APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Ronnie Bradfield, appeals the trial court's denial of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following our review, we affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The issue in this health care informed consent case is whether the trial court erred by limiting the testimony of plaintiff patient’s expert witness regarding the risks that the defendant doctor was required to disclose to obtain the patient’s informed consent for surgery.  The doctor performed a spinal fusion on the patient.  His back pain initially improved, but subsequently worsened.  The patient sued the doctor, claiming his back pain was caused by nerve compression due to ectopic bone growth at the site of the fusion.  The patient alleged that the doctor failed to give him adequate information to enable him to give an informed consent to the surgery.  In a pretrial deposition, the patient’s expert testified that to obtain informed consent, the doctor was required to advise the patient that he would use a bone-grafting protein and inform the patient about all the potential risks arising from its use, including risks that allegedly caused harm and risks that did not cause harm.  The trial court granted the doctor’s motion to limit the patient’s expert witness testimony to only those risks that allegedly materialized and injured the patient.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the doctor.  In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the expert medical testimony.  We hold that the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony regarding undisclosed medical risks that had not materialized.  Because this error, more probably than not, influenced the jury’s verdict, the patient is awarded a new trial.  

A developer submitted a final site plan for a mixed-use development in the Green Hills area of Nashville for approval to the Metropolitan Nashville Planning Department; the plan was approved first by the Department’s Executive Director and later by the Metropolitan Planning Commission. A neighborhood association composed of residents in the area, as well as an individual Green Hills resident, filed a petition for certiorari review of the Commission’s approval of the final site plan. Upon review of the administrative record and following a hearing, the trial court affirmed the decision and dismissed the writ with prejudice; Petitioners appeal. We concur with the trial court and affirm the decision of the Commission.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jessica Green, entered guilty pleas to one count of theft of property less than $1,000 and one count of forgery under $1,000, both Class E felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103; 39-14-114. The trial court denied judicial diversion and imposed one-year concurrent sentences for each offense, which were suspended to probation. In this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her request for judicial diversion. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Myron Tate, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to advise him regarding the sufficiency of his indictment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Timothy Lewayne Morton, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Sumner County Criminal Court convictions of disorderly conduct, public intoxication, repetitive telephone harrassment, and solicitation to bribe a witness.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Robert W. Roddy, was convicted of two counts of first degree (premeditated) murder and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He received a sentence of two life terms and an additional four years, all to be served consecutively. In his post-conviction petition, the petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony regarding his behavior after he was transported from the scene of the crime. The post-conviction court found that trial counsel did not perform deficiently. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted Nicos Broadnax and Aaron Cook of aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered Defendant Broadnax, as a Range I standard offender, to serve eleven years, and ordered Defendant Cook, as a multiple offender, to serve nineteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Broadnax asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Defendant Cook also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence but additionally asserts that: (1) the trial court improperly declined to strike the jury venire following notice that the jury pool was tainted by comments from observers at the trial; (2) the prosecutor's misstatement of facts during closing argument unfairly prejudiced him; and (3) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The Petitioner, Wilmarcus H. Martin, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his guilty-pleaded conviction for cocaine possession with intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a park. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, leading to an involuntary plea, because trial counsel told him incorrectly that his release eligibility would be changed from 100% to 85% by the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) once he began serving his sentence, and because trial counsel failed to reserve a challenge to the search as a part of the guilty plea. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Sharon Donella Phillips, appeals her Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of reckless endangerment and aggravated arson, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on the arson conviction and the length of her sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

At issue in this appeal are several divorce and post-divorce matters. We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues related to the divorce litigation, as they were not timely appealed. With respect to the post-divorce matters, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over Mother’s petition to modify the parties’ parenting schedule, that the evidence does not preponderate against its decision to modify the parenting schedule, and that it did not err in its refusal to find Father in civil contempt. Exercising our discretion, we decline to award Mother discretionary costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-122 or attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c).

The trial court determined that it did not have authority to assess discretionary costs against the State in an eminent domain proceeding. It accordingly denied Defendants’ motion for discretionary costs under Rule 54.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and determined that it did not have jurisdiction to make findings with respect to the reasonableness and necessity of Defendants’ costs. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-17-912 does not authorize an assessment of costs against the State in an eminent domain proceeding other than those costs that are explicitly permitted by the section.

I agree that in this case, there are three separate state actions to consider when determining whether the evidence seized, as a result of the warrantless search of the defendant's residence, should have been suppressed. First, the investigators entered the defendant's property to conduct a “follow-up investigation,” without a search warrant, despite the defendant's “no trespassing” signs. Second, after smelling methamphetamine, Investigator Chunn forcibly entered the defendant's residence and conducted a brief sweep, during which he saw the firearms and some of the components for making methamphetamine, but did not see the active nor inactive labs. Third, after the defendant told officers that the lab was in the freezer, the investigators re-entered the defendant's residence and collected the active lab from the refrigerator and the inactive lab from the deep freezer. I believe the majority has correctly analyzed actions two and three. My disagreement with the majority only relates to the State's first action. My review of the record leads me to conclude that this defendant had clearly revoked any implied consent for the officers to come upon his property without a search warrant. Without lawfully being upon the premises, the second and third actions are void and the fruit of the poisonous tree.

