph R. Wiggins v. State, No. W2010-00091-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3075644, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 6, 2010), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed this, his second habeas corpus petition in 2010. The habeas corpus court again denied the petition. On appeal, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Angela Greene, filed a post-conviction petition, seeking relief from her convictions of first degree murder in the perpetration of a theft, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 and the accompanying life sentence. The Petitioner raised numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, including insufficient trial preparation, failure to request a continuance when cocounsel became ill, failure to raise objections during trial, failure to ask the Petitioner on direct examination whether she killed the victim, and a conflict of interest due to his prior representation of a State’s witness. Following the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves the assignment of a deed of trust and subsequent foreclosure. Appellants purchased a home and later defaulted on the mortgage. Appellees foreclosed on the property, and Appellants filed suit to set aside the foreclosure. Appellees argued numerous theories, which were all dismissed by the trial court on grant of summary judgment. Appellants appeal. We affirm. 

In this action to recover for personal injuries suffered in a hit-and-run accident, the trial court held that the suit was barred by the one year statute of limitations and dismissed it. Plaintiff appeals; we affirm the judgment of the trial court.    

Defendant, Terry Leon Lancaster, was indicted on four counts of rape of a child and four counts of aggravated sexual battery for events that took place during the summer of 2015 when the victim, then aged twelve, was staying at Defendant’s home while attending vacation bible school. At trial, the trial court dismissed Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment after a motion for judgment of acquittal. The jury found Defendant guilty of the remaining counts of the indictment, two counts of rape and four counts of aggravated sexual battery. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of thirty years as a multiple offender. Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A mother and father each sought to be named the primary residential parent of their son, who was nine years old when the court granted the father a divorce. The trial court designated the father as the primary residential parent and granted the mother 146 days of residential parenting time with the child per year. The mother appealed, arguing that the court erred in conducting its comparative fitness analysis and in concluding that the father should be the primary residential parent. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Appellant, Cumberland Bail Bonding, argues that the trial court erred in suspending its bonding privileges due to a violation of Rule 26.05(B) of the Local Rules of the Thirty-First Judicial District, a rule requiring a bonding agent to be present for a defendant’s court appearance. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jason Perry, appeals the ruling of the Knox County Criminal Court granting him relief from a sentence imposed pursuant to Code section 40-35-121(b), the gang enhancement statute previously declared unconstitutional by this court, arguing that the trial court erred by finding that the illegal sentence issue was not a material element of his plea agreement and arguing that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas. The record supports the determination of the trial court. For reasons discussed more fully below, however, we affirm that court’s ruling not as a grant of post-conviction relief but as a grant of habeas corpus relief.

This appeal involves a will contest. The decedent’s son alleges that his father “was of unsound mind, without sufficient degree of mental capacity and/or was mentally incompetent to make a valid will” and “was unduly influenced . . . in all circumstances surrounding and including the execution of the purported Last Will and Testament” by his daughter. The trial court found that the decedent had the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the November 2012 will, no confidential relationship existed between the Decedent and his daughter that triggered a presumption of undue influence, and the will was not a product of undue influence. The trial court further found that, in the alternative, the daughter rebutted any presumption of undue influence. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

J.V. (mother) and R.W. (father) have two children together, D.V. (child 1) and S.W. (child 2). In connection with a case involving the custody of the children, father attended a hearing in the trial court. He brought his children to the courthouse. While there, he was taken into custody and thereafter extradited to Michigan on outstanding warrants. Mother was not able to care for the children. As a consequence, the children remained in Hamilton County without a parent or legal guardian. The children were adjudicated dependent and neglected and placed in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services. Father was later convicted in Michigan on four counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree; mother was identified as the victim. Father was sentenced to serve a minimum of fifteen years in prison. In 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate mother and father’s parental rights. Mother did not oppose the termination, but father did. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support DCS’s petition to terminate the parties’ parental rights. By the same quantum of proof, the court also found that termination is in the children’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, Anthony Eugene Barnett, appeals his Lawrence County Circuit Court jury convictions of possession with intent to sell alprazolam, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, simple possession of marijuana, and speeding, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s ruling admitting certain evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.