APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mamie Marshall (“Employee”) developed a gradual shoulder injury as a result of her work for Pinnacle Food Group (“Employer”). She underwent three surgeries and was eventually referred to a pain management specialist. After the third procedure, she was placed in a modified duty job. Two months after her return to work, she retired. Two of her treating physicians assigned 4% impairment to the body as a whole. Employee’s evaluating physician examined Employee on three occasions and assigned impairments of 7% to the body as a whole after the second surgery and 11% to the body as a whole after her retirement. A physician chosen from the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) assigned 4% impairment to the body as a whole. The trial court found that Employee overcame the presumption of correctness attached to the MIR physician’s rating and adopted the evaluating physician’s 11% impairment. The trial court also found that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded 66% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning impairment and meaningful return. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We modify the judgment.

The defendant, Kenneth Kyle Fletcher, was convicted by a Carter County jury of facilitation of initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to ten years on community corrections. In a separate case, the trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent four-year sentences for five counts of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine and ordered that the four-year sentence be served consecutively to the ten-year sentence in the instant case, for a total effective sentence of fourteen years on community corrections. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court's order of consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a Motion for Disqualification or Recusal filed by the Defendants, William Kinney and Margaret Kinney ("Defendants") in this case that arises out of the indebtedness of Defendants' business, Kinney Custom Interiors, to the Plaintiff, Anderson Lumber Company, Inc. ("Plaintiff"). Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Defendants, and finding no error in Trial Court's ruling, we affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Arterious North, of four counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years of confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever his case from the cases of his co-defendants and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we reverse the trial court's judgments of conviction and dismiss the charges for the attempted voluntary manslaughter of L.P. and for employing a firearm during the commission of the attempted voluntary manslaughter of L.P. We affirm the trial court‟s judgments in all other respects.

On June 27, 2013, James Austin (“Employee”) operated a piece of machinery in the course of his employment with Roach Sawmill & Lumber Company (“Employer”). The machine trapped his right hand, injuring Employee and resulting in the amputation of his right ring finger. In a post-injury drug screen, Employee tested positive for amphetamine, nordiazepam, oxazepam, temazepam and alpha-hydroxyalprazolam. Employer operated as a drug-free workplace program as described in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-9-101 et seq. The trial court found that Employee did not rebut the presumption that the drugs were the proximate cause of his injury and dismissed the action. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-110(c)(1) (Supp. 2012). Employee appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s decision. The Supreme Court referred this appeal to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

Petitioner, Travis Armstrong, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following convictions, Petitioner received an agreed sentence of 20 years for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver and 15 years for possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution, to run concurrently, in exchange for waiving his right to appeal from the convictions which he received in a jury trial. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After appointment of counsel and filing of multiple amended petitions, this petition was denied following an evidentiary hearing. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Vicki J. Redick (“Plaintiff”) appeals the dismissal with prejudice of her health care liability action against Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital (“the Hospital”) and Jane Doe, an employee of the Hospital. We find and hold that Plaintiff, despite application of the common knowledge exception when appropriate, would be unable to prove her claim without expert proof, and therefore, Plaintiff was required to file a certificate of good faith in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. As Plaintiff failed to file the required certificate of good faith, we find no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) dismissing Plaintiff’s case with prejudice for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122.

The father of two children opposes the relocation of the children with their mother from middle Tennessee to Harrison, Arkansas. He also contends he is entitled to a child support deviation. At trial, testimony revealed that the mother wants to relocate because her husband accepted a position in Harrison that resulted in an annual salary increase of $20,000, plus a bonus. The mother also testified that she was offered a job in Harrison that pays more than her current position. The trial court granted permission to relocate, finding that the relocation had a reasonable purpose because the mother and her husband would receive a significant increase in annual income and increased opportunities for advancement in Arkansas. The trial court also found that relocating would not result in serious harm to the children and was not intended to defeat the father’s visitation. In addition, the trial court denied the father’s request for a child support deviation. The father appealed, contending that the court’s findings about the relocation are erroneous and that he is entitled to a child support deviation. The evidence supports the trial court’s findings regarding the purpose and nature of the relocation. Additionally, the father is not entitled to a child support deviation under the plain language of the regulations. Accordingly, we affirm.

