APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an administrative appeal in which Petitioner challenges the decision of the Tennessee Department of Human Services to suspend services he received pursuant to the state’s vocational rehabilitation program. The Division of Appeals and Hearings upheld the Department’s decision to suspend Petitioner’s services and this decision was affirmed by the Department’s commissioner. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for judicial review with the Shelby County Chancery Court. The court upheld the Department’s actions and dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed; we affirm.

The Petitioner, Mahlon Johnson, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief for his convictions for sexual battery and aggravated assault. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Corey Forest, was indicted for possession of twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell in a drug-free school zone, possession of marijuana, and unlawful possession of a firearm.  The Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the warrantless search of his vehicle.  The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and the Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of possession of more than .5 grams of a Schedule II substance and to unlawful possession of a firearm, and attempted to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) about whether the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle by law enforcement was lawful.  After review, because the Defendant has failed to properly comply with Rule 37, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal.

The minor child at the center of this appeal was born on April 3, 2012, in El Paso, Texas. Mother and child moved to Nashville, Tennessee, three months later. Father subsequently moved to Delaware. While living in Delaware, Father pled guilty to two counts of rape and was sentenced to concurrent twenty-five year sentences beginning June of 2013. Mother married Stepfather in late 2013, and in October 2014, Stepfather and Mother filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights and to allow Stepfather to adopt the child. The petition, as amended, alleged abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, abandonment by failure to visit or support in the four months prior to Father’s incarceration, and Father’s incarceration under a sentence of ten or more years with the child being under eight years of age as grounds for termination. Following a trial at which Father, who was incarcerated, participated by telephone, the court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and incarceration under a sentence of ten years or more and upon a finding that termination was in the child’s best interest; the petition for adoption was also granted. Father appeals the termination of his rights, stating that the court erred in denying a motion to continue so he could appear in person and in determining that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the minor child. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified. 

This cause came on to be heard upon the record on appeal from the Davidson County Circuit Court, the briefs of the parties, and the arguments of counsel. Upon consideration of the entire record, this court finds and concludes that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.

This appeal concerns a dispute between a father and his adult son over the transfer of real property. In 1997, the father constructed a house on a portion of his two-acre tract of land for his son. Several years later, the son agreed to purchase the house. Subsequently, a disagreement led the parties to discover identical errors in the legal descriptions in the warranty deed executed by the father transferring the property to the son and the deed of trust securing the son’s purchase money loan. The trial court, upon its finding of mutual mistake, reformed the incorrect legal descriptions in the deeds, but the court also granted the father a right to use a shed and garden on the son’s land. We affirm the trial court’s reformation of the legal descriptions in the deeds. However, because we conclude that the evidence is less than clear and convincing that the parties intended the deeds to include the father’s right of use, we reverse the trial court’s decision to grant the interest.

This is a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal. Biological grandparents of a child at issue in a termination of parental rights action sought to intervene in the termination proceeding. The child had lived in the grandparents' home with them and the child's parents. The Department of Children's Services removed the child from that home and later sought to terminate the parental rights of the child's parents. The grandparents filed a motion to intervene. The trial court denied their motion, but granted their request for an interlocutory appeal. Thereafter, we also granted their request for interlocutory review. We affirm the decision of the trial court and now remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This custody dispute involves the child born to Jonathan D. Grigsby (Father) and Alexandra Alvis-Crawford (Mother). In July 2014, the parties were residing together when Mother moved out of the house with the child and refused to let Father see or talk to him. Shortly thereafter, Mother had medical issues and was admitted to the hospital where she remained until September 2014. During this time, the child lived in the home of the maternal grandparents of the child. Because the maternal grandparents refused to allow Father to see or speak with the child, he filed a petition seeking an ex parte order for immediate custody of his minor child. Based on Father’s petition, the trial court entered an order finding that the grandparents were unlawfully keeping the child from Father. The trial court gave Father immediate temporary custody of the child. The trial court did not make a permanent custody determination at that time. In December 2014, Mother filed a petition for custody. In January 2016, the trial court held a hearing on Father’s amended emergency petition and Mother’s petition. The trial court found that it is in the best interest of the child to stay with Father. Accordingly, the court designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, James Floyd Thomas, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2014 Bedford County Circuit Court
guilty-pleaded convictions of the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture and initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine, for which he received an effective sentence of 18 years.  Because the petitioner failed to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court’s order is affirmed.

