APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Robert E. Odle, was convicted of aggravated arson and sentenced to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, he claims that he proved by clear and convincing evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense and that, therefore, this court should reverse his conviction.  Following our careful review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Shayne Thomas Hudson, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to three years, suspended to supervised probation.  He appeals his conviction on two grounds: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior conviction for theft; and (2) sufficiency of the convicting evidence.  Following our careful review of the parties’ briefs, the applicable legal authority, and the record as a whole, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Renita Elaine McDonald, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000.  As a result, the trial court sentenced her to eight years as a Range II, multiple offender, and denied all forms of alternative sentencing.  After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals, challenging the trial court’s decision to exclude testimony on the basis that it constituted hearsay, the sufficiency of the evidence as to the value of the property taken, and the denial of alternative sentencing.  After our full review, we determine: (1) that the trial court did not err in allowing nontestimonial statements offered by a security officer from another officer while in pursuit of a shoplifter; (2) that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of theft of property valued at  $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 where the testimony of the store’s loss prevention supervisor regarding identity and value was accredited by the jury; and (3) that the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing was appropriate.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, and sentenced to concurrent nine-year sentences for a robbery of a couple that took place outside a laundromat. The indictment charged the defendant with having accomplished the crimes with a deadly weapon or through the display of an article used or fashioned to lead the victims to reasonably believe it was a deadly weapon. The trial court correctly instructed the jury orally regarding the elements of aggravated robbery in both counts. However, the written jury instructions for Count 2 omitted the element that the defendant used a deadly weapon and instead instructed the jury to consider whether the victim suffered serious bodily injury. The defendant appeals, challenging both the sufficiency of the evidence and the incorrect instructions under plain error. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdicts and that the error in charging the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury necessarily found that the defendant used a deadly weapon when it convicted the defendant in Count 1. We accordingly affirm the convictions.

This divorce action follows a thirty-three year marriage. Plaintiff Husband appeals the trial court’s property division, award of alimony in futuro to Wife, and award of attorney’s fees to Wife. We affirm.

The petitioner, Shawn Hatcher, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not putting on expert proof to support his defense theory of diminished capacity and that the post-conviction court erred by relying on Denton v. State and Black v. State to deny his petition on the basis that he failed to present the expert witness’ proposed trial testimony at the evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The employee alleged that he sustained a compensable back injury when a stool on which he was sitting collapsed, causing him to fall to the ground. His treating physician opined that he sustained permanent impairment as a result of the incident. Two evaluating doctors opined that his symptoms were related to a prior motor vehicle accident. The employee had not informed the treating physician of the prior motor vehicle accident nor of his prior history of back pain. The trial court found that he did not suffer a compensable injury. The employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Derrick Garrin, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which petition challenged his 1994 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of felony murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder on grounds that his sentence was imposed in contravention of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this appeal pursuant to Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant, Christopher Brian Darnell, appeals two certified questions of law that arose from the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained via wiretapping:  (1) whether the State provided the defendant with timely and adequate notice that his cellular telephone communications had been intercepted by law enforcement officers and (2) whether the State failed to show the required necessity in its application to monitor the defendant’s telephone communications.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marcus Puckett, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and DUI per se. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401. The trial court merged the two charges, and the Defendant was sentenced to eleven months twenty-nine days, with all but seven days suspended, to be followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant makes the following arguments: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of his blood-alcohol level based on an illegal search and seizure; (2) that the trial court erred in concluding that the State met its burden in proving compliance with State v. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412 (1992), and thus, should not have allowed the testing officer to testify regarding the results of his breath-alcohol test; and (3) that his constitutional rights were violated because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing pursuant to Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999), following his decision not to testify at trial. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress based on an illegal search and seizure. We further hold that the trial court improperly concluded that the State complied with the Sensing requirements, and we therefore reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Finally, although we conclude that the trial court’s failure to conduct a Momon hearing was plain error, we hold that such error does not necessitate further action from the trial court at this time because we have ordered a new trial on other grounds.

