APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Westley A. Albright, pled nolo contendere to one count of soliciting a minor in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-528, a Class E felony, for which he received a one-year suspended sentence and deferred judicial diversion.  As a condition of probation, the defendant agreed to participate in therapeutic treatment for the duration of probation or until favorably discharged.  Prior to the conclusion of the one-year suspended sentence, the defendant’s treatment provider discharged him for failure to comply with the goals of his treatment program.  Following service of a probation warrant and a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s deferred diversion and extended his probation for six months to allow for the completion of treatment.  On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to advise him at the time he entered his nolo contendere plea that, as a condition of probation, he would be required to confess to the solicitation of a minor; (2) the trial court violated his due process rights by relying on a probation rule not referenced in the revocation warrant; and (3) the trial court erred when revoking his deferred diversion despite his completion of the objective requirements of the sex offender treatment program.  Upon review, we affirm the findings of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Mitchell Nathaniel Scott, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Davidson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists in his case. The petitioner also calls on this Court to apply the doctrine of stare decisis and ignore the Tennessee Supreme Court holding of Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016). After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Tommy Lee Collins, Jr., was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, evading arrest, a Class D felony, and reckless endangerment, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, Class E felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1324 (2014) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony), 39-16-603 (2014) (amended 2016) (evading arrest), 39-13-103 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2013) (reckless endangerment), 39-17-417(a)(4) (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014) (possession of a controlled substance). The trial court merged the possession of marijuana convictions and sentenced the Defendant to an effective eight years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his drug and firearm convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop and subsequent search of the car he was driving, (3) the prosecutor improperly challenged a juror on the basis of race, (4) the trial court erred by declining to order the prosecutor to disclose the identity of a confidential informant, and (5) the Defendant’s dual convictions for reckless endangerment and evading arrest violated double jeopardy principles. Because we conclude a juror was improperly challenged, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Patrick Russell Chambers, pleaded guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court in case number C-24053 to possession of contraband inside a penal institution, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-16-301 (2014). The Defendant also stipulated that his conduct in case number C-20453 violated the conditions of his community corrections sentence relative to a reckless homicide conviction in case number C-20398. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years’ confinement for the contraband conviction and to serve the remainder of his eight-year sentence for the reckless homicide conviction after finding that the Defendant had violated the conditions of his release. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Vanessa Rennee Pinegar, appealed her convictions of one count of facilitation of delivery of 0.5 or more grams of cocaine within a drug-free school zone and two counts of attempted delivery of 0.5 or more grams of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, challenging the denial of her motion to sever the trial of the defendants, certain evidentiary rulings, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and her effective nine-year sentence.  This Court affirmed the convictions and sentence.  The defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to our Supreme Court.  The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration of sentencing in light of State  v. Gibson, 506 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2016).  Upon reconsideration, we vacate the defendant’s enhanced sentences under the Drug-Free School Zone Act and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Rawney Jean Taylor, of initiating a false report, a Class D felony; criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced her to three years, two years, and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively.  The court ordered that she serve the three- and two-year sentences consecutively for a total effective sentence of five years.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that her three- and two-year sentences are excessive, that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing, that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion, and that the trial court erred by denying her request for probation.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The Trial Court Judge announced a ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the final hearing below and then subsequently entered a written order vacating the oral ruling. The order vacating the oral ruling contemplates further proceedings in the Trial Court. Because there is no final written order terminating the parental rights of the appellant, Shanna K., to her children, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Appellant, Walter Jr. Shegog, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.  Said motion is hereby granted.

The Petitioner, Jaleel Jovan Stovall, was convicted by a Hardeman County jury of rape of a child and received a sentence of twenty-five years at 100% service. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which asserted that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to object to hearsay introduced by the State and for failing to argue that a letter allegedly authored by the Petitioner was not properly authenticated. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm.