The defendant, Jeremiah Thomas Sullivan, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to one count of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor involving one to twenty-four images, a Class C felony; eight counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor involving twenty-five or more images, a Class B felony; one count of sexual exploitation of a minor involving 100 or more images, a Class B felony; and two counts of solicitation of a minor, a Class B felony.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court used a combination of concurrent and consecutive sentencing to sentence him to an effective term of twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by not merging the multiple convictions for aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor involving twenty-five or more images into a single offense and by imposing an excessive sentence.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Termel Dowdy, pled guilty to introduction of contraband into a penal institution, a Class C felony, and DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, in exchange for a ten-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in confinement, which he now appeals.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The decedent in this estate action made inter vivos transfers of all his real and personal property to the defendant, who was the decedent's friend and caretaker. Following the decedent's death, his brother was appointed as administrator of the decedent's estate. The decedent's brother filed the instant action, questioning whether the transfers of property by the decedent were the result of undue influence by the defendant. The trial court determined that there existed no confidential relationship between the decedent and the defendant. The court ultimately found that no undue influence had been shown. The decedent's brother appeals that determination. He also appeals the trial court's ruling regarding an evidentiary matter and motions seeking the trial judge's recusal. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.

This is a breach of contract action concerning a construction project. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's failure to provide access to the job site hampered its ability to complete the project in an efficient manner. The defendant responded that the plaintiff waived the failure to provide access to the site and that the plaintiff was the first to breach the contract by failing to provide a construction schedule. Following a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court as modified to reflect an adjustment in the award of discretionary costs.

The petitioner, Undray Luellen, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Travis Lamonte Steed, was convicted by a Madison County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder; second degree murder, a Class A felony; felony reckless endangerment, a Class E felony; convicted felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony; and attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. The court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, violent offender to concurrent sentences of life for the felony murder conviction and twenty-five years for the second degree murder conviction. The court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years for the attempted second degree murder conviction and four years each for the felon in possession of a handgun and felony reckless endangerment convictions. The court ordered that the defendant serve the four-year sentences for felony reckless endangerment and felon in possession of a handgun concurrently to each other but consecutively to the twenty-year sentence for attempted second degree murder. The court also ordered that the defendant serve the twenty-year sentence for attempted second degree murder consecutively to the life sentence, for a total effective sentence of life plus twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his murder and attempted murder convictions; (2) whether the jury's verdicts finding him guilty of first degree felony murder and attempted second degree murder are mutually exclusive; and (3) whether the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments to reflect that the defendant's second degree murder conviction is merged into his felony murder conviction.

Appellant, James Robert Christensen, Jr., stands convicted of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony; initiation of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class B felony; and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class D felonies. He received an effective sentence of three years‟ incarceration followed by eight years suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following our careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the remodeling of a 1940’s era block and frame house. The agreement was based on a written estimate that described the work in very general terms. The issues on appeal are whether the contractor was liable for negligent construction of several areas of the work and, if so, the amount of damages. After a bench trial, the trial court found that there was barely a meeting of the minds, but, to the extent there was a contract, the contractor was to build a bedroom addition, a garage addition, and a sunroom; the contractor was to additionally replace the porches and repair the roof. Placing significant weight on the contractor’s testimony, the trial court found that the homeowner failed to carry his burden of proof on all claims but for the negligent construction of the sunroom ceiling and roof for which the trial court awarded $12,950 in damages. Both parties appeal. The homeowner contends the trial court erred in failing to find the contractor liable for negligent construction of other areas of the work and in failing to award damages commensurate with the cost of repair. The contractor contends the court erred in finding him liable for any negligent construction and in the calculation of damages awarded the homeowner. Finding the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the contractor was liable for negligent construction of the sunroom ceiling and roof and the award of damages in the amount of $12,950, we affirm that award. As for the claim the contractor was negligent in failing to install roof ventilation, the trial court made no findings regarding this claim, and, following a de novo review, we have determined the contractor was negligent and thus liable for failing to install the ventilation, and we award an additional $2,500 in damages. As for all other claims, we affirm. 

In this juvenile court proceeding, Father objects to a number of decisions made by the trial court concerning the parenting plan for the parties' child. We have determined that the trial court erred in its determinations regarding parenting time and child support. As to the latter, the trial court failed to consider Father's argument that Mother was underemployed, abused its discretion in its treatment of Mother's work-related child care expenses, and failed to properly calculate Father's income. We find no merit in any of the other issues raised by Father.

Petitioner, Jerry Rommell Gray, was convicted in Knox County of felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery. Trial counsel filed a premature notice of appeal and an untimely motion for new trial. On direct appeal, this Court reviewed Petitioner’s issues, other than sufficiency of the evidence, for plain error. State v. Jerry Rommell Gray, No. E2010-00637-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2870264, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2012). Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he sought a delayed appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically alleging that trial counsel’s failure to file a timely motion for new trial was presumptively prejudicial. The post-conviction court determined Petitioner was entitled to a delayed appeal but instructed Petitioner that he was not permitted to file an additional motion for new trial. Petitioner appealed to this Court, and we determined that the petition was untimely, reversed the decision of the post-conviction court, and remanded the matter for a hearing on whether due process should toll the statute of limitations. See Jerry Rommell Gray v. State, No. E2014-00849-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 6876184, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2014), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2015). Petitioner filed an application for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11. The supreme court granted the application in light of the timeliness of the petition for post-conviction relief and remanded the case to this Court to consider whether the post-conviction court should have allowed Petitioner to file a second motion for a new trial when it granted him a delayed appeal. We determine the trial court improperly prohibited Petitioner from filing a motion for new trial upon grant of the delayed appeal. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed and remanded. On remand, Petitioner is entitled to file a motion for new trial, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-113(a)(3).