APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff brought an action to pierce the corporate veil of defendant company and hold its sole shareholder personally liable for a debt. The trial court conducted a bench trial on the issue and found in favor of the defendant company and shareholder. The trial court initially declined to issue findings of fact in its final judgment. After both parties submitted their own proposed findings of fact, the trial court adopted the defendants‘ version nearly verbatim, incorporating two additional findings of fact of its own. However, because we find the trial court‘s findings of fact and conclusions of law insufficient to facilitate appellate review, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Carl C. Dotson, was convicted of driving on a revoked license, eighth offense, and driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 55-50-504 and 55-10-401, respectively.  For these offenses, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served consecutively to an unrelated matter.  In this appeal as of right, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court erred by using a prior 1998 DUI conviction to enhance the instant DUI to a third offense and that the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI conviction.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Willis Holloway, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to 135 years, and this court affirmed the judgments against him on direct appeal. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, petitioner has abandoned his original claims for post-conviction relief and now argues that he should be granted a new trial because his trial counsel passed away prior to his post-conviction hearing. He also contends that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's assignment to hear the post-conviction proceeding. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a transfer from juvenile court, the Madison County Grand Jury indicted Abraham Medina, Jr. (“the Defendant”), along with five other co-defendants, with three counts of aggravated robbery and one count of evading arrest. The Defendant was tried separately from his co-defendants and convicted as charged. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective twelve years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant's convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to include a lesser included jury instruction as to facilitation; and (3) the trial court erroneously imposed the maximum sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Justin Terrell Knox, was convicted following a jury trial of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-506(c). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years as a Range II, multiple offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) that the State knowingly presented false testimony at trial; (3) that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from two of the witnesses at trial; (4) that the State failed to file a timely notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment; and (5) that the trial court erred by ordering his sentence in this case be served consecutively to his sentence for a prior felony conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Richardson, was indicted for one count of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402, -502. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the aggravated robbery charge, a mistrial was declared with respect to that charge, and it was ultimately dismissed. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-two years for the aggravated rape conviction to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred “in ruling that if consent [was] raised as a defense,” then evidence of two other rapes committed by the Defendant “would be relevant to rebut the issue of consent.” Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Brian Allen Cathey, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and one count of theft of property of $1000.00 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, in exchange for concurrent sentences of three and two years. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied an alternative sentence and ordered the defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying him an alternative sentence. Following our review of the briefs of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Aaron Dean Lawson, was convicted of two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to two life sentences and a consecutive two-year sentence. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by (1) disallowing expert proof of mental problems which were not such that they prevented his premeditating the murders; (2) admitting evidence of a jail telephone call which he made; (3) allowing proof of prior arrests, some of which resulted in his acquittal; (4) without a hearing, placing the Defendant in a stun-belt during the trial; (5) allowing evidence regarding pistol shells as proof of premeditation; and (6) excluding evidence of a prior consistent statement of the Defendant's father after he had been impeached with an allegedly inconsistent statement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Jennifer Lopez (“Defendant Lopez”) was convicted of one count of aggravated child neglect, and her ex-boyfriend, Sergio H. Gonzalez (“Defendant Gonzalez”) was convicted of two counts of aggravated child neglect in connection with severe abdominal injuries received by Defendant Lopez’s two-year-old son, N.L, in September 2011. On appeal, Defendant Gonzalez argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his September 27, 2011 interview with lead investigator, Detective Pilarski; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of N.L.’s bruises; (3) the trial court erred in preventing Defendant Gonzalez from impeaching Detective Pilarski with evidence from the detective’s personnel file; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (5) the trial court erred when it sentenced Defendant Gonzalez to twenty years for one of his aggravated child neglect convictions.  Defendant Lopez argues that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to strike “improper statements made by the State’s attorney in closing arguments”; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced her to seventeen years.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a divorce action in a marriage of a long duration. The trial court granted the parties a divorce and divided the marital property. The wife appeals the trial court’s classification of the parties’ separate property, the valuation of their pensions, and the division of the marital property. We affirm

Defendant, Darren Antonio Smith, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury with one count of aggravated burglary, one count of vandalism over $1000, and one count of theft of property under $500.  After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of criminal trespass and was convicted as charged of vandalism and theft.  On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.  Upon our thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Chad Richard Dietz, sought post-conviction relief on the basis of an involuntary guilty plea and ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  Because Petitioner has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his plea was involuntary, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Employee was terminated as a result of a verbal altercation with an employee of a contractor at his employer’s wellness center. He thereafter sought reconsideration of his three previous workers’ compensation claims. Employer asserted that Employee was not eligible for reconsideration because he was terminated for misconduct connected with his work. See Tenn. Code. Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(B)(iii)(b) (2014). The trial court found that Employer had not sustained its burden of proof that Employee’s misconduct was connected with his employment, determined that Employee was entitled to reconsideration, and awarded additional permanent disability benefits. Employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in its ruling concerning the termination, incorrectly excluded evidence of statements given by the contractor’s employee and erred by finding that Employee established that he was entitled to disability benefits above those he had already received. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

