APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Amanda L. Irwin (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to driving under the influence and possession of an open container of an alcoholic beverage, reserving two certified questions of law challenging the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress.  On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the law enforcement officer lacked reasonable suspicion to ask her to step out of her car and perform field sobriety tests.  After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

William Reynolds (“the Petitioner”) was indicted for sale of cocaine in an amount less than .5 grams in a school zone, a Class B felony.  He entered a negotiated plea to sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to twelve years’ incarceration as a career offender with release eligibility after service of 60% of the sentence.  The Petitioner filed petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction which the habeas corpus court denied.  On appeal, the Petitioner claims that his judgment of conviction is void because the indictment was insufficient to support his plea to an increased amount of cocaine and that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.  After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A jury convicted the defendant on nine counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, one count of attempt to commit that offense, thirteen counts of observation without consent, and one count of attempt to commit that offense. The convictions arose out of the defendant’s hidden-camera videotaping of his twelve-year-old daughter and her teenage friend while they were in various stages of undress. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-two years. In a divided opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentence. In determining that the hidden-camera videos constituted prohibited child pornography under the child sexual exploitation statutes, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied in part on the six specific factors set forth in United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), sometimes referred to as the “Dost factors.” The defendant now appeals his nine convictions for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and he also challenges his sentence. We hold that, under the three child sexual exploitation statutes, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-17-1003, -1004, and -1005 (2014), the content of the prohibited material is judged by the same standard, regardless of whether the accused produced it, distributed it, or merely possessed it. In assessing whether material is prohibited under these statutes, we reject the use of the Dost factors as a “test” or an analytical framework. The material at issue must be evaluated based on what is depicted, without reference to the defendant’s subjective intent, because the Tennessee statutes on the production of child pornography do not include the accused’s subjective intent or purpose of experiencing sexual arousal or gratification as an element of the offense. Assessing the surreptitious videos taken by the defendant in the instant case, we conclude that the videos do not depict a minor engaged in “sexual activity,” defined by statute as the lascivious exhibition of a minor’s private body areas. For this reason, the videos are insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated child sexual exploitation. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss the defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. In light of this holding, we remand to the trial court for resentencing based on the convictions that were not challenged on appeal. On remand, the State may, if it so chooses, retry the defendant on the lesser-included offense of attempt.

Marcus T. Johnson (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to ten years of probation. The Defendant now appeals from the denial of his fourth Rule 36.1 motion. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Brian Gauldin, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court for Dyer County. He was convicted of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug free zone and the sale of cocaine under .5 grams in a drug free zone and received an effective sentence of twenty years' incarceration. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to (1) present current photos of the location where the drug sales occurred to demonstrate that it was a “vacant lot” rather than a city park; (2) present an expert witness to rebut the State's explanation of a change in drug amounts listed in its reports between his first and second trials; (3) advise him that he would be sentenced as a Range III, Persistent Offender; and (4) challenge the racial composition of the jury. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Luis Castanon, the Petitioner, appeals the summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.  Because the motion failed to state a colorable claim, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of the motion.

A jury convicted the defendant, Thomas L. Dowlen, of first degree (premeditated) murder. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict of guilt and that he is entitled to a new trial based on the prosecutor’s remarks during opening argument. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree with most of the conclusions set forth in the majority opinion.  I write separately, however, to respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Sergeant Sanderson qualified as an endangered third party, which elevated the evading arrest to a Class D felony.

