APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Walter Lee Hicks, was indicted for aggravated assault, evading arrest, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, driving on a revoked driver’s license, speeding, and making a false report. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of the lesserincluded offense of assault, evading arrest, reckless endangerment, driving on a revoked driver’s license, speeding, and making a false report. The trial court imposed a 17-year sentence. A panel of this court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal, but the panel remanded the case for entry of corrected judgments to reflect that the conviction for misdemeanor assault merged into the conviction for felony reckless endangerment. State v. Walter Lee Hicks, Jr., No. M2013-01410-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 2902277, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., June 26, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Oct. 22, 2014). Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Following a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel omitted portions of a state trooper’s dash camera video when presenting that evidence at trial. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Blake Austin Weaver, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence. Pursuant to a guilty plea, he was convicted of one count of theft of property valued more than $60,000 and eleven counts of forgery of a check in an amount greater than $1,000 and less than $10,000. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served on community corrections. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence after finding that the Defendant failed a drug screen, failed to pay restitution, and did not comply with orders to attend intensive outpatient therapy and enter a halfway house. After revocation, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community corrections sentence, contending that the trial court erroneously failed to consider his ability to pay restitution, relied on grounds outside the notice of violation, and acted too harshly in requiring him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment revoking the Defendant’s community corrections sentence.

This is a breach of contract action in which the issues hinge on the meaning of several provisions in the agreement. In 1999 and again in 2009, BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. (“BlueCross”) and Individual Healthcare Specialists, Inc. (“IHS”) entered into a general agency agreement that authorized IHS to solicit applications for individual insurance policies through IHS’s in-house agents and outside “subagents.” The commission rates to be paid were stated in a schedule, which was subject to modification by BlueCross. During the first eleven years, BlueCross modified the commission schedule several times and each modification was prospective only. In 2011, BlueCross modified the commission schedule and, for the first time, applied the commission schedule retrospectively. At the same time, IHS determined that BlueCross had been underpaying commissions since 1999. As a consequence, it commenced this action asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and damages, while also claiming it was entitled to recover its attorney’s fees based on the contract’s indemnification provision. BlueCross denied any breach of contract. It also asserted the statute of limitations defense as a bar to recovering any commissions that accrued more than six years earlier, and asserted that IHS was not entitled to recover its attorney’s fees because the indemnification provision did not apply to disputes between the contracting parties. Shortly thereafter, BlueCross terminated the general agency agreement and began paying renewal commissions directly to IHS’s subagents instead of paying them to IHS as it had done since 1999. IHS then amended its complaint to assert a claim that BlueCross also breached the agreement by failing to pay commissions directly to IHS. Following a bench trial, the court denied BlueCross’s statute of limitations defense on the ground that IHS’s claims were “inherently undiscoverable.” The court also determined that BlueCross breached the contract by underpaying commissions, by applying the 2011 commission rates for renewals to existing policies, and by failing to pay all renewal commissions to IHS after termination of the general agency agreement. As for damages, the court awarded IHS some of the damages it claimed but denied others on the ground the evidence was speculative. As for IHS’s attorney’s fees, the trial court considered parol evidence to ascertain the intent of the parties and held that the indemnification provision authorized the recovery of attorney’s fees in a dispute between the contracting parties. Accordingly, it held that IHS, as the prevailing party, was entitled to recover its attorney’s fees. Both parties appeal. We affirm the trial court in all respects but one, that being the award of attorney’s fees. We have determined the trial court erred by considering parol evidence to determine the meaning of the indemnification provision. We also find that the indemnification provision does not apply to contractual disputes between the parties. Accordingly, IHS is not entitled to recover its attorney’s fees in this action.

The Defendant, Ronald Levon Cosper, was convicted of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2014) (felony murder), 39-13-403 (2014) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-12-101 (2014) (criminal attempt). He received concurrent sentences of life for the felony murder conviction and ten years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and (2) he was deprived of due process because the State introduced unreliable identification evidence of him as the perpetrator of the offenses. We affirm the first degree felony murder judgment of the trial court. We affirm the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction but vacate the judgment and remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

In this termination of parental rights case, prospective adoptive parents appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their petition after finding that father did not willfully fail to pay support for the child. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant-Appellant, William Langston, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of the second degree murder of his wife and received a twenty-year sentence. On appeal, Langston argues: (1) the trial court erred by denying his request to enter a guilty plea to a pending indictment charging him with voluntary manslaughter; (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it accepted a police officer as an expert in the field of blood spatter analysis at trial; (3) the instructions in his case precluded the jury from considering the offense of voluntary manslaughter; (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (5) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the date that the second degree murder conviction was entered following sentencing.

