APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following the apparent denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, the Petitioner, John Ivory, filed a pro se motion to reconsider the denial of relief, which the post-conviction court denied without a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider the denial of post-conviction relief. Because the Petitioner does not have an appeal as of right from the denial of such motion, we dismiss the appeal.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in an action on a homeowner’s insurance policy. The home of the insured party was damaged by a fire on May 29, 2011. The insured submitted proof of loss to the insurer pursuant to her homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurer requested additional information from the insured to complete the proof of loss, which the insured provided. The insurer subsequently denied coverage. The insured party filed suit against insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that the insured party’s claims were barred by the one-year contractual limitations period. We reverse.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Andrew Hall, was found guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUI). He had been charged in the same indictment with violation of the implied consent law, and the trial court found him guilty of that offense in a bench trial. Prior to the jury trial, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges because no lawful prosecution was initiated within the applicable statute of limitations. After a hearing, the motion was denied. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Owner of back-to-back billboards filed a petition for review challenging the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) to revoke his billboard permits on the ground that the billboards were not in compliance with the TDOT spacing requirements. We find substantial and material evidence to support the decision of the TDOT Commissioner and, therefore, affirm the chancellor’s decision. 

The defendant, Seddrick Curry, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony; and one count of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to serve an effective sentence of thirty years at 60%. Subsequently, he filed a motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty, which was denied following a hearing. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the pleas. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the motion.

The petitioner, Adrianne Kiser, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, he asserts that: (1) the post-conviction court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating trial counsel's performance and the resulting prejudice, and (2) if the post-conviction court applied the correct standard, then the court's interpretation of that standard renders Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-106(e) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13 section 5(a)(2) unconstitutional as applied to him. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Carl Brown, sought relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to vacate and correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence, the judgments in question not stating whether they were to be served concurrently or consecutively. The trial court concluded the motion was without merit, and, following our review, we affirm the court’s order denying the motion for relief, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Scott L. Bishop (“the Defendant”) with four counts of aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged, and the trial court ordered concurrent sentences for an effective sentence of eleven years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the trial court failed to act as a thirteenth juror; (3) the trial court should have granted the Defendant a new trial based on newly discovered alibi and impeachment evidence; (4) the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the prosecutor to ask leading questions during the direct examination of the nine-year-old victim; (6) a juror's sleeping during the jury instructions requires a new trial; (7) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive; and (8) cumulative error necessitates granting a new trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Frederick L. Moore (“the Petitioner”) filed his second petition for writ of error coram nobis, presenting “newly discovered evidence” in the form of expert testimony regarding cell phone towers accessed by the Petitioner's cell phone at the time of the offense. The coram nobis court denied relief without a hearing, finding that the Petitioner's claim was time-barred, that the evidence was not newly discovered, and that it was not the type of evidence which might have produced a different result at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

A jury convicted the defendant, Dennis Haughton Webber, of driving with a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor; disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor; failure to display his registration plates, a Class C misdemeanor; and failure to carry a registration, a Class C misdemeanor.  The defendant on appeal challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court.  We interpret his other issues to be challenges to the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.  We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to impose its judgments on the defendant.  However, we reverse the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct because the evidence was not sufficient to support it as it was charged in the indictment.  We affirm the remaining judgments of the trial court.

This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff alleges he slipped and fell in a leaf-filled gutter maintained by defendant. Plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, alleging that the defendant failed to properly maintain and warn pedestrians of a dangerous condition. Because the trial court granted defendant summary judgment without making findings of fact or stating the legal basis for its decision before instructing defendant to prepare an order, we vacate the trial court’s order of summary judgment and remand.

