APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Bedford County Jury convicted Defendant, William Jason Harris, of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, and Defendant pled guilty to failure to appear. He received consecutive sentences of twelve years for promotion of methamphetamine manufacture and six years for failure to appear to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach his mother’s testimony with Defendant’s prior convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of Defendant’s past use and manufacture of methamphetamine to rebut Defendant’s assertion that he was coerced and threatened into committing the offense of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture; (3) that the trial court improperly allowed the State to admit the “pseudoephedrine log” which contained Defendant’s past attempts to purchase pseudoephedrine; (4) the trial court did not fulfill its role as thirteenth juror, by allowing the jury’s verdict to stand; and (5) the trial court erroneously denied Defendant’s request for a sentence of community corrections. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant, Marcus Smartt, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies, and one count of solicitation of a minor to engage in aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony.  The trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years’ imprisonment for each aggravated sexual battery conviction, to be served consecutively, and to five years for the solicitation conviction, to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of twenty years.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motions for a mistrial and the trial court’s decision to admit evidence that he asserts is inadmissible propensity evidence.  He also alleges prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument.  After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not commit error on the grounds presented, and we affirm the defendant’s convictions for aggravated sexual battery. However, we conclude that the solicitation conviction must merge into one of the aggravated sexual battery convictions, and we remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The appellant, Derek Gene Clark, pled guilty in the Sevier County Circuit Court to aggravated domestic assault, a Class C felony; theft of property valued more than $1,000, a Class D felony; coercion of a witness, a Class D felony; and retaliation for past action, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences except that the appellant was to serve the sentences for the aggravated domestic assault and theft convictions concurrently. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective ten-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that concurrent sentencing for his aggravated domestic assault and theft convictions is illegal because he was on bail for the theft when he committed the aggravated domestic assault, that the lengths and manner of service of his sentences are excessive, and that the trial court erred by ordering that the serve the sentences for coercion of a witness and retailiation for past action consecutively to the other two sentences. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the appellant's convictions and sentences but remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the statutory ground of wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. Father appealed. We reverse because when Father engaged in the conduct at issue, in fact, Father did not know of his parentage. A father cannot exercise wanton disregard for the welfare of a child if he does not know the child exists.

The trial court denied the defendant doctor’s motion to dismiss this medical malpractice action on the ground that the plaintiff had substantially complied with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122, despite the fact that her certificate of good faith did not contain a statement that the executing party had no prior violations of the good faith certificate requirement. This Court granted an interlocutory appeal. While this appeal was pending, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued its Opinion in Davis v. Ibach, No. W2013-02514-SC-R11-CV, --- S.W.3d ---, 2015 WL 3451613 (Tenn. May 29, 2015), ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122 does not require a party executing a certificate of good faith to note the absence of any prior violations of the good faith certificate requirement. Based on Davis, we conclude that plaintiff’s certificate of good faith was fully compliant with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122. Accordingly, although we rely on different grounds, we affirm the trial court’s ruling denying the defendant doctor’s motion to dismiss.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s petition for a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief. Although Appellant was represented by counsel at oral argument, she filed her initial appellate brief and reply brief to this Court pro se. Significant procedural shortcomings in Appellant’s brief prevent this Court from reaching the merits of the appeal. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a certiorari review action where the trial court upheld the Knoxville City Council's ruling in favor of the respondents. The Knoxville City Council found that a proposed expansion project involving the construction of a crematory for incinerating human bodies was permitted as an accessory use for the existing funeral home. The trial court found that the Knoxville City Council had not exceeded its jurisdiction, followed an unlawful procedure, acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, or acted without material evidence to support its decision. The petitioners appeal. We affirm.

The defendant, James Gordon Freeman, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence.  Discerning no error, we affirm the summary dismissal of his motion.

The defendant, Roy Allen Smith, was convicted after a jury trial of simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of a Schedule III controlled substance with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, a Class D felony; maintaining a dwelling used for keeping or selling controlled substances, a Class D felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant received an effective twelve-year sentence, which was ordered to be served consecutively to the sentences of six prior convictions for which the defendant had been on probation at the time that the instant offenses were committed. On appeal, the defendant contends that the City of LaVergne did not have jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute the offenses because the crimes occurred outside the city limits. He also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the order to serve his sentence consecutively to his prior convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

Defendant, Donald Joseph Powell, was convicted at a bench trial of attempted aggravated burglary.  On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior aggravated burglaries committed by Defendant and that the testimony of his co-defendant was not sufficiently corroborated to sustain a verdict of guilt.  Upon thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This matter concerns the circuit court’s resolution of the appellant’s appeal from Chattanooga’s City Court of two violations of the municipal code. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal decision.

Plaintiff who purchased a used automobile sued the dealership for damages asserting various statutory and common law causes of action arising out of the sale, financing, repossession and subsequent resale of the automobile. Following a trial in which the jury found in Plaintiff’s favor on a claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and on several common law claims, Plaintiff moved the court for an award of attorney’s fees; the court awarded $10,000.00 of the requested $72,909.00 sought. Plaintiff appeals. Because the trial court did not state the factual or legal basis for the award of fees, this court cannot properly perform its review function; accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for reconsideration and entry of an order setting forth the factual and legal basis of the award.

The Defendant, John Edward Lewis, was convicted of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony.  On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the value of the damaged property for the purposes of the grade of the offense and restitution.  Upon review, we find that the evidence was insufficient to establish the value of the property damaged.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and modify the Defendant’s conviction to vandalism of property valued at less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor.  The case is remanded for a hearing to determine the sentence and the amount of restitution.