The Defendant, Shawn P. Bradley, appeals from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s order declaring him to be a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO). On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in declaring him to be a MVHO because the judgment forms for the qualifying offenses were facially invalid. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kalandra Lacy, appeals her Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of abuse of a corpse, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her bid for judicial diversion. Following a de novo review occasioned by the trial court’s failure to consider on the record all the factors relevant to the denial of judicial diversion as well as the trial court’s consideration of irrelevant factors, we conclude that the defendant is entitled to judicial diversion. We remand the case for entry of an order placing the defendant on judicial diversion under the same terms and conditions of her previously imposed sentence of probation.

A Tennessee company brought an action in the Davidson County General Sessions Court against an Arizona company for breach of contract and negligence, seeking recovery for damage to plaintiff’s restaurant, which was located in Michigan. The case was dismissed on the ground of improper venue. Plaintiff appealed to the circuit court, which granted summary judgment to defendants on the basis of improper venue, lack of personal jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse the holdings that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant and that venue was improper; we affirm the dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens and vacate the denial of the motion to amend the complaint.

This is the second appeal regarding the termination of Father’s parental rights with respect to this child. On October 22, 2014, the trial court entered an order terminating both Mother’s and Father’s rights to their son based on a finding of severe abuse and a determination that it was in the child’s best interest that both parents’ rights be terminated. Mother and Father appealed that determination to this Court. On May 29, 2015, this Court issued an opinion, In re Wesley P., No. W2014-02246-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 3430090 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015), affirming the trial court’s finding of severe abuse but reversing the termination of parental rights on the basis that it was not in the best interest of the child to do so at that time. On January 12, 2016, DCS filed another petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, alleging several grounds for termination. Mother subsequently surrendered her parental rights to the child voluntarily, and her rights are not subject to this appeal. After a full hearing, the chancery court found by clear and convincing evidence that all grounds for termination alleged against Father existed and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Father appeals. We affirm.

This is a mechanic’s lien case. Appellee/auto repair shop agreed to repair Appellant’s vehicle for $5,267.30. Appellant paid this amount, but Appellee raised the estimate to $9,489.30. Appellant did not pay the additional costs. Under a purported mechanic’s lien, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 66-19-103, Appellee sold Appellant’s vehicle for $4,500.00. Appellant filed a complaint, seeking damages for conversion and for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim. Concerning the conversion claim, the trial court held that Appellee did not have a valid mechanic’s lien and had converted the property. The trial court awarded $10,000.00 in damages to Appellant. Appellant appeals, arguing that the damage award is insufficient. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I concur fully in the majority Opinion. I also agree with the dissent that this Court “has no authority to overrule or modify Supreme Court’s opinions.” Bloodworth v. Stuart, 428 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tenn. 1968). I, however, disagree with the dissent regarding duty of care as the Trial Court was in fact cognizant of and adhered to our Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008).

Although I agree with the majority Opinion’s discussion of the improper jury instructions given by the trial court in this case, I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis with regard to the duty owed by Ford. Because Ford’s duty is a threshold issue that must be determined prior to any consideration of the jury instructions given by the trial court, I therefore file this partial dissent.

This is a jury case. Automobile mechanic and his wife, Appellees, filed suit against Appellant Ford Motor Company for negligence in relation to wife’s diagnosis of mesothelioma. Appellees allege that Ford’s brake products, which contained asbestos, were unreasonably dangerous or defective such that Ford owed a duty to warn Mr. Stockton so that he, in turn, could protect his wife from exposure to air-borne asbestos fibers. The jury returned a verdict against Ford for $3.4 million. Ford appeals. Because the jury verdict form is defective, in that it omits two necessary questions in products liability cases, i.e., that the product at issue was unreasonably dangerous or defective and that the plaintiff’s injuries were reasonably foreseeable, we vacate the judgment and remand.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jacob Pearman, was convicted as charged by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and child abuse, and he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus five years. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), -102(a)(1), -15-401(a). On appeal, Pearman argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of venue; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike a juror for cause; (3) the evidence is insufficient to show that he premeditated the victim’s killing; (4) the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s statements pursuant to the state of mind hearsay objection; (5) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its rebuttal closing argument; and (6) the trial court failed to properly exercise its role as the thirteenth juror.1 We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Travis Smith, of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and he was sentenced to serve twenty-five years in prison. The Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s decisions regarding the admission of testimony, the sufficiency of the bill of particulars, the timing of the State’s election, the jury instructions regarding the election, the introduction into evidence of a videotape of the victim’s forensic interview, and the State’s alleged failure to turn over exculpatory evidence. The Defendant also asserts he is entitled to relief for cumulative error. Discerning no error, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