I concur with the majority's conclusion that the Appellant has presented a colorable claim as to case numbers 90-227, 90-161, and 90-935 and that those cases must be remanded for appointment of counsel and a hearing unless waived by the parties. I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the Appellant presented a colorable claim as to case number 86-521, and I would affirm the summary dismissal of the motion as to that case. I write separately to explain my opinion concerning each of the four cases and to express my opinion that a felony committed while a defendant is released on bail for a probation violation does not trigger mandatory consecutive sentencing, and that if following the hearing on remand, the trial court determines that the six-year, illegal concurrent sentence entered in 1990 has been fully served and has expired, then the promise of concurrence has been fulfilled, and the claim raised by the Rule 36.1 motion is moot.

The Appellant, George Prince Watkins, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion without a hearing. The State concedes that the trial court erred. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with Rule 36.1 and this opinion.

The Petitioner, James Lambert, appeals the McNairy County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape of a child, incest, and aggravated sexual battery, for which he is serving a twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Jerry Sandridge, appeals from the trial court's summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that his sentence of life without the possibility of parole for his aggravated robbery conviction is illegal and violates the 8th Amendment prohibition again cruel and unusual punishment. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Tony C. Woods, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis on December 17, 2013, seeking a new trial of the offenses for which he was convicted in 1989:  first degree murder, armed robbery, and possession of an illegal firearm, a sawed-off shotgun.  The petition for writ of error coram nobis alleges that he is entitled to relief because the forensic medical examiner who testified at his trial had his medical license revoked in 2005 due to “intentional misdeeds.”  The coram nobis court dismissed the petition because it was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations, and no due process concerns precluded application of the limitations period.  After a full review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Honey Bunch (“Plaintiff”) filed suit seeking partition by sale of a parcel of real property located in Anderson County, Tennessee. B.F. Bunch (“Defendant”) filed a counterclaim alleging, in pertinent part, that a quit claim deed of a portion of the property was void for lack of capacity, undue influence, or fraud, and that the property at issue should be partitioned in kind. After a trial, the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) found and held, inter alia, that the quit claim deed was valid and that the remaining property should be partitioned by sale. Defendant appeals raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding the quit claim deed valid, whether the Trial Court erred in finding that the property should be partitioned by sale, and whether the Trial Court erred in prohibiting Defendant from using a common driveway. We find and hold that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we find no error by the Trial Court. We affirm.

A former police officer with the City of Cleveland brought this retaliatory discharge action, alleging that he was fired for reporting his superior for the crime of official misconduct and official oppression. During the pendency of the retaliatory discharge action, the officer’s termination was upheld in the administrative appeal process. A panel of this court affirmed the administrative decision. Thereafter, the City of Cleveland moved for summary judgment in this action, arguing, in pertinent part, that the claim was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because the issues raised were addressed in the administrative appeal of the termination. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

Husband filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to set aside an agreed upon Final Decree of Divorce. He claims the agreed order was the result of a mutual mistake concerning one of his military benefits and that he lacked the mental capacity to understand the agreement. The parties married in 1989. Husband retired from the military in 2009 with 100% disability. Wife filed for divorce in 2012. Over the course of several months, the parties negotiated an agreement as to the division of all of their marital property. The agreement was announced in court in August 2013, at which time both spouses were called to testify concerning their understanding and approval of the agreement. The final divorce decree was subsequently approved by the trial court and entered in January 2014. Pursuant to the final decree, Husband received the entirety of his Veterans Affairs disability benefits, and Wife received one-half of Husband’s other retirement benefit. Husband subsequently filed a Rule 60.02 Motion to Set Aside Marital Agreement for Lack of Capacity and Mistake. He contended that the parties mistakenly believed that his military retirement benefit was marital property when, as a matter of law, the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act prohibits the courts from treating a disability benefit as marital property. He also contended that he lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the nature of the hearing in which he agreed to the division of marital property due to the pain and stress related to his disease, as well as his medication. The trial court denied relief on both grounds. We affirm. The trial court acted within its discretion by denying Rule 60 relief on the finding that Husband failed to present sufficient proof to obtain relief on the ground of mental incapacity. Furthermore, a mistake of law is not a ground for Rule 60.02 relief and the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied relief on this ground and enforced the parties’ agreement.

Viewing the defendant's motion in the light most favorable to the movant, as we are obliged to do, see State v. David Morrow, No. W2014-00338-CCA-R3-CO, slip op. at 3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Aug. 13, 2014); see also Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 2(H), we should accede to the State's concession that a fair reading of the claim indicates that it bespeaks an illegal sentence.

Defendant, Michael C. Bigbee, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the motion.

The defendant, Theodore Lebron Johnson, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury regarding the loss or destruction of evidence.  We discern no flaw in the conviction and affirm the trial court’s judgment.