The mother of three sons appeals the termination of her parental rights. A juvenile court magistrate determined that one son was the victim of severe abuse and that the other two sons were dependent and neglected. The magistrate also found that the mother was the perpetrator of this abuse, dependency, and neglect. The magistrate’s order was not appealed. All three sons were placed with the same foster mother. They remained with her for around two years during which time they had some visitation with their biological mother. Subsequently, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights alleging severe abuse and persistence of conditions as grounds for termination. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)-(4). The mother opposed the petition, and the children’s maternal grandmother and uncle each filed separate petitions for custody. After two hearings, the trial court found that DCS had proven both alleged grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and that terminating the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The court also dismissed the petitions for custody filed by the grandmother and the uncle. The mother appealed, arguing that termination was not in the best interests of the children and that the trial court erred by failing to place the children with their grandmother as a less drastic alternative to foster care. Mother also argues that DCS failed to make a diligent search for the children’s fathers. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s best-interest findings, and the mother cannot appeal the dismissal of the grandmother’s petition or the termination of the fathers’ parental rights. Additionally, by the time a court considers whether to terminate parental rights, it is too late to bring a less drastic alternative before the court. Accordingly, we affirm.

The petitioner, Billy DeBow, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 1999 conviction of first degree murder. Because the interest of justice does not require that we waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal in this case, the appeal is dismissed.

In this appeal, the State challenges the ruling of the trial court granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the two-count indictment charging the defendant with driving under the influence (“DUI”) and driving with a blood alcohol content greater than .08 percent (“DUI per se”). Because the trial court failed to consider the effect of a search warrant and because, at any rate, probable cause supported the defendant’s arrest, the trial court erred by granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Gregory Charles Dixon, appeals his Lawrence County Circuit Court jury conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the sentence imposed was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This property dispute involves adjacent commercial property owners. When defendants revealed their intent to erect a fence between the adjoining properties, plaintiffs sued under the theories of adverse possession, prescriptive easement, and implied easement to use a portion of defendants’ property for parking, trash removal, and receiving deliveries. After a bench trial, the trial court found that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing their asserted rights over the area in dispute. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s conclusions as to prescriptive easement and easement by implication only. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

This appeal involves a multi-count petition filed in chancery court by a prisoner after he was denied parole. The prisoner’s petition set forth five counts alleging various constitutional and civil rights violations in connection with the parole process, and he requested declaratory and injunctive relief related to these five counts. The sixth count in the petition sought review of the decision of the parole board pursuant to the common law writ of certiorari. The chancery court dismissed the five counts for declaratory and injunctive relief and certified its order of partial dismissal as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, leaving only the certiorari action pending. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its order as final and dismiss the appeal.

This case involves a challenge to an election commission’s decision not to set a special election to fill a vacancy in the office of district council. Appellant, a Davidson County resident and registered voter, appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellees’, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County and the Davidson County Election Commission, Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion on its finding that Appellant’s petition failed to aver facts sufficient to show a distinct and palpable injury to Appellant so as to establish his standing to challenge the election commission’s decision not to schedule a special election. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

An applicant for a nursing license filed a petition for a writ of certiorari regarding the decision of the Tennessee Board of Nursing to deny his license. The trial court ruled: (1) that the applicant was not entitled to a contested case prior to the denial of his initial nursing license; (2) that the Tennessee Board of Nursing correctly found that the applicant’s license could be denied due to his “fraud or deceit” in his efforts to procure his license; and (3) that the Tennessee Board of Nursing could not rely on an expunged conviction to establish the statutory ground of “guilty of a crime.” Both parties appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

An inmate of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed a claim against the State of Tennessee seeking to recover damages for personal injuries he sustained when he was attacked on August 23, 2013, by a fellow inmate. The Claims Commissioner found that the material facts were not disputed and there was no forewarning of the assault. Because the claimant provided no evidence showing that the attack was foreseeable, the Claims Commissioner concluded that the prison did not breach any duty to protect the claimant and summarily dismissed the claim. The claimant appealed. We affirm. 