This is Defendant’s, Javonta Marquis Perkins, direct appeal from his conviction of evading arrest, a Class D felony.  On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by giving a jury instruction on criminal responsibility.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Anthony L. Woods, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of driving on a revoked license and received an effective six-year sentence to be served on probation. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary. The post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Demarico Chalmers, of attempted aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of life plus five years. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions. State v. Demarico Chalmers, No. W2011-01274-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3601626, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 22, 2012), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to obtain gunshot residue testing. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner's petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Johnny Wilkerson, guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of twenty years for each conviction. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The Petitioner, Marcus Thomas, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and entered an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Maurice Brown, Sr., appeals from his convictions for two counts of felony murder, aggravated child abuse of a child under eight years old, aggravated child neglect of a child under eight years old, and resisting official detention, for which he received an effective sentence of life plus eighteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I write separately to express my opinion that the trial court erred in its attempted curative instruction to the jury during cross-examination of Defendant. As noted in the majority opinion in its analysis of the mistrial issue, the prosecutor asked Defendant, “And it’s true . . . that you never told any police officer that came to the scene any of this, right?” Defendant objected on the basis that the question violated his constitutional right to remain silent. The trial court sustained Defendant’s objection. However, in the trial court’s attempt to minimize damage caused by the prosecutor’s question, the instruction to the jury included that, “The defendant has a constitutional right against self-incrimination.”

Sedrick Darion Mitchell (“the Defendant”) was convicted offailure to appear after a jury trial.  The trial court sentenced him to serve six years at sixty percent release eligibility in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient and that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive and contrary to law.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

Stephen Gerard Smith, the Defendant, filed a pro se Motion for Reduction of Sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 in which he asked the trial court to either reduce his sentence or to grant a new sentencing hearing.  Because the Defendant was erroneously sentenced as a career offender rather than a persistent offender for Class C felony aggravated assault and because the sentence was entered as the result of an agreement between the State and the Defendant, the trial court granted a new sentencing hearing.  Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to thirteen years’ incarceration as a Range III persistent offender for Class C felony aggravated assault and to a consecutive sentence of twelve years’ incarceration as a career offender for Class D felony attempted aggravated assault.  The Defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the three domestic assault convictions to be served concurrently with each other and with the felony sentences.  The Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in allowing him to proceed pro se in the motion hearing and in the imposition of the sentences.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce action, the trial court granted the wife a divorce, divided the marital assets, and awarded her alimony in solido but denied her request for alimony in futuro. The wife appeals. We reverse and grant a divorce without fault to either party. We also modify the judgment to reflect an award of alimony in futuro in the amount of $2,000 per month.

After a bench trial, the trial court issued a written order finding the Defendant, Leroy Myers, Jr., not guilty of the charged offense, aggravated assault, but guilty of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon.  On appeal the Defendant asserts that reckless endangerment is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault under the facts of this case and that there was not an implicit amendment to the indictment to include reckless endangerment.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Jonathon Wayne Thompson, was convicted of theft of property valued over $500 but less than $1000. He received a sentence of one year and six months, with 90 days to serve in incarceration on consecutive weekends and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s decision to deny full probation. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bryant Jackson Harris, was convicted by a Hawkins County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), (2) (2014) (first degree murder), 39-14-402 (2014) (aggravated burglary). The Defendant received an effective life sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial, and (4) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case to the trial court for corrected judgments reflecting merger of the first degree felony murder conviction with the first degree premeditated murder conviction.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, Appellants appeal from separate orders denying two motions for recusal filed in this case. As to denial of the first motion for recusal, we hold that Appellants failed to file a timely appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. As to the denial of the second recusal motion, we hold that the recusal motion was ineffective because it was not signed by local counsel as required by Rule 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. In the absence of a timely filed appeal from an effective recusal motion, we dismiss this appeal.

The developer of a Nashville subdivision and its surety entered into three performance agreements by which they bound themselves to complete the infrastructure in the subdivision. The Metropolitan Government brought an action to enforce the agreements against both parties when the developer failed to complete the infrastructure. The surety filed an answer as well as a cross claim against the developer and a third-party complaint against a group of investors who had executed a separate agreement to indemnify the surety for any amounts the surety might pay or be held liable. After settling with the Metropolitan Government, the surety sought summary judgment against the developer and investors; the cross and third-party defendants also sought summary judgment asserting that, since the surety did not issue a separate bond, they had no obligation to indemnify the surety. The court granted summary judgment to the surety upon holding that the performance agreement operated as a bond and entitled the surety to indemnification. The developer and investors appeal the grant of the surety’s motion and the denial of their motion. We hold that the surety’s execution of the performance agreements operated as an “undertaking[] or other writing[] obligatory in nature of a bond” as contemplated by the indemnity agreement and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.