The petitioner, Frederick Alexander Avery, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel.  Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Defendant, Shasta Jackson, appeals after being convicted by a Knox County jury of two counts of reckless endangerment, one count of second degree murder, one count of attempted second degree murder, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this appeal, Defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court's refusal to allow an expert witness testify about eyewitness identification; (3) introduction of evidence relating to Defendant's membership in the “Westside 111 Neighborhood Crips”; (4) introduction of pictures from Defendant's Facebook page; (5) the decision by the trial court to strike the testimony of a defense witness after he refused to answer a question on cross-examination; and (6) the length of her sentence. After a review of the record, we determine that Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Ray Neil Thompson, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Davidson County.  He was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery and later entered a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of evading arrest.  For these offenses, he received an effective sentence of fifty years at 100 percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Shelby Lesean Harris, was indicted for one count of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine and one count of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417.  Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and facilitation of the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403.  The trial court merged the Defendant’s conviction for facilitation of the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine into his conviction for facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine.  The trial court then sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years and six months.  On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the in-court identification of the Defendant by two confidential informants; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted permission to appeal to address whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is required in this lawsuit brought by a hospital against a TennCare managed care organization (MCO). The hospital alleged in its complaint that the MCO had not paid the hospital all of the monies due for emergency services provided to the MCO’s TennCare enrollees. In its answer, the MCO asserted that it had paid the hospital in accordance with TennCare regulations; the MCO also filed a counterclaim regarding overpayments made pursuant to the TennCare regulations. The MCO filed a motion for partial summary judgment. It argued that the hospital’s allegations implicitly challenged the applicability and/or validity of the TennCare regulations, so the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) required the hospital to exhaust its administrative remedies by bringing those issues to TennCare prior to filing suit. Absent exhaustion of administrative remedies, the MCO argued, the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The trial court agreed; it dismissed the hospital’s lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the MCO’s counterclaim as well. The Court of Appeals reversed; it concluded that the hospital’s lawsuit was simply a dispute regarding the interpretation of statutes and regulations, over which the trial court had jurisdiction. The MCO appeals. Looking at the substance of the parties’ dispute rather than simply the face of the hospital’s complaint, we hold that the UAPA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies in this matter to the extent that resolution of the parties’ claims would necessarily require the trial court to render a declaratory judgment concerning the validity or applicability of TennCare regulations. While the UAPA prohibits the trial court from rendering such declaratory relief absent exhaustion of administrative remedies, it does not address claims for damages. In this case, both parties have asserted damage claims that hinge on the issues to be addressed in the administrative proceedings. Under these circumstances, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint and the counterclaim and remand the case to the trial court with directions to hold the parties’ damage claims in abeyance pending resolution of administrative proceedings regarding the validity or applicability of the TennCare regulations at issue.   

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Roy Seagraves, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant.  He properly reserved a certified question of law for appeal.  The question of law is dispositive of the case.  Having reviewed the record in this case, we hold that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charges with prejudice.

Given the clear and apparently controlling case law concerning convictions enhanced pursuant to the Drug Free School Zone Act (the Act), I must reluctantly concur. However, I write separately to set forth my ever increasing concern regarding enhancement of convictions under the Act.

Defendant, Jordan Thomas Peters, was convicted of one count of delivery of psilocin, a Schedule I controlled substance, and one count of delivery of psilocin within 1000 feet of a school. Defendant received a total effective sentence of fifteen years to serve at 100%. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether a retrial for delivery of a controlled substance violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy after Defendant was originally acquitted of sale of a controlled substance; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel discovery of the case names and files of other cases in which the confidential informant had been involved; (3) whether the trial court erred by giving acquittal-first jury instructions, precluding the jury from considering the inference of casual exchange; (4) whether the trial court erred in not giving a specific instruction with regard to the defense of entrapment by luring into a school zone; (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (6) whether his sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime committed and therefore unconstitutional. Upon our thorough review of the arguments, record, and authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant appeals the trial court‘s order enforcing a settlement agreement, arguing that the agreement was the product of coercion on the part of her attorney. We affirm.

This is an appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission involving a contract dispute. The Claims Commissioner concluded that the Appellants were not entitled to damages other than for services rendered because their services contract with the State was terminated for cause. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from an action for divorce wherein the trial court ordered the parties’ marital debt to be divided in a nearly equal fashion. The trial court awarded child support to the wife, who was designated primary residential parent and who received a greater share of co-parenting time with the children. The court also awarded child support retroactive to the date of the filing of the divorce complaint. In addition, the court allocated both federal tax exemptions for the children to the wife. The husband has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment with a slight modification in the amount of the child support arrearage award.

Appellant TennCare enrollee has been receiving 24/7 care from a private duty nurse in the home of his grandparents in Martin, Tennessee. TennCare determined that he could receive adequate care for less cost in a special respiratory care unit in St. Francis Hospital in Memphis. Enrollee, through his grandparents as his co-conservators, filed an administrative appeal. The administrative law judge agreed with TennCare. Appellants appealed that decision to chancery court, which reversed the administrative law judge’s decision as being arbitrary and capricious. TennCare appealed. We reverse the decision of the chancery court and affirm the administrative law judge’s opinion.