Selvin Calderon (“Employee”) suffered a compensable injury to his spine when he fell from a two-story roof. The trial court found Mr. Calderon to be permanently and totally disabled and ordered Auto Owners Insurance Company (“Insurer”) to pay benefits and provide medical care for the injury. Seven months after entry of the judgment, Employee filed a “Motion to Compel Appropriate Medical Accommodations and Expenses and for an Award of Attorney’s Fees,” seeking to have Insurer pay the difference in rent between his present apartment and a wheelchair accessible residence and also for a bus pass to be used for daily activities unrelated to his disability. Insurer is willing and able to modify any apartment for wheelchair accessibility, and it provides transportation to Employee for his medical appointments. Insurer argued it is fulfilling its obligations under the workers’ compensation law. The trial court denied Employee’s motion, and he appealed. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case.

The majority concludes that the Policy exclusion for any vehicle “owned or operated by a self-insurer under any applicable motor vehicle law” is ambiguous. I disagree. As explained below, under the plain Policy language, the rental car driven by the Defendant was not an “uninsured motor vehicle” because it was owned by a “self-insurer” under Tennessee’s Financial Responsibility Act. For this reason, I would conclude that the Policy does not provide UM coverage to the Plaintiff in this case.

This case arises out of an incident in which the Defendant, Gregory Powers, drove a car he had rented from Enterprise Rent-A-Car (“Enterprise”) into the Plaintiff, Edward Martin. The Plaintiff sued the Defendant, the Defendant’s automobile liability insurer, and Enterprise. Additionally, the Plaintiff provided notice of the lawsuit to his own automobile liability insurance carrier, IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company (“IDS”), in order to recover through the uninsured motorist coverage provision of the Plaintiff’s policy (“the Policy”). IDS denied coverage and moved for summary judgment, arguing that the rental car (“the Rental Car”) did not qualify as an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the Policy. The trial court granted IDS’s motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted review to determine whether the Rental Car qualified as an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the Policy. We hold that the Rental Car was an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the Policy. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to IDS and remand this matter for further proceedings.  

This is an appeal of a trial court's award of alimony and valuation of marital assets. Husband appeals the trial court's decision to award a percentage of his bonus income as alimony as well as the trial court's valuation of stock allocated to Husband. Wife appeals the trial court's decision not to award her alimony in futuro. We affirm both the trial court's finding with respect to the value of the stock and its decision to not award alimony in futuro. However, we vacate the trial court's decision to award a percentage of Husband's bonus income as alimony and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Eddie Medlock, of two counts of aggravated rape and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping perpetrated during the brutal assault of his ex-girlfriend. On direct appeal, this court vacated one count of especially aggravated kidnapping but affirmed the other convictions and the Petitioner‘s sentence of one hundred and twenty years. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief on June 27, 2003, but the post-conviction court did not enter a final disposition until October 1, 2015, when it denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court erred in denying him funding for expert analysis during the post-conviction proceeding and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This appeal involves a mother’s petition to set child support. The father objected to the petition, citing a prior order in which the parties agreed that no child support would be ordered but that he would remit payment for medical insurance or medical expenses as needed. The trial court granted the petition, set a current support obligation, and awarded retroactive child support and attorney fees, finding that the prior order was void as against public policy. The father appeals. We reverse the award of retroactive child support, vacate the attorney’s fees awarded and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The trial court found that the Defendant, Demarcus Holman, was guilty of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, a Class C felony. The Defendant asserts that the conviction should be overturned on the basis of insufficient evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Harold Smith, of reckless aggravated assault, vandalism over $1,000, and attempted theft of property over $1,000. The Defendant received an effective sentence of twelve years as a career offender at sixty-five percent. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.