The question presented is whether the corporate veil of Christenberry Trucking and Farm, Inc. (CTF), should be pierced and its sole shareholder, Clayton V. Christenberry, Jr., be held personally liable for a debt owed by CTF to F&M Marketing Services, Inc. In 2012, F&M obtained a judgment against CTF for breach of contract. By that time, CTF, a trucking company, had suffered mortal setbacks primarily owing to the great recession. CTF was administratively dissolved that same year. CTF had no assets to satisfy the judgment. F&M brought this action, seeking to hold Mr. Christenberry personally liable for the debt. After a bench trial, the court held that F&M did not meet its burden of proving that CTF’s corporate veil should be pierced. F&M appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendants, Dantario Burgess, Rodriguez McNary, and Joseph Jones-Cage, of two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of reckless endangerment. Mr. Jones-Cage and Mr. McNary also were convicted of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Mr. Burgess also was convicted of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been previously convicted of a felony and of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of violence. The trial court sentenced Mr. Burgess to an effective term of fifty-five years, Mr. Jones-Cage to an effective term of fifty years, and Mr. McNary to an effective term of forty-one years. On appeal, the Defendants raise the following issues either collectively or individually: (1) the trial court erred in denying Mr. Burgess‘ motion to suppress a witness‘s identification of him in a photographic lineup and in limiting the
cross-examination of the victim during the suppression hearing; (2) the failure to name the predicate felony in the indictment for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony voids the conviction; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (4) the trial court committed plain error in not allowing defense counsel to impeach the victim‘s testimony at trial with her statement to the police; (5) the malfunctioning of the recording equipment during the trial warranted a mistrial; (6) the sentences of Mr. Burgess and Mr. McNary are excessive; (7) the cumulative effect of the errors warrants a new trial; and (8) the trial court erred in denying Mr. Burgess‘ pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. We conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support Mr. McNary‘s conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and reverse the conviction. We remand the matter for a new trial on possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as a lesser-included offense. We also remand the case for entry of corrected judgments reflecting that Mr. Jones-Cage was convicted of attempted first degree murder in count one and is to serve 100 percent of his sentence for the firearm conviction in count three. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a 1997 divorce judgment that awarded the wife a percentage of the husband’s federal retirement annuity. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, later incorporated into a judgment, which provided that the wife would receive one-half of the marital portion of the husband’s retirement. The 1997 judgment contained no provisions regarding salary adjustments or cost-of-living adjustments applicable to the retirement annuity. In 2008, the husband’s attorney filed and the trial court entered a “Court Order Acceptable for Processing,” which provided for the wife’s fractional share of the husband’s retirement annuity but made no mention of salary adjustments applicable thereto. This order did provide, however, that the wife would be entitled to cost-of-living adjustments. Following his retirement in 2015, the husband filed a motion in 2016 seeking relief from the trial court’s prior final orders pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60. The trial court granted the motion, determining that the relief sought merely “clarified” but did not modify the earlier orders. The wife has appealed. We conclude that the trial court impermissibly granted relief to the husband pursuant to Rule 60.01, which had the effect of modifying the parties’ settlement agreement and the court’s prior orders. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order granting Rule 60 relief.