Appellant, Rudy Vincent Dunn, entered a plea without a recommended sentence to one count of possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony.  Following a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to serve one year and ninety days in confinement.  In this appeal, appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for alternative sentencing.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, William Eugene McGinnis, II, entered guilty pleas to two counts of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive eight-year sentences for each count.  Subsequently, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which was denied by the trial court.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because his pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily and because he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the pleas.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, David Richardson, was convicted as charged by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury in case number 11-07432 of first degree premeditated murder and in case number 11-02623 of twelve counts of attempted first degree murder (counts 1-12), twelve counts of aggravated assault (counts 14-25), one count of employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony (count 27), and one count of reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon (count 30). The trial court sentenced Richardson to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction. It also sentenced Richardson to eighteen years at thirty percent release eligibility for each of the attempted first degree murder convictions, five years at thirty percent release eligibility for each of the aggravated assault convictions, six years at one hundred percent release eligibility for the employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony conviction, and two years at thirty percent release eligibility for the felony reckless endangerment conviction. The court ordered the sentences for the attempted first degree murder convictions served consecutively to one another, consecutively to the sentence of life imprisonment, and consecutively to the sentences in counts 27 and 30 but concurrently with the sentences in counts 14 through 25, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus 224 years. On appeal, Richardson argues: (1) the trial court’s response to two questions from a juror during trial invaded the province of the jury and improperly commented on the evidence; (2) the trial court committed plain error by informing the jury venire that the State was not seeking the death penalty or a sentence of life imprisonment without parole; (3) the trial court committed plain error in instructing the jury that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to support a conviction; (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the first degree premeditated murder conviction, the attempted first degree murder convictions, and the aggravated assault convictions in counts 16, 17, 18 and 20 through 25; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing partially consecutive sentences resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment plus 224 years. Upon review, we affirm Richardson’s convictions but remand the cause to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. This hearing is limited to consideration of the factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995), to determine the propriety of consecutive sentencing in this case.

Defendant, Wayne Sellers, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated rape. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged in the indictment. As a result, he was sentenced to twenty-three years as a Range I, standard offender and ordered to serve 100% of the sentence as an aggravated rapist. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of photographs of the victim’s genitalia at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court did not err in admitting the photographs. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Ronald Shipley, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that illegality in his sentence for his conviction of rape of a child renders the judgment void. Discerning no error, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant, Russell Brown, was convicted by a Bradley County jury of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated arson for which he received concurrent sentences of life with the possibility of parole and 20 years, respectively. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in refusing to give a self-defense jury instruction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a parental rights termination appeal brought by the mother. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds for termination and clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, William R. Holt, was convicted of second degree murder and aggravated robbery upon his “best interest” guilty pleas.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2014), 39-13-402 (2014).  As part of the plea agreement, he accepted a thirty-year sentence at 100% service for second degree murder and a concurrent twelve-year sentence at 100% service for aggravated robbery.  Almost two years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct errors in the judgments relative to his offender classification.  The trial court summarily dismissed the motion.  On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Ladell Walker, of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to nine months in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Richard Lowell Blanchard, II, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from nine misdemeanor convictions spread across four separate indictments for which he received four consecutive sentences of 11 months 29 days. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, David Andrew Oliver, of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his confession to police and by limiting his cross-examination of the victim about her prior inconsistent statements. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jarvis Taylor, was convicted of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery in Shelby County. His convictions and effective life sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See Jarvis Taylor v. State, W2005-01966-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2242096, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct 30, 2006). In January 2014, over seven years after Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on appeal, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely. Petitioner appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. We determine that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing where there were no grounds upon which to toll the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Demond Hughlett, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain a determination from a medical expert or the court regarding his competency to stand trial and in failing to inform him of his right to file a motion to reduce his sentence or to appeal his sentence. The Petitioner also argues that counsel’s errors rendered his guilty plea involuntary and unknowing. Upon review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant-Appellant, Silio Hilerio-Alfaro, was convicted as charged by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, one count of possession of .5 grams of more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court merged the delivery count with the sale count and imposed an effective sentence of eleven years. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and vacate the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions.

The Petitioner, Marty Joe Kelley, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for five counts of rape of a child, three counts of aggravated sexual battery, nine counts of rape without consent, eighteen counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and two counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor and resulting effective sentence of thirty-six years to be served at 100%.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.