APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Terrell Loverson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred by concluding that appellate counsel rendered effective assistance. According to the petitioner, appellate counsel should have raised, as an issue on appeal, the trial court's denial of his request for a self-defense jury instruction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, William M. Cole, was indicted for rape of a child and entered a best-interest guilty plea to incest on May 6, 2015. He was sentenced on September 8, 2015, to six years as a Range I, standard offender. On September 14, 2015, he filed a timely notice of appeal of his sentence. On September 28, 2015, he filed in the trial court a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, arguing that he was not related to the victim by blood or marriage and, therefore, could not be found guilty of incest. In this direct appeal filed after his plea of guilty and sentencing, but before he sought to withdraw his guilty plea, he argues that his plea of guilty was involuntary and should be set aside and that the trial court failed to consider all relevant factors in sentencing him. The State responds that the defendant may attack the voluntariness of his plea only in a petition for post-conviction relief and not in a direct appeal. We agree with this response, as well as the State’s assertion that the defendant was properly sentenced. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Luis Napoleon Paz, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal pertains to an effort to set aside a default judgment. M.V. (Mother) filed a petition seeking a restraining order against M.A.G. (Father) and modification of their permanent parenting plan. Father was served with Mother’s petition. He did not file a response. Mother later filed a motion for a default judgment and mailed the same to Father. He did not respond or attend the noticed hearing. At the hearing, the trial court granted Mother’s proffered permanent parenting plan and awarded her attorney’s fees. The court mailed the final judgment to Father. Father then moved to set aside the judgment, claiming, in part, that he had not received Mother’s motion for default. The trial court denied his request after finding that the motion for default was mailed to Father’s address on file with the court and that Father had not asserted just cause as to why the final judgment should be set aside. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The Defendant, Jonathan Wayne Utz, pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony.  SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to a term of imprisonment of nine years and six months to be served at one hundred percent.  In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that “the sentence in this case is excessive and contrary to the law.”  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Christopher Earl Watts, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, for which he received an effective sentence of seventy-five years.  On appeal, the petitioner argues trial counsel provided ineffective counsel by failing to fully explain the nature and consequences of waiving his right to testify, failing to call certain witnesses, and failing to file a motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding living in the “projects” and “on the streets.”  Due to the cumulative effect of this allegedly ineffective representation, the petitioner requests a new trial.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Teddy Reece Ragan, of sexual exploitation of a minor, and the trial court sentenced him to a ten-year sentence to be served at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court improperly admitted the Defendant’s prior conviction for violation of the sex offender registry, and that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury with attempted sexual exploitation of a minor.  After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case arises from the sale of the assets of a small cable television system. DirecTV program channels constituted the majority of the system’s programming. Three years after the sale, DirecTV stopped providing its programming signal to the cable system, claiming the signal had been obtained illegally. The buyer of the cable system filed suit against DirecTV for breach of contract and defamation. After reaching a settlement with DirecTV, the buyer filed this action against the seller of the cable system, seeking damages for breach of contract and fraud and a declaratory judgment that the promissory note the buyer had executed as part of the purchase was not yet due and payable. The seller filed a counterclaim, seeking payment of the promissory note. After a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the buyer’s claims against the seller. The court also dismissed the seller’s counterclaim under the doctrine of unclean hands. After a review of the record, we conclude that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the doctrine of unclean hands barred the seller’s counterclaim. Accordingly, we affirm.

Petitioner, Gale Marleen Krizka, appeals from the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, in which she alleged that her counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an expert witness, failing to call witnesses, and failing to give an opening statement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, E. Louis Thomas, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2008 conviction for first degree premeditated murder and his life sentence. He contends that (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by admitting the Petitioner’s confession, and (3) the habeas corpus court violated his due process rights by summarily dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Robin Bass, was convicted of first degree murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, arguing that there was no proof that he intended to rob the victim or that the murder occurred during the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery. Additionally, the Defendant argues that the extrajudicial confessions used to convict him were uncorroborated. Following our review, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, David Richardson, appeals the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences upon remand for a new sentencing hearing. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

This appeal involves an in rem forfeiture proceeding which was initiated after the appellant’s property was seized as proceeds of illegal drug sales. The appellant did not file a claim in the forfeiture proceedings. On appeal, she asserts that she was denied due process because she did not receive notice of the forfeiture proceedings. The record does not support the appellant’s assertion that she was not afforded adequate notice. We, therefore, affirm the decision of the trial court forfeiting the appellant’s interest in the seized property.