In January 2012, a jury convicted Windie L. Perry (“the Defendant”) of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated child abuse, facilitation of rape of a child, aggravated assault, two counts of false imprisonment, and six counts of reckless endangerment. For these offenses, the trial court imposed an effective 20-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to her convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, facilitation of rape of a child, and aggravated assault. Following review of the record and relevant authority, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, because aggravated assault is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated child abuse as charged in the indictment under Tennessee Code Annotated, section 39-15-402(a)(3), and we remand for a new trial on that count. The Defendant’s remaining convictions are affirmed.

Abbas Nejat (“the Petitioner”) challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to include the transcript of the Petitioner’s Rule 404(b) hearing in the record on direct appeal.  Upon review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner’s challenge to admission of evidence about his membership in the Kurdish Pride Gang under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) is without merit.  Accordingly, the Petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficiency.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this appeal, we are asked to overrule established precedent regarding the circumstances under which an arbitration provision in an adhesive consumer contract is rendered unconscionable and unenforceable based on non-mutual remedies, i.e., mandating arbitration for the consumer but reserving a judicial forum for the merchant. This case involves an adhesion contract for the sale of a manufactured home. The contract includes an arbitration provision under which the sellers retain the right to seek relief in a judicial forum for limited purposes. After the buyer took possession of the home, he filed a lawsuit against the sellers for breach of contract, and the sellers filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to compel. In reliance on this Court’s decision in Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. 2004), the trial court held that the non-mutuality of remedies in the arbitration provision rendered it unconscionable and invalid. The Court of Appeals affirmed, also relying on Taylor. We granted permission to appeal to address whether the ruling in Taylor is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act under the reasoning in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), and to address whether Taylor should be overruled or modified in light of the current majority view in other jurisdictions on the validity of arbitration contracts that include non-mutual remedies. We hold that Taylor did not adopt a per se rule that any degree of non-mutuality of remedies in an arbitration provision in an adhesion contract renders the provision unconscionable and unenforceable. Consequently, the ruling in Taylor is not preempted by federal law. In addition, after reviewing the law in other jurisdictions, we decline to overrule or modify the ruling in Taylor. Applying Taylor to the contract in this case, we conclude that the sellers’ retention of a judicial forum for limited purposes does not render the arbitration agreement unconscionable. Accordingly, we reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Deaundra Donnell Smith, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial based upon the State’s alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; and (3) the trial court erred when it failed to admit into evidence a text message sent from one of his co-defendants to the other co-defendant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against an individual and an insurance company. This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside a final judgment of dismissal for failure to prosecute in favor of the individual defendant. Summary judgment was granted to the defendant insurance company, and the order was certified as final. In addition, the trial court denied a motion to amend the complaint to add allegations against a different insurance company. Approximately one year later, a trial occurred against the individual defendant; plaintiff failed to appear. The trial court subsequently granted the individual defendant an involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute. More than thirty days later, plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the final judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and plaintiff appealed. Because plaintiff’s claims against the defendant insurance companies became final prior to the filing of the notice of appeal, we have no jurisdiction to consider any alleged errors relative to them. Accordingly, plaintiff’s appeal against the insurance companies at issue is dismissed. We affirm the trial court’s ruling denying plaintiff’s motion to set aside the final judgment of dismissal.

The Petitioner, Jason Christopher Underwood, appeals as of right from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on initial counsel’s failure to “provide adequate protections” for the Petitioner during his February 25, 2005 interview with the assistant district attorney general, pre-trial counsel’s failure to pursue a motion to suppress statements from the aforementioned interview, and trial counsel’s failure to object to admission of the February 25 statements at trial. The Petitioner also requests that we revisit our holding on direct appeal that the trial court’s denial of his request for a deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) expert was not error.  Following our review, we conclude that the Petitioner’s first issue is without merit, and his second and third issues have been waived because he raises them for the first time in this appeal.  Also, we decline to revisit our earlier holding that the trial court did not err when it denied the Petitioner’s motion requesting additional funds for a DNA expert.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Jason Lyles, was convicted by a Maury County jury of two counts of facilitation of sale of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in an amount of 0.5 grams or more in a drug-free zone, a Class C felony; one count of sale of cocaine in an amount of 0.5 grams or more in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony; and one count of sale of cocaine in an amount of 0.5 grams or more, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of three years, three years, and eight years (at 100% release eligibility) and a consecutive sentence of ten years, suspended to probation, respectively. In his motion for new trial and in this appeal, appellant presents one issue: whether the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple causal exchange. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Wise, pleaded guilty to sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-527 (2014). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to three years' confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court abused its discretion by denying him alternative sentencing and that a presumption of reasonableness should not apply to its findings. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s modification of the parties’ parenting plan and designation of Father as the Primary Residential Parent. We affirm. 

The appellant, James E. Kenner, filed in the Davidson County Criminal Court a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The motion was summarily denied, and the appellant appealed this ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Mark A. Crites, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class C felony.  On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, and that the trial court erred in restricting cross-examination of the victim.  After reviewing the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Matthew Alton King (“the Defendant”) entered guilty pleas in case number CR087458 and CR087459 with the length of sentence and manner of service to be determined by the trial court.  After the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sixteen years’ incarceration.  On appeal, the Defendant challenges both the length of his sentences and the denial of alternative sentencing.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.