APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court awarded Wife a judgment in the amount of $28,000 for back alimony and ordered Husband to honor his obligations, under the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, with respect to life insurance and disability insurance. Husband appeals. We affirm and remand the case for further proceedings as are necessary and consistent with this Opinion.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee alleged that he sustained bilateral thoracic outlet syndrome, bilateral shoulder injuries and a herniated disc in his neck as a result of his work and that he was permanently and totally disabled by those injuries. His employer denied that the neck injury was work-related and denied that he was totally disabled. The trial court found that the neck injury was not compensable and awarded 80% permanent partial disability for the other injuries. On appeal, the employee contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding concerning the neck injury, and the employer contends that the award was excessive. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

The mother of the parties’ only child contends the trial court erred in changing the designation of the primary residential parent from Mother to Father and in limiting her parenting time to 100 days a year. She also contends the court erred in failing to award her retroactive child support. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent and the parenting schedule. As for Mother’s claim for retroactive child support and reasonable medical expenses for the birth of the child, she asserted these claims in her counter-petition; however, when Father attempted to introduce documentary evidence of support he had provided to Mother and child, Mother’s counsel objected to the relevancy of the evidence, informing the trial judge that Father “made those payments” and that back child support was not an issue. Based on Mother’s representations, the court ruled that evidence of Father’s payments of back child support was not relevant, and no evidence was introduced to show that support had been provided or that any support was owed. While we acknowledge prior cases which stand for the general rule that parents may not waive or circumvent their minor child’s right to support, State ex rel. Dauda v. Harris, No. W2006-01314-COA-R3-JV, 2007 WL 906746 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2007), we cannot allow a litigant to proceed on a claim she affirmatively abandoned during trial. Moreover, because she deprived the trial court of the opportunity to rule on the issue at trial, we will not permit Mother to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

The Petitioner, Brannon Blake Black, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of relief from his conviction for rape, a Class B felony. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a dispute between unmarried parents regarding a parenting schedule for their young son. Following a hearing before a juvenile court magistrate, an order was entered providing that the parents would have joint custody, with the designation of primary residential parent alternating each year. Mother requested a rehearing before the juvenile court judge. Several months later, the matter was reheard before another magistrate, who was appointed by the juvenile court judge to hear the matter as substitute judge. The magistrate sitting as substitute judge entered an order naming Mother primary residential parent and limiting Father to only supervised visitation. Father was ordered to pay all of Mother‟s attorney's fees. Due to the lack of written findings, we vacate the final order and remand for further proceedings.

The notice of appeal was not timely filed. Therefore, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

An attorney was summarily punished for direct criminal contempt. The attorney appeals, alleging numerous procedural errors and claiming that his actions did not rise to the level of contemptuous behavior. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s parental rights. When the child was four months old, he was placed in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services’ for lack of supervision and drug exposure. A permanency plan was created shortly thereafter, but less than one year later, the Department petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Following a trial, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment for failure to support; (2) abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; and (3) persistent conditions. Mother appeals the juvenile court’s determination on all three statutory grounds, the court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest, and several other court rulings. We affirm.

I concur fully with the Court’s opinion except for Section III(E), which reaffirms the proportionality review performed in Mr. Hall’s original direct appeal. Because I believe this Court used an improper method for analyzing the proportionality of Mr. Hall’s death sentence, I have conducted an independent proportionality review. Upon doing so, I concur with the Court’s conclusion that Mr. Hall’s death sentence is not disproportionate to the sentences imposed on other similar offenders who have committed similar crimes.

The defendant was convicted on two counts of felony murder in the perpetration of a first degree burglary, three counts of grand larceny, one count of petit larceny, and three counts of first degree burglary. The jury imposed a sentence of death for the murder of one victim and a life sentence for the murder of the second victim. The trial court ordered an aggregate sentence of eighty years for the remaining crimes, to be served consecutively to the life sentence. The direct appeal was decided adversely to the defendant. On post-conviction review, this Court granted the defendant a delayed appeal and remanded to the trial court based upon the lack of meaningful representation during the original direct appeal. The trial court denied relief, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant, Kenneth Moses, was charged by presentment for one count of rape of a child and one count of incest. A  jury found Defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to consecutive sentences of 25 years for rape of a child and six years for incest. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering his sentences to run consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a product liability action arising from a workplace injury to the plaintiff, Danny Long. Mr. Long’s left arm was severely injured on October 30, 2002, when a reducing mechanism attached to a ball valve he was using suddenly broke, causing a release of pressurized air and water onto his left arm and shoulder. Following lengthy medical treatment and multiple surgeries, Mr. Long’s left arm was amputated. On October 30, 2003, Mr. Long and his wife filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, negligence in the design, manufacture, assembly, distribution, and sale of the ball valve, as well as failure to warn of potential danger to users of the ball valve and failure to include with the ball valve adequate safety information relative to its use. The Longs named four companies as defendants allegedly responsible for the design, manufacture, assembly, distribution, and sale of the ball valve. Mr. Long’s employer was subsequently joined as an intervening plaintiff. Through the course of the proceedings, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of two of the defendant companies on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction. These defendants are not parties to this appeal. Mr. Long died on December 22, 2006, and Ms. Long thereafter by substitution assumed his interest in this action. In May 2010, the trial court granted Ms. Long and the intervening plaintiff permission to amend the complaint to reassert a strict liability claim against the two remaining defendant companies based upon the sole theory of failure to warn. In May 2013, the two remaining defendants subsequently filed separate motions for summary judgment. Finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed that could establish strict liability based upon failure to warn, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both remaining defendants. Ms. Long and the employer appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Billy Ray Allen, was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of facilitation of possession with the intent to sell or to deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a) 4) (2010) (amended 2012, 2014) (possession with intent to sell and to deliver); 39-11-403(a) (2014) (facilitation). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to six years’ confinement. In this delayed appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Doyle Haney, appeals the Cocke County Circuit Court’s denial of his two petitions for post-conviction relief. In case number 3457, the Defendant was convicted of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine and received a thirty-year sentence. In case number 4924, he was convicted of delivering 0.5 grams or more of cocaine and received a thirty-year sentence. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying post-conviction relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Derrick Richardson, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his two motions to reopen his post-conviction proceedings relative to his first degree felony murder conviction and resulting life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his motions. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing an appeal from the denial of a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings.

A former student at National College of Business and Technology, Inc. (“National College”) sued the school and its director for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act following the cancellation of her enrollment due to the fact her student file did not contain an official copy of her high school transcript or the equivalency certificate as required by the Tennessee Higher Education Commission. Plaintiff’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act were dismissed pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Thereafter, Defendants moved to summarily dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claim for breach of contract. The trial court found that Defendants negated two essential elements of Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, namely, breach and damages, and summarily dismissed that claim. We affirm.

In 2006, the Petitioner, Christopher M. Black, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of two counts of aggravated rape and two counts of aggravated robbery, for which the Petitioner received an effective sentence of 50 years in the Department of Correction.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence.Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied following a hearing.  On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to hire a DNA expert to analyze the evidence against the Petitioner.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Levar O. Williams, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Following our review of the briefs of the parties, the record, and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the petitioner failed to file a timely notice of appeal and that the “interest of justice” does not warrant waiver of the timely notice requirement. As a result, we dismiss his appeal.

In January 2005, David Muangkhot (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of sale of a Schedule I controlled substance and one count of possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with the intent to sell.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court imposed concurrent, 10-year sentences and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement.  Following the completion of a boot camp program, the Defendant was released and placed on supervised probation for the remainder of his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-206.  In April 2014, the trial court issued a violation of probation warrant and, following a hearing, revoked the Defendant’s probation and imposed the Defendant’s original sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The substantive issue in this case is whether the decedent was a domiciliary of Tennessee or Texas at the time of her death. Because Appellant was not an original party and did not file a motion to intervene in this case, we dismiss this appeal for lack of standing and remand the case for further proceedings as are necessary and consistent with this Opinion.

The Defendant-Appellant, James Pennock, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of three counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to establish the Defendant's identity as the person who committed the offenses; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding eyewitness identification testimony; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing the co-defendant, Nora Gibson, to testify without proper notice provided to the Defendant. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pro se petitioner, Thomas Edward Kotewa, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief by the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that the habeas corpus court erred in denying his petition because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept his plea of guilty. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant, the City of Waynesboro. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on May 5, 2006, alleging that acts and/or omissions of the City caused injury to them on May 6, 2003, when a creek near their home flooded and damaged their property. The City moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that the material facts were not in dispute and that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was time-barred by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act’s statute of limitations. Moreover, the trial court found that the City was immune from liability for the claims. Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. After thoroughly reviewing the record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves a custody dispute between two parents and a non-parent intervener. Father originally filed a petition against Mother requesting a change of custody, but the couple reconciled and began living together while the litigation was pending. Thereafter, the maternal grandmother intervened, seeking custody of the child. The trial court found that Father presented a substantial risk of harm to the child based on his prior and current criminal history but granted Mother custody of the child. On appeal, Grandmother argues the court erred in not finding that Mother also presented a risk of substantial harm to the child because Mother lived with Father. We affirm the trial court.

This case involves the termination of a biological father’s parental rights to a young child. The trial court granted the mother and step-father’s petition to terminate the father’s rights and to allow the step-father to adopt the child. Father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. The evidence is clear and convincing that (1) the father abandoned the child by failing to visit and failing to support her for four months preceding the filing of the petition and (2) it is in the child’s best interest that the father’s parental rights be terminated.