APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from the denial of a petition to establish a lost will. Following a bench trial in which the opportunity and motive of key witnesses to destroy the original will were at issue, the trial court failed to “find the facts specially” as mandated by Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The only findings of fact made by the trial court read: “The evidence in the case was relatively undisputed so this court will not reiterate a lot of the facts. The dispute between the parties is over how the evidence is to be interpreted.” Whether or not the evidence was “relatively undisputed” is debatable; nevertheless, we have concluded thatconflictinginferencescan be drawn from undisputed evidence concerning the dispositive issue, that being whether persons who had access to the original will had the motivation to destroy the original will. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the trial court to make findings, even on stipulated or undisputed facts. See Lovelace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 35 (Tenn. 2013). Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact to afford this court a clear understanding of the basis of its decision, and realizing that the credibility of two key witnesses who may have had the opportunity and motive to destroy the original will was at issue at trial, we are unable to conduct an effective de novo review. Under these circumstances, we would generally remand a case such as this to afford the trial court the opportunity to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter judgment accordingly; however, the judge who tried this case retired in August of 2014. Therefore, we have no choice but to vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial.

On November 19, 2012, Eastman Credit Union (“Eastman”) filed suit against Chadwick D. Hodges (“Hodges”) seeking recovery for indebtedness owed by Hodges pursuant to two separate credit agreements. Eastman’s complaint noted that it had declared all amounts owed under the agreements to be due and payable and prayed that a judgment be entered in its favor for all monetary advances made under the agreements.

The defendant, Rhakim Martin, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of carjacking, a Class B felony, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to an effective term of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) his conviction for employing a firearm during a dangerous felony violates the terms of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c) and the prohibitions against double jeopardy; (2) the failure to name the predicate felony in the indictment for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony voids the conviction; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s identification of him; (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (5) the trial court committed plain error by failing to charge the jury on possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as a lesserincluded offense of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Norman McDowell, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated rape, Class A felonies; and aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony. The trial court merged appellant’s aggravated rape convictions and sentenced appellant to an effective twenty-two-year sentence. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his aggravated rape and aggravated robbery convictions. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reduce one of appellant’s merged aggravated rape convictions to rape, affirm the trial court’s judgments as modified, and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

Defendant, Kerry Randall Meadows, entered a guilty plea to driving while being an habitual motor vehicle offender pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement and properly reserved a certified question of law for appeal.  The precise issue, as reserved, is “[w]hether reasonable suspicion or probable caused existed to stop and seize [Defendant’s] vehicle based on incorrect information contained in the police database?”  After thorough review we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Marisa Ann Shrum, appeals the sentencing decision of the trial court following the revocation of her probationary sentence. The defendant pled guilty to two counts of prescription drug fraud and one count of failure to appear. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received an effective sentence of five years, with sixty days to be served in confinement, sixty days to be served on consecutive weekends, and the balance on supervised probation. A violation report was subsequently filed and, following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered that the balance of the sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant does not contest the revocation of her probation, but she argues that the trial court erred in ordering total confinement. Following review of the record, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the decision of the trial court.

Defendant, Bradley Douglas Parker, was indicted by the Hickman County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated child neglect, also a Class A felony.  Both charges involved the same incident and victim.  Subsequently, the State announced that it was unable to prove serious bodily injury of the victim and moved the trial court to dismiss the count of aggravated child abuse and to amend the count charging aggravated child neglect to charge the Class D felony offense of child neglect of a child less than eight years of age.  Immediately, Defendant pled guilty to the Class D felony offense of child neglect.  The parties agreed Defendant would be sentenced as a Range I standard offender, with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court following a sentencing hearing.  The trial court imposed a sentence of three years to be served by split confinement comprised of thirty days’ incarceration in the county jail followed by three years’ probation.  Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court should have granted judicial diversion or in the alternative imposed a three-year sentence totally suspended to be served on probation.  After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Latonya Shanta Bowman, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s order revoking her probation and ordering that she serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking her probation “without considering alternative sentencing options.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a will contest. Appellants, Bill Morris, Jr., and Cheryl Morris, appeal the trial court‟s determination that their Father‟s will was properly executed pursuant  to the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 32-1-104.  We conclude that the witnesses to the will only signed the affidavit of attesting witnesses and  not the will itself.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

The Defendant, Jay Herman Sanders, appeals from the trial court’s denial of an alternative sentence and order to pay $250,000 in restitution.  He argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to 10 years in the Department of Correction and claims that the trial court failed to consider his future ability to pay restitution.  After a review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On June 29, 2011, the petitioner entered guilty pleas to several offenses, including one count of the possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine, a Class A felony, and two counts of money laundering, Class B felonies.  The petitioner received an effective twenty-year sentence for these crimes.  The petitioner’s total effective sentence was forty-one years, twenty-one of which were for crimes not at issue in this appeal.  The petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition, challenging his convictions for possession of over 300 grams of cocaine and two counts of money laundering on the basis that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to investigate these cases and that his trial counsel was operating under a conflict of interest when he represented the petitioner in the pleas.  The post-conviction court denied relief.  Because we conclude that trial counsel did not have an actual conflict of interest, that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, that there was no showing of prejudice, and that the pleas were knowing and voluntary, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Ashley Bradshaw, was convicted by a jury of three counts of aggravated child abuse, three counts of aggravated child neglect, and three counts of aggravated child endangerment. The trial court merged the convictions into one count of aggravated child abuse and sentenced appellant to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for the trial court to clarify on the judgment sheets that the judgments have been merged into the first count.

I concur in the excellent opinion presented by the majority. I write separately to express a view concerning the effectuation of mergers of verdicts. The theory of merger in cases in which multiple verdicts of guilty reflect alternative theories of offending is predicated upon the distinction between a verdict of guilty, on the one hand, and a conviction, on the other.

The defendant, Derick D. Armstrong, was convicted of one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony, and one count of employment of a firearm during the attempted commission of a felony, a Class C felony. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. After thoroughly reviewing the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether an Assistant City Attorney of the City of Memphis was an agent properly authorized to settle a dispute with a former employee. The former employee sued the City to enforce a settlement agreement he purportedly reached with the Assistant City Attorney for an amount in excess of $500.00. His complaint alleged that although he was never informed that the agreement was contingent on the Mayor’s approval, the Mayor subsequently rejected the agreement, and the City, based on the Mayor’s rejection, refused to honor it. The Memphis City Charter provides that the City Attorney has independent authority to settle claims against the City for amounts less than $500.00, but settlements for amounts exceeding $500.00 must be entered “by and with the approval of the Mayor.” After a period of discovery, the City filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the former employee’s evidence was insufficient to establish that the Assistant City Attorney acted with authority to bind the City to the settlement agreement. The former employee opposed the City’s motion and filed his own motion for summary judgment, in which he argued that evidence established the Mayor either actually or apparently authorized the Assistant City Attorney to enter the settlement agreement. The trial court granted the former employee’s motion for summary judgment after finding that the Assistant City Attorney acted with apparent authority to enter the settlement agreement. On appeal, we find that the record does not contain evidence sufficient to establish that the Assistant City Attorney acted with either actual or implied authority to bind the City. In light of our findings, we reverse the trial court and hold that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the City.

After entering a conditional guilty plea to robbery pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313, Ephraim J. Nielsen (“the defendant”) was arrested on charges of burglary, vandalism over $1,000, and theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $10,000. Based upon the new charges, his probation officer filed a probation violation warrant against him. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that his probation should not have been revoked because the State did not offer proof of every element of the new charges against him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer for sexual discrimination, employer retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, retention and supervision practices, and workers’ compensation retaliation. The parties entered into an agreement which settled Plaintiff’s claims; pursuant to the terms of the agreement,the parties submitted an agreed order dismissing the case which was entered by the court. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the order of dismissal, and her former employer filed a motion to enforce the settlement. After a hearing on the motions, the court entered an order dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff filed a motion for relief, which the court denied. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Deshawn Mahon Mancill, was convicted by a jury in the Knox County Criminal Court of possession of heroin with the intent to sell or deliver. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joshua Edward Kilgore, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his conviction for violating the sex offender registry requirements and ordering his four-year sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Ray Jobe, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure: (1) to communicate the amount of restitution that was included as a part of his guilty plea; (2) to file a motion to vacate his plea; and (3) to effectively communicate with him. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Tyler Young, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered him to serve an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and attempted aggravated robbery and argues that the trial court erred in its sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jared Booth Spang (“the Defendant”) was indicted for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault.  The Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide.  Pursuant to a written plea agreement signed by the Defendant and the State, the State agreed it would take no position at the sentencing hearing as to whether the sentence would be deferred pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313.  At the sentencing hearing, the State argued against deferral, stating that “a permanent conviction is necessary [so as] not to depreciate the seriousness of this crime.”  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years probation and denied deferral, concluding “there is something permanent about death” and “there should be something permanent about . . . this conviction.”  We conclude that the State breached the plea agreement.  We, therefore, reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The defendant, Monterious Bell, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated burglary, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Lemario Hill, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. On appeal, he contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure (1) to present a jury nullification defense or any other defense strategy, (2) to promptly investigate his case, and (3) to adequately communicate with him regarding his defense. Upon review, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

A Marshall County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Christopher Lee Blunkall, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of testimony regarding the reaction of the victim’s family while the victim was missing, and the length of the sentence imposed. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.