This appeal stems from a dispute over a tract of real property in Nashville.  The plaintiff, who claims to have entered into an enforceable contract for sale of the disputed tract, brought multiple claims against multiple defendants after the land was not transferred to him.  After competing cross-motions for summary judgment were filed, the trial court dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims, finding, inter alia, that the plaintiff never entered into a valid, enforceable contract regarding the subject property.  For the reasons stated herein, we affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

A father and mother moved to modify a permanent parenting plan in which they were each named primary residential parent. Both parents alleged, for different reasons, that a material change in circumstance had occurred sufficient to modify custody. After a hearing, the court determined a material change in circumstance had occurred and that modification of the current joint custody arrangement was in the child’s best interest. The court named the father the primary residential parent and granted the mother liberal visitation. The mother appeals, arguing that the court erred in finding that her move was a material change and in dismissing her modification petition. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the chancery court’s findings, and the court did not err in dismissing Mother’s petition. Accordingly, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Steffon Hodges, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Madison County Circuit Court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was not advised of his rights before entering his guilty plea. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pro se petitioner Sheila Mitchell appeals from the post-conviction court’s summary denial of relief. In this appeal, the State concedes, and we agree, that the petitioner stated a colorable claim in her petition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for appointment of counsel.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. After carefully reviewing the trial court’s ruling pursuant to the de novo standard of review required under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion for recusal.        

The petitioner, Jarrod Reese Spicer, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the trial court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel. More specifically, the petitioner claims counsel was ineffective because he failed to fully assist the petitioner until receiving full payment for his services, failed to subpoena certain witnesses to testify at trial, failed to obtain a medical expert to rebut the medical examiner’s opinion regarding the victim’s cause of death, and failed to obtain a mental evaluation. Following our review of the record and submissions of the parties, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Madison County jury found Eddie H. Pittman, the defendant, guilty of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, aggravated criminal trespass, and reckless aggravated assault. The trial court merged the reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon conviction with the reckless aggravated assault conviction and imposed an effective sentence of twelve years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions and argues the trial court erred when imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review of the record and the pertinent authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Shane H. Bishop, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication. He appeals from his sentence of eleven years, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by denying an alternative sentence. Because Defendant was ineligible for an alternative sentence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Frankie Jason Cope, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This appeal arises from an indigent tenant’s petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas for a de novo review of an unlawful detainer action originally filed in general sessions court. The tenant sought to remain in possession of the leased premises during the review without posting a possessory bond. The circuit court initially issued the writs and, in lieu of a bond, ordered the tenant to pay rent as it became due. The landlord objected, arguing that a possessory bond was mandatory under the applicable statute. The circuit court then ordered the tenant to post a bond and, after the tenant failed to comply, dismissed the previously issued writs. On appeal, the tenant argues that the circuit court erred in calculating the amount of the bond and in dismissing the writ of certiorari with the writ of supersedeas. She also contends that the landlord executed the writ of possession in violation of the initial stay of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 62.01. We conclude that, although it erred in including court costs as part of the possessory bond in light of the tenant’s indigence, the trial court properly dismissed the writs of certiorari and supersedeas after the tenant failed to file a possessory bond. We also conclude that Rule 62.01 did not stay the dismissal of the writ of supersedeas. Consequently, we affirm.

The Defendant, William Charles Burgess, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of one count of preventing or obstructing an arrest and two counts of obstructing or preventing service of process, Class B misdemeanors. See T.C.A. § 39-16- 602 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six months, with all but ten days suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Because the Defendant’s conduct did not constitute a criminal offense, we reverse the judgments of the trial court, vacate the Defendant’s convictions, and dismiss the charges.

The Defendant, Mario Frederick, was convicted of two counts of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class E felony, two counts of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor less than thirteen years of age, a Class C felony, and three counts of indecent exposure, a Class B misdemeanor. He received an effective sentence of five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever the counts of the indictment and his motion for arrest of judgment. He also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Larsheika Hill, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court’s revocation of her community corrections sentence for selling or delivering cocaine and order that she serve ten years in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a third-party’s attempt to intervene in this case in order to gain access to documents in the record, as the entire record was previously sealed by the trial court pursuant to an agreed order between the original parties. The trial court denied the third-party’s motion to intervene and also denied its motion to modify the order sealing the record. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion to intervene, vacate its denial of the motion to modify the protective order sealing the record, and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Felton Jackson, filed a petition in the Wilson County Criminal Court, seeking post-conviction relief from his conviction of especially aggravated robbery.  The Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to call alibi witnesses, coercing the Petitioner not to testify, and failing to investigate or present proof regarding the Petitioner’s “social, medical and mental health.”  The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Robert E. Lequire, Jr., appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, in which he alleged that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.