This is a premises liability case filed pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Appellant was walking down a sidewalk when she fell and sustained injuries. She and her husband brought suit alleging that she fell because the sidewalk was in a dangerous and defective condition due to the negligence of the City of Newbern. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the sidewalk in question was in a defective condition and that the upkeep of the sidewalk was the responsibility of the City of Newbern. However, the plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence that the sidewalk was the cause of the fall. The trial court issued a memorandum opinion and final judgment order dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims. We affirm.

A purchaser of property filed a complaint against numerous individuals asserting intentional interference with its business relationships and tortious interference with its contracts based on the individuals' alleged misconduct aimed at preventing the development of the property the purchaser was attempting to acquire. The defendants filed motions to dismiss based on Tennessee Rules of Procedure 10.03 and 12.02(6), which the trial court granted. The trial court also awarded the defendants their attorneys' fees pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-1003(c). The plaintiff appealed, and we find the plaintiff properly stated a claim for tortious interference with business relationships and civil conspiracy; the plaintiff did not state a claim for tortious interference with contracts; and the defendants are not entitled to an award of their attorneys' fees at this stage of the proceedings.

This appeal arises from a will contest. The witnesses to the will failed to sign the body of the will, but they signed the self-proving affidavit in the presence of the testator. After the will was admitted to probate in common form, the contestants filed a complaint challenging the validity of the will. The contestants later filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the decedent did not comply with the execution requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104, because the witnesses did not sign the body of the will. The trial court granted the motion based on In re Estate of Bill Morris, No. M2014-00874-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 557970 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2015), holding that a will is not validly executed if the witnesses sign only the self-proving affidavit. The executor appealed. While this appeal was pending, the General Assembly passed an amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104, which states that wills executed prior to July 1, 2006, satisfy Tennessee’s due execution requirements if the witnesses to the will signed the self-proving affidavit. In this appeal, both parties ask this Court to determine whether the newly enacted amendment applies and, if so, whether it comports with Tennessee’s constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws. But for a few exceptions, we will not consider issues the parties did not present to the trial court. Because the General Assembly enacted this amendment while this appeal was pending, the trial court has not had the opportunity to consider these issues. In order to afford the trial court that opportunity, we vacate the judgment declaring the will invalid. Further, we remand to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the petition to admit the will to probate and to reinstate the amended complaint challenging the will, which will give the parties the opportunity to present these issues to the trial court.

Father appeals the modification of a parenting plan, which changed the designation of primary residential parent to Mother and decreased Father’s parenting time. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for entry of factual findings in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.

Tony Gray (“Employee”) sustained a back injury on August 6, 2013 while working as a chief engineer at the Hyatt Place Hotel Airport in Nashville, Tennessee (“Employer”). Employee’s injury occurred while lifting and moving thirty rolls of carpet padding. After notifying Employer of his back injury, Employee was referred to Concentra Medical Clinic, where he was subsequently diagnosed with a back sprain and prescribed physical therapy. Employee experienced a slight improvement in his condition and was released in September 2013 to full-time work for a trial period in a light duty capacity. Upon his return to Employer, Employee was terminated for several issues relating to his job performance. Employee’s symptoms worsened, and he eventually required lower back surgery. He did not return to work for any employer thereafter. Based on Employee’s physical injuries, the trial court determined that Employee was permanently and totally disabled. Employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its determination of permanent and total disability. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

The petitioner, Bruce D. Mendenhall, was convicted in 2007 of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.  His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and his application for permission to appeal was denied.  Subsequently, he filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which the court treated as a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel had been ineffective.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court concluded that the petitioner’s claims were without merit.  The record on appeal supports this determination.  Accordingly, the order of the post-conviction court denying relief is affirmed.

The petitioner, Janette Ebony Robinson, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary.  Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Christopher Hatcher, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the rights of S.J.C.P. (Mother) with respect to her children, S.D.P. and C.D.P. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of four grounds supporting termination. By the same quantum of proof, the trial court held that termination of Mother’s rights is in the best interest of the children. Mother appeals. We modify the trial court’s judgment. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Tedrik Woods, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because the Petitioner’s three-year sentence for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is illegal, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with Rule 36.1 and this opinion.