Defendant, Randall Kenneth Reed, was convicted by a Hamilton County Jury of four counts of the fraudulent use of a debit card, first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and theft of property less than $500.00. The trial court merged the premeditated murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and imposed a life sentence to be served concurrently with 25 years for especially aggravated robbery and 11 months, 29 days each for theft of property less than $500 and four counts of the fraudulent use of a debit card. The trial court further ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to a probation violation in an unrelated case. On appeal, Defendant argues as follows: (1) that the trial court erred by allowing Milo Geiger to testify that he agreed to take a lie detector test and that Defendant refused to take one; (2) that the trial court improperly admitted photographs of the victim; (3) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter; and (4) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

After the trial court denied Wife’s motion to set aside the mediated Marital Dissolution Agreement and Permanent Parenting Plan and entered its order declaring the parties divorced, Wife filed a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge. The judge denied the motion, and Wife timely filed her petition for recusal appeal seeking an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of her motion. We affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

This appeal arises from a two-car accident. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the collision occurred because Defendant violated several statutory rules of the road by failing to yield the right of way and making a turn across traffic without confirming it was safe to do so. Defendant denied any negligence and claimed that Plaintiff was more than 50% at fault. Following a trial, the jury found that Plaintiff was 75% at fault; as a result, judgment was entered for Defendant. On appeal Plaintiff contends she is entitled to a new trial for two reasons. She contends the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the testimony of the investigating police officer to what the parties told him at the scene and to matters that are reflected in his accident report. She also contends she is entitled to a new trial due to jury misconduct. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The Defendant, Paula Jean Lacommare, pled guilty to initiation of the manufacturing process of methamphetamine and was sentenced to eight years on probation.  A violation of probation warrant was issued against the Defendant for testing positive for methamphetamine.  Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered her to serve her sentence in prison.  The Defendant appeals.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant appeals from the trial court’s decision granting a judgment of possession to the Appellee bank. Because of profound deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we hold that her arguments are waived. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Defendant, Scarlet I. Martin, was convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”) and driving under the influence of an intoxicant with a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) greater than .08 (“DUI per se”). She appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient and that the blood draw was justified by exigent circumstances. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Desmond Eugene Davis, pled guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to eight years on probation. A violation of probation warrant was issued against the Defendant. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in prison. The Defendant appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jeffrey Walton (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of vandalism over the value of $10,000 and burglary of a building and received an effective sentence of twenty-seven years. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that second and third trial counsel’s performance was deficient because they (1) failed to prepare a trial strategy; (2) failed to investigate the background of Barrow-Agee Laboratories and discover a fatal variance in the indictment; (3) failed to properly cross-examine witnesses; and (4) failed to request jury instructions on the defenses of duress and necessity. The Petitioner asserts that he was prejudiced because absent these deficiencies, he would have likely been convicted of a lesserincluded offense or acquitted of the offenses. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Victor Dunn (“Employee”), a Tennessee resident, was injured in Iowa while working for Tradesmen International, Inc. (“Employer”).  Employer accepted the injury as compensable but disputed Tennessee’s jurisdiction over the claim, contended that any award of permanent disability benefits should be limited to one and one-half times the impairment rating, and disagreed with Employee’s calculation of his average weekly wage.  The trial court held that it had jurisdiction, that the claim was not “capped,” and that Employee’s proposed average weekly wage was correct. It awarded permanent partial disability benefits of 25% to the body as a whole.  Employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court’s ruling on the average weekly wage issue was incorrect. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51.  We affirm the judgment.