Eric D. Wallace (“the Defendant”) filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence under Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, alleging that his sentences for first degree felony murder and attempted first degree murder were illegal because the trial court constructively amended the corresponding indictments by instructing the jury on “alternative theories for felony murder.” The trial court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals contending the trial court erred in classifying Husband’s interest in his family’s business as his separate property and by failing to classify the appreciation in value of this asset as marital property. Wife contends she should have been awarded more than one-half of the marital estate, given that she is in poor health, unable to work and Husband has separate assets of significant value. She contends the award of alimony in futuro is insufficient and the trial court erred by requiring her to pay her attorney’s fees and expenses. Husband contends the trial court erred by failing to award him certain items of personal property that are of sentimental value. We affirm the classification of Husband’s interest in his family business as his separate property. We modify the division of the marital property by increasing Wife’s share of the cash proceeds from the sale of the home, the adjoining land, cattle, and farm equipment from fifty (50%) percent to fifty-five (55%) percent. As for the specific items of tangible personal property Husband seeks to recover, we remand this issue to the trial court to make specific findings of fact and enter judgment accordingly. As for alimony in futuro, we have determined that Husband has the ability to pay more, and Wife has a need that is greater than what was awarded; therefore, we modify the award of alimony in futuro by increasing the amount to be paid monthly. We affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision denying Wife’s request to recover the attorney’s fees she incurred at trial. As for the attorney’s fees and expenses Wife incurred on appeal, we conclude that she should be awarded the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses she incurred in this appeal and remand for the trial court to make the award it deems appropriate in its discretion. 

The Petitioner, Ronnie Hughes, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pro se Petitioner, Marcus Deangelo Lee, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Dekarlos Johnson, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of nine years with a release eligibility of eighty-five percent. On appeal, Johnson argues: (1) the admission of his redacted statement negatively impacted the jury's verdict; (2) he was denied the opportunity to present evidence in his own defense; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument; and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors entitles him to relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pro se Petitioner, Rocky White, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court‟s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. Because the sentences in this action have expired, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Father appeals the order entered on the motion of the Mother of four children awarding her sole decision-making authority regarding the children’s religious upbringing and designating that the children attend her church, contending, among other things, that the mandate that the children attend Mother’s church violates his and the children’s freedom of religious expression, as protected by the Federal and Tennessee Constitutions. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting Mother sole authority regarding the children’s religious upbringing and modify the order to remove that portion specifying the church that the children are to attend.   

In this dispute among competing battery distribution companies, the plaintiff companies appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant company and its employees. The plaintiffs also appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss the defendant company's counterclaim on jurisdictional grounds. Having determined that the trial court granted summary judgment without stating the legal basis for its decision prior to instructing the defendants' counsel to prepare a template for the court's order, we conclude that the trial court failed to fully comply with the procedural requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. We therefore vacate the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denying the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery. We affirm the trial court‟s denial of the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the defendant company's counterclaim. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of the defendants' motion for summary judgment in compliance with Rule 56.04 and of the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery.

The defendant, Radames Antonio Rivera, was indicted for one count of first degree murder, one count of attempted tampering with evidence, and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon.  Following trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of one count of second degree murder.  The trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years of incarceration.  On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Stephanie Lynn Ferguson, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and one count of vehicular assault in the Criminal Court for Davidson County.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-six years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that her effective sentence does not comport with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing.  Specifically, she contends that the sentence imposed was not the “least severe measure necessary,” that the trial court ignored applicable mitigating factors, and that the court improperly determined she was a dangerous offender.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a two-car accident. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s vehicle sustained irreparable damage and that Defendant, the driver of the other vehicle, was 100% at fault. Prior to the commencement of this action, the automobile insurance carrier for Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, paid the lien-holder of Plaintiff’s vehicle $7,852.57, the amount Allstate believed to be the fair market value of the vehicle. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued Defendant to recover the balance of the fair market value of her car and damages for loss of use. She also asserted a direct action against Allstate, alleging that Allstate reached a settlement with her lien-holder before exploring the full extent of her damages. The trial court dismissed the direct action against Allstate for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), because Tennessee law does not permit a direct action against an insured’s insurance carrier “without first establishing that the insured . . . has become ‘legally obligated’ to pay damages.” Ferguson v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 218 S.W.3d 42, 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Seymour v. Sierra, 98 S.W.3d 164, 165 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). Following the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Allstate, the trial court summarily dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant upon the finding that Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the fair market value was more than Allstate paid on behalf of Defendant. The court also summarily dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for the loss of use of her car, because it could not be repaired and she never sought to rent a replacement vehicle. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm.