APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Kenneth L. Williams, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery with a sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed, pro se, a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court issued an order denying the motion and dismissing the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his guilty plea was not knowingly entered and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgments.

Appellant, Orlando E. Bourrage, pleaded guilty to simple possession of marijuana and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended to probation.  In pleading guilty, he reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of an allegedly illegal detention.  On appeal, he argues that the arresting officer unreasonably prolonged the initial traffic stop and that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Borla Performance Industries, Inc. (Borla) entered into two contracts with Universal Tool and Engineering, Inc. (UTE), by the terms of which UTE was to repair and refurbish six of Borla's pipe bending machines, which machines are used in Borla's business of designing and manufacturing automobile exhaust systems. Borla later sued UTE for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Borla alleged that as a result of UTE's failure to timely repair and deliver the machines, which are also known as “benders,” Borla incurred lost profits in the amount of $486,166. After a four-day bench trial, the court dismissed Borla's negligent misrepresentation and TCPA claims; the court did grant Borla a judgment for $11,839.98 on its breach of contract claim. The trial court held that Borla failed to prove that it incurred lost profits as a result of a breach of contract by UTE. Borla appeals the trial court's judgment denying its claims for lost profits. Borla also appeals the court's judgment dismissing the TCPA claim. UTE appeals the judgment against it for breach of contract. We affirm.

Dontavis K.W. (“Defendant”) appeals the order of the Criminal Court for Hamilton County (“the Criminal Court”) committing him to the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) for an indefinite term based upon findings of delinquency and violation of probation. We find and hold that pursuant to Tenn. R. Juv. P. 35 and Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-131(a)(4) and 37-1-137(a)(1)(A) the Criminal Court did not err in the probation revocation proceeding when it ordered a disposition which would have been permissible in the original delinquency proceeding. We, therefore, affirm.

In this divorce case, Robert Allan Inman, Jr. (Husband) appeals the trial court's decision awarding Glenna Randolph Inman (Wife) alimony in futuro of $1,900 per month. We hold that the court's decision is supported by a number of relevant statutory factors, including the twenty-nine year duration of the marriage, Wife's age, sixty-three at the time of trial, her poor physical condition, Husband's good physical condition, his higher earning capacity, Wife's demonstrated need, and Husband's ability to pay. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a termination of parental rights proceeding. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Ashley L. (“Mother”) and Aaron B. (“Father”) to their minor child Autumn L. (“the Child”) in the Juvenile Court for Claiborne County (“the Juvenile Court”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child on a number of grounds. Mother and Father appeal to this Court. In addition to challenging the termination of their parental rights to the Child, Mother and Father argue that the case should be remanded to the Juvenile Court because the Juvenile Court did not enter an order within 30 days of the hearing as required by statute. We hold, inter alia, that remand is not an appropriate remedy for this noncompliance with statute and would serve no purpose. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in all respects.

An employee of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (“Goodyear”) fell while at work and suffered injuries; pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-101, et seq., she began receiving medical treatment. She subsequently relocated to Minnesota and made a request to Goodyear that she be provided a second panel of physicians in order to continue her treatment; Goodyear denied the request. At the employee’s request a workers’ compensation specialist from the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development ordered Goodyear to provide a second panel of physicians. Goodyear requested and received an administrative review of the specialist’s order; the Department affirmed the order. Thereafter, Goodyear filed a petition for writ of certiorari in Chancery Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101 asserting that the Department exceeded its authority by ordering Goodyear to provide a second panel of physicians and a physician outside of Tennessee. The Department moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the court denied the motion and considered the merits of the petition. The court held that the Department did not exceed its authority in ordering the panel of physicians; Goodyear appeals. The Department of Labor also appeals the holding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to review its decision. Concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse the judgment of the court and dismiss the petition.  

Wife appeals the trial court’s division of property and award of transitional alimony in this divorce action. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further findings and proceedings, consistent with this Opinion.

The Defendant, Cheyne R. Stewart, was convicted by a Franklin County Circuit Court jury of criminal attempt to commit sexual battery, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-505(a)(3) (2014) (sexual battery), 39-12-101 (2014) (attempt). The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days of probation. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the court erred by failing to provide his requested jury instructions, (3) the court erred by limiting defense counsel’s questioning of character witnesses, (4) the court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense, and (5) the court erred by failing to fulfill its duties as the thirteenth juror. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, John E. Carter, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated because, at the time of his trial, he was not given “fair warning” that the negation of an element of a criminal offense was recognized as a defense in this state. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Travis Heath King, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence.  Because the defendant stated a colorable claim for relief under the terms of Rule 36.1, the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Billy Jack Cook, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Sumner County Criminal Court, alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Kevin Lee Johnson, appeals as of right from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief for two separate convictions: (1) a 2012 conviction for driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”) and (2) a 2013 conviction for failure to appear.  Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the Petitioner’s claim regarding his 2012 MVHO conviction for having been untimely filed.  However, we reverse the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the Petitioner’s claim regarding his 2013 failure to appear conviction because the Petitioner stated a colorable claim for relief and remand the case to the post-conviction court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Gordon Herman Braden, III, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant, who pleaded guilty to a single count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), appeals a certified question of law related to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the results of blood alcohol testing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Antonio Crenshaw, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of the charged offense of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years. On appeal, Crenshaw argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the generic offense of theft of property rather than the offense of shoplifting, by providing an incomplete charge for theft of property, and by giving a confusing definition for the term “violence” in the robbery charge in response to a question from the jury; (3) he was deprived of due process and a fair trial when the trial court corrected defense counsel during and after his closing argument, when the trial court ruled against him on a Rule 404(b) issue, and when a witness later testified, over his objection, that employees informed her Crenshaw had been “stealing again” after the incident in this case; and (4) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his case because the grand jury foreperson on the grand jury indicting him possibly served longer than her two-year term. Upon review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Defendant-Appellants, Gerald Stephen Cassell and Brian James Beckwith, were jointly convicted by a Hardin County jury of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-402. The trial court ordered each Defendant to serve twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, consecutive to their unserved sentences in Florida. In this consolidated appeal, the Defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress a witness's pretrial and trial identifications of them, the evidence is insufficient to sustain their aggravated robbery conviction, and the trial court erred in sentencing them. In addition, Cassell argues that the trial court erred in admitting witness testimony regarding the contents of a WalMart surveillance video. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the applicability of an arbitration agreement. The plaintiffs purchased decking product manufactured by the defendant. The product was covered by a limited warranty, which included an arbitration agreement. The limited warranty was never provided to the plaintiffs. Instead, a notice was attached to the product, advising them to retrieve a copy of the limited warranty through the defendant's website. Following installation of the product, the plaintiffs experienced problems with the product. The defendant advised the plaintiffs that the issue was merely cosmetic. The plaintiffs filed suit. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss or to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the parties had not entered into an agreement to arbitrate disputes. The defendant appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Brandon Mobley, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel allowed a stun belt to be placed on the Petitioner without a hearing or any evidence from the State that use of the stun belt served a legimate necessity. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that wearing the stun belt forced him to testify against his will, affected his demeanor while testifying, impeded his ability to communicate with trial counsel, and “imparied his ability to take an active interest in the presentation of his case.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns three notes executed by the defendants and made payable to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff filed suit, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations for recovery on the notes had passed. The trial court denied the motion for the summary judgment. Following a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the defendants were estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a defense and that they had revived the obligation after the limtiations period ran. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

Appellant, Robert R. Bishop, pleaded guilty to simple possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended to probation.  Subsequently, the general sessions court found that appellant violated his probation.  He appealed the general sessions court’s judgment to criminal court.  After a hearing, the criminal court also found that appellant had violated his probation.  He now appeals to this court, arguing that his due process rights were violated when the probation office disposed of potentially exculpatory evidence and that the minimum due process requirements for probation revocation proceedings were not met.  Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

This appeal involves claims asserted by a beneficiary of various trusts against numerous defendants, including the beneficiary’s sister and her husband, who serve as the trustee and co-trustee of some of the trusts. Among other things, the beneficiary alleged that the defendant-trustees breached their fiduciary duties by failing to pay the beneficiary all distributions to which he was entitled. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that they had followed the terms of the trusts and paid the beneficiary all distributions to which he was entitled pursuant to the trust documents. In response to the motion for partial summary judgment, the beneficiary asserted that the trust documents were void because he executed them due to undue influence. In a previous appeal, this Court reversed the entry of partial summary judgment on the issue of undue influence, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed. The parties engaged in additional discovery on remand, and after lengthy proceedings and numerous evidentiary and other rulings, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant-trustees and denied a motion for partial summary judgment filed by the beneficiary. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees and discretionary costs to the defendants. The beneficiary appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to support, substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. The trial court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm.

The appellant, Joe Clark Mitchell, filed in the Maury County Circuit Court a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  The motion was summarily denied, and the appellant timely appealed the ruling.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff filed the instant action on September 28, 2012, alleging claims against the defendant of breach of contract, misrepresentation, negligent construction, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Despite several attempts, the plaintiff was unable to obtain personal service of process upon the defendant. The plaintiff subsequently served process upon the defendant via registered mail pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04, but that mailing was returned “unclaimed.” The plaintiff filed a return of service, indicating that service had been properly completed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(11). The trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the defendant had been properly served with process. The defendant in turn moved to set aside the default judgment, and the trial court denied that motion. The defendant has appealed. We affirm the trial court's finding that the defendant was properly served with process. However, we determine that the default judgment was improperly entered in violation of the express language contained in